

1 May 1917 in Iași

By Whom, How, and Why Was Dr. Cr. Rakowsky Released

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ON 13/26 April 1917, the Petrograd newspaper *Izvestiya* published an appeal of “comrade Rakowsky,” “a well-known Romanian socialist,” detained “on the day Romania entered the war,” to Prime Minister Ion I.C. Brătianu, who was expected to visit the Russian capital. The editorial commentary indicated that Cr. Rakowsky had begun his socialist activity in Russia, during the years when he was studying at the University of Odessa. In 1905, he had returned to Romania, where he relaunched the Romanian Socialist Party. It was mentioned that Rakowsky had rendered many invaluable services to the “Russian comrades”: he helped some rebellious sailors from the battleship *Potemkin*, refugees in Constanța in 1905, to leave the country, he contributed to the transportation of banned literature to Russia, and he supported with money the activity of some clandestine publishing houses. During the peasant uprising of 1907, Rakowsky was expelled from Romania, obtaining the right to return to the country in 1910. At the time of his arrest, as mentioned, he was working tirelessly within the Romanian Socialist Party and the international socialist movement, without interrupting the ties with the Russian socialists, to whom he continued to render various services. From the beginning of the world war, as reported, Rakowsky made efforts for its conclusion as soon as possible, speaking out against Romania’s entry into the great conflagration. “On the day of Romania’s entry into the war,” the editorial comment stated at the end, “he was arrested after a large anti-militarist rally and is suffering in detention in the most unbearable conditions ever. His family members are being killed, his wealth plundered.”¹

In his appeal to Brătianu, Rakowsky complained that six months had passed since he had been arrested, in accordance with a Government decision and without a court sentence, deprived of the possibility of seeing his family members and his political and personal friends. He also had no possibility of managing his assets, being ruined: his property in Dobrogea, which had fallen under the occupation of the Central Powers, had been burned and devastated. Of the six months of detention, he had spent two in the prison in Vaslui, in unsanitary conditions and in strict isolation, having access only to literature with a religious content. He had asked the prefect to allow him to receive collections of money and to go to the city baths, since the prison had no washrooms. He was given no answer. After two months, he was transferred to Iași, to the house of a head of the local security department, guarded by agents of this institution. Rakowsky admitted that he had better conditions of detention in Iași and that the food was better, but he was dissatisfied that he was not allowed to be visited by any of his friends. He had asked to be allowed to see, in

the presence of the guard, “the family of a professor from the local university,” in order to sort out his personal affairs, but the answer was delayed until the professor had gone abroad. For half a year he had not heard from his mother, who was almost 80 years old, who had been left without any means of support after the devastation of the estate in Dobruja. There were rumors about his sister, who had a house in Dobruja, that she had been killed, and her two sons had also been arrested by the Romanian authorities. He reproached those guarding him for censoring the telegrams that he intended to send, on his behalf through the Red Cross, to his mother and wife, who were in the occupied territory. Rakowsky pointed out that his name was not included in the arrest warrant in the Vaslui prison, being listed in the documents as the “detained person.” He had protested several times against the arrest and the conditions of detention. In two requests to the Ministry of the Interior he had asked to be released. After the first request, when he was told that his release would cause “agitation in the country,” he asked to be allowed to go abroad. He had addressed a request directly to Brătianu, demanding to be released, but it went unanswered. “For six months, Rakowsky mentioned, they treated me like a criminal, whom they kept alone, like a foreigner, almost like a hostage, without any legal procedure, although I am not deprived of my rights as a Romanian subject and, despite the state of war, which does not admit arbitrary actions without a court decision.” Wondering why he was being treated this way, Rakowsky indicated that all his attempts to find out the answer had yielded no results, but he continued, “knowing the habit of our authorities—to often justify their arbitrary measures by the so-called ‘good of the fatherland,’ I protest with all my energy against such an attempt in my case.” “The Romanian country and people,” Rakowsky claimed, “cannot be interested in me being deprived of my freedom and in the voice of Romanian social democracy, one of whose militants I am, being stifled. On the contrary, in today’s conditions, to outlaw citizens of this country known for their activity dedicated to the cause of the proletariat and democracy, means only to act to the detriment of the moral prestige and authority of the country.” Maintaining secrecy regarding the authorities’ measures in his case made him believe that “the government’s conscience is not clear.” Against the will of an immense majority of the people, Rakowsky considered, the country had been pushed into war, had lost its independence and a good part of its territory. In his opinion, the coercive measures taken against Romanian democracy during the war, to the consolidation of which the social-democratic formation had contributed together with other parties, which through their specific methods fought for “the independence of the people, for the self-determination of all nationalities, therefore also of the Romanian one, wherever they may be,” would have had the significance of diminishing “the moral power of our people.” He recalled that in 1913 the Romanian Social-Democratic Party had protested against the “policy of conquests and annexations” of the Government, while preserving its moral authority. Rakowsky claimed that by participating in the international socialist conferences at Zimmerwald and Kienthal in 1915–1916, where it advocated a peace without annexations and contributions, the Romanian Social Democratic Party had gained an international reputation that entitled it to defend Romania’s interests much better than any other political formation. In any case, as he emphasized, “better than our old political regime which, with all its constitutional face, is well known to all of Europe.” Rakowsky accused the Government that by arresting him, some union leaders and some socialist activists from the province, it was not pursuing “the defense of the country,” but its class interests, fearing the increase in the popularity of the Romanian Social

Democrats. The Romanian Social Democratic Party, as Rakowsky firmly declared, was “the only popular, conscious and disciplined force” that could ensure the implementation of the agrarian and electoral reforms, also promised but delayed by the authorities. He suspected that the Government was trying to divide the workers’ political opposition, in order to avoid any confrontations after the end of the war, when it would have to put the burden of the accumulated debts on the shoulders of taxpayers. “It is enough for me to remember that under your government, in 1907, after the peasant uprising, I was exiled for 5 years from the country, separated from my family, ruined—to make me and the public opinion realize that it was precisely for my permanent struggle for the rights and freedom of the Romanian people that I was struck once again. Convinced that the injustice done to me has not the slightest foundation, in the interest of the country and the people, I protest again against my arrest and demand my release,” concluded Dr. Rakowsky’s in his letter to Brătianu.²

Shortly afterwards, through the émigré and correspondent of Russian newspapers in Iași, E.Z. Volkov, Rakowsky sent a postcard to his “comrade” N.S. Chikheidze, chairman of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers, and a letter to Robert Grimm, secretary of the International Socialist Commission in Bern. While in Petrograd, Volkov discussed Rakowsky’s situation with Foreign Minister P.N. Miliukov, who, however, advised him not to address the case in the press until he had spoken with Prime Minister Brătianu, who was expected in the Russian capital, to request his release under his high guarantee.³

On the eve of his trip to Petrograd, Brătianu communicated on 14/27 April to the plenipotentiary minister of Romania in Russia, C. Diamandy, that the Russian minister of foreign affairs had expressed his desire to see the release of Dr. Cr. Rakowsky, interned by the Romanian authorities since the beginning of the campaign against the Central Powers. The prime minister asked Diamandy to make the Russian minister understand that Rakowsky was “a genuine agent of German-Bulgarian policy”⁴ and that it was impossible to give free rein to dangerous agitation behind the front and in armies already exposed to hostile propaganda.⁵

On 18 April/1 May, in the midst of the war, Russian soldiers from Iași and the surrounding area of the city, which had become the capital of the wartime refuge, organized a rally on the Socola Field, between the Aviation Park and the new triage, starting at 12 noon. That day, several groups of soldiers and officers could be seen with various banners, including those for the continuation of the war and for the immediate conclusion of the peace: “War until the final victory!,” “Long live the revolutionary army!,” “Long live the International!,” “Long live free and republican Russia!,” “Long live the freedom of the peoples!,” “Land and freedom!,” “We want peace without annexations and contributions!.” By 1:30 p.m., over 5,000 people had gathered around an improvised stage. Several cars were parked near the stage, and in one of them were several senior officers, headed by the Russian General Baliasny. Four speeches were made, more or less peaceful. The first to speak was the former deputy to the Russian State Duma, Vadeyev, a delegate of the Petrograd Soviet, who explained how the February Revolution had taken place. He mentioned that it was the Petrograd Soviet that had opposed the evacuation of Tsar Nicholas to London, as the Provisional Government had agreed, because there was a risk that the dethroned autocrat would return with his supporters to deal a blow to the Revolution. Officer Mikheyev spoke about the right to an eight-hour workday, about freedom and democracy, and the delegate of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, Doychenko, a technical engineer, referred in his speech to the significance of May Day, emphasizing in con-

clusion that the war should not be carried to a victorious end, but only to the “complete peace of the peoples.” The fourth speaker, Sergeant Ghilert (Ghilerter, Hiller), “engineer of the railway battalion and jurist,” a member of the Soldiers’ Committee of Iași, spoke in Russian about Romania, furiously attacked the “Romanian oligarchy,” called on the Romanians to follow the example of the Russians and predicted that King Ferdinand would suffer the fate of Nicholas II. We, he said, “must fight until the liberation from slavery of the Romanian people, our ally, and show the King of Romania the path that Nicholas has now taken.” He urged the Russian soldiers to sow the “seed of freedom” in the soil of Romania and to guide the Romanian people on the right path to social emancipation. He ended his speech to the applause of the crowd, shouting: “Long live free and democratic Russia!,” “Long live free and democratic Romania!,” “Long live the entire free and democratic world!.” Romanians were absent from this meeting. At 3 p.m., the soldiers present at the rally formed a column and set off through the city to demonstrate. The demonstrators “walked through the streets of the city to the home of Dr. Rakowsky, at 30 Apeduct Street, where he was being held under police guard, forcibly took him into a car and, all of them, headed for Union Square.”⁷⁶

About the release on that day of Cr. Rakowsky, an agent of the Special Security Brigade of Iași, reported the following: “At 3:30 p.m. my colleague P. Iliescu came in, telling me that by order of Inspector Rafail, when the Russian demonstrators would approach Dr. Rakowsky’s house, we should take him and hide him in a place in that yard, where they would not be able to find him. He did not have time to finish these words and reach the doctor’s room, as the demonstrators surprised us in the middle of the yard, because they had come in two cars. This was only 5 minutes after the inspector left. During this time, the doctor was drinking coffee. The demonstrators were shouting for Dr. Rakowsky, especially a civilian wearing gray clothes and a gray hat. At their shouts, the doctor came out and the demonstrators cheered him, kissing him and picking him up. They put him in the car, where the doctor “gave a speech in Russian, after which they left.”⁷⁷ Another agent wrote: “Yesterday, 18 April, while I was near the house of lawyer Bujor, Inspector Rafael passed by and took me in his car, taking us to Dr. Rakowsky’s house, giving me instructions that, in case we saw Russian demonstrators approaching that house, we should take Dr. Rakowsky and hide him in a place where there would be no demonstrators. I got out of the car and approached the sergeant posted in the street, to whom I spoke to bring him up to speed. My colleague Vasilescu was also there at that time. I didn’t even have time to cross half of the yard and suddenly I found myself with two Russian cars, full of Russian demonstrators and a civilian in gray clothes and a gray hat, rushing right into Rakowsky’s room. All of this happened less than 5 minutes after Inspector Rafael left. Seeing this, I ran to the nearest telephone at the foot gendarmes barracks and I notified Inspector Olărașu, who ordered me to see where the car was taking him.”⁷⁸ A third agent reported: “On the occasion of the socialist demonstration, held yesterday, 1 May 1919 N.St., I was in front of the house where Dr. Rakowsky was staying, I saw him getting into a car and surrounded by Russians. Taking the floor and speaking to the crowd, I heard him say the following: “Long live the Russian people who gave him freedom and long live the Romanian proletariat,” repeating this three times. Later, after the convoy left with him, I talked to Mrs. Petrovici, where the doctor was staying, and, telling me the story of the doctor’s capture by the Russians, she also told me that, a day or two before, the doctor had told his lordship

that only Russia would give him freedom.”⁹ According to the information provided by the Iași Special Security Brigade, the one who planned and led the operation of “Rakowsky’s kidnapping” had been Yevgeny Zakharovich Volkov, “an old revolutionary, journalist, pro-Bulgarian” after five years of activity in Bulgaria, “a friend of Kerensky and Miliukoff,” settled in Iași, Tătăraști, at Ciornei St. 4. “As long as this individual is in Romania,” a note from the Iași Security stated, “things will not calm down, as he is a propagandist and a forceful agitator and, at the same time, an enemy of the Romanians. Volkov, who came to the country deliberately for this purpose, walks around in Russian uniform.”¹⁰

The Romanian intelligence service had learned that “among the Russian soldiers here (in Iași—A/N) and also among some officers, there was a current talk that for the Russian revolution it was necessary to make a revolution in Romania, for the proclamation of a socialist republic, because in Romania both civilians and the army were hostile to such propaganda.” As Foreign Minister Take Ionescu telegraphed to Diamandy on 19 April/2 May, Rakowsky had carried out during Romania’s neutrality “a violent campaign against the war and against any idea of going together with the Entente; we considered him a dangerous man.” Take Ionescu also noted that “it is useless to add here his well-known Bulgarian sentiments.” He also invoked a laudatory feature article about Rakowsky, published in the Hungarian newspaper *Pester Lloyd*, on 1 May, which stated: “... for two years the socialist party devoted all its activity exclusively to fighting the war. All meetings had an anti-war program. The newspaper *Lupta*, Rakowsky’s press organ, very well-known beyond the borders of Romania, did not publish a single wrong article; he protested against the war in every one of its lines.”¹¹

At the May Day rally, organized by the revolutionary Russian soldiers in Union Square, Dr. Cr. Rakowsky gave a short speech in Russian and Romanian. After ending his speech with the call “Long live the Balkan Federative Republic!,” Rakowsky gave another speech in Russian to the soldiers at Socola, translated into French by the Russian sergeant Ghiller (Hiller), the one who predicted that King Ferdinand would share the fate of Nicholas II Romanov. Driving down Ferdinand Street, Rakowsky was joined by “a Romanian reserve officer, the anarchist Bujor,”¹² defying orders from his superiors, with whom he and “a third individual,” who remained unidentified, left for Vladiceni, 6 km from Iași, where they were received in the cantonment of a Russian pioneer battalion. The Romanian intelligence service was aware that in the circles of some Russian soldiers there was discussion about the urgency of a coup in Iași to overthrow the king, the crown prince, the government and proclaim together with Rakowsky a “Romanian socialist republic.” The slogan “Long live the Romanian Republic!” was chanted by several voices in Russian during the procession through the city, but to the call of some Russian soldiers to demonstrate together, the Romanian workers and French soldiers responded with a categorical refusal. In a meeting of a Russian military committee, it was said that the release of Rakowsky had been requested by the Provisional Government itself, but the Romanian Government had refused to comply with this request. Several Russian officers, present at the May Day meeting, declared that “from now on Dr. Rakowsky is under the protection of the Russian Revolutionary Committee, because they consider that he is capable of leading the revolutionary movement in Romania.”¹³

What happened in Iași was also known to General Dm. Shcherbachev, commander of the Romanian Front, and to the Russian Minister Plenipotentiary in Romania, St.

Poklewsky-Kozel. "We," wrote Take Ionescu to Diamandy, "have no doubt as to the feelings of the Russian Government and we take into account the difficulties inherent in a revolution of such magnitude, which broke out in the midst of a war. We do not need to emphasize how unusual are the actions of the Russian soldiers who indulged in these vile manifestations in Romania; we are convinced that most of them are victims of the agitation of German agents. But our situation is more than delicate and we are sure that the Russian Government will tend to present us with its sincere apologies."¹⁴ Diamandy had to inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Petrograd in the most amicable way possible about the "revolutionary" events in Iași, which were putting the Romanian authorities in an uncertain situation.¹⁵

On the night of 20 April/2 May, at around one o'clock, a locomotive with a single carriage carrying Rakowsky, accompanied by "a Romanian officer" (Bujor), passed through the Cristești station, heading for Odessa.¹⁶ Shortly afterwards, the Romanian consul general in Odessa, Sebastian Grecianu (Greciano), reported that Rakowsky had arrived in the city, where the Russian socialists had offered him a banquet. He was to hold two conferences and then set off for Petrograd.¹⁷

Rakowsky stayed for a few days in Odessa, working with local socialists on a campaign against Romania.¹⁸ He gave an interview to the local newspaper *Utro*, showing that he had not caused disturbances in Romania, because no one wanted to be part of a reactionary government. Drawing a parallel with the situation in Russia, Rakowsky stated that in Romania there was no party similar to the Cadet Party (of the Constitutional Democrats) and the socialists would have hesitated to take responsibility for the moment they had experienced. If Romania, the socialist leader emphasized, continued to live under the influence of the Russian revolutionary army, "we will be able to achieve all our objectives down to one." The Romanian authorities, who, in his opinion, were helpless, impotent and hesitant, could not cope with the situation.¹⁹

In Odessa, Rakowsky had the audacity to write a resolution of refusal in his own hand at the request of a supply commission from Galați, claiming that only the rich could benefit from the goods he intended to procure and that its demands could only be satisfied when another commission was established, freely elected by a workers' union and the Social Democratic Party, which would take control of the retail sale of goods. Reacting promptly to this abuse, Ion I.C. Brătianu asked Diamandy to intervene with the Provisional Government so that such cases would not be repeated by people like Rakowsky, who were in the pay of enemy interests, and who could affect Romanian-Russian relations.²⁰

Arriving in Odessa after his release, Rakowsky said that Brătianu "was late, and what he wanted to do diplomatically in Petrograd had been done by the Russian revolutionary army" in Iași. Rakowsky declared himself an enemy of "German imperialism and Russian tsarism" and a partisan of "a federative Balkan republic." Fighting Brătianu, who had said that his release was "a symbol of a separate peace with Germany," Rakowsky did not want the Romanian people to renounce the alliance with Russia and surrender to the Central Powers. He pinned his hopes on the "Russian Republic," in which he saw a defender of all democracies in Eastern Europe. Rakowsky argued that only the replacement of the government in Romania could restore the Romanian army's fighting capacity and the possibility of ending the war without territorial losses. He was convinced that the future of the "Russian Republic" would be secured only when "in the Balkans, instead of foreign

lords, free peoples would govern.” Rakowsky could not resist the temptation to declare that his release would have produced such a strong echo in Romania that it would have marked the “beginning of democratic rule.” In reality, his political audience in Romania was insignificant, and what was commented on and indeed echoed in the mass media, and in the sphere of Russian-Romanian bilateral relations, was the element of the direct, unprecedented interference of Russian troops in the internal affairs of an allied state.²¹

From Odessa, before reaching Petrograd, Dr. Rakowsky passed through Poltava

IN THE Russian capital, Prime Minister Ion I.C. Brătianu discussed the Rakowsky case with the Minister of War, A.I. Guchkov, on 22 April/5 May. As a result, Guchkov decided that: 1) public opinion should be informed that Rakowsky was not, in reality, a socialist, but “an agent in the pay of the Germans” and that the Romanian Government had evidence to this effect; 2) the Russian Command should ask the revolutionary soldier committees not to give any support to Rakowsky’s instigating actions and to take into account the fact that the Russian armies were present in Romania not to defend Romanian interests, but to defend the interests of Russia and its loyal allies; 3) the Russian Command in Romania should guarantee, in case of necessity, the security of the royal family and ensure public order in the event of a conflict between Russian troops.²²

On 23 April/6 May, Brătianu sent Take Ionescu a copy of Guchkov’s order to General Shcherbachev, condemning the actions of incitement against the legal order in Romania and the release of the “Germanophile Rakowsky” who, together with the “Romanian socialist Bujor,” was visiting the Russian troops. The Provisional Government could not tolerate such behavior, which undermined the fighting capacity of the troops and affected the relations with the Russian allies. Shcherbachev was asked to immediately take firm measures to prevent similar incidents in the future and to refrain from interfering in Romania’s internal affairs. “Rakowsky’s propaganda,” Guchkov conveyed, “is carried out in the name of the Germans and is obviously hostile to our interests.”²³

However, the measures requested by the Minister of War did not have the expected effect. The French Minister Plenipotentiary in Romania, the Count de Saint-Aulaire, was right when he observed that “ideological storm clouds” were moving in from revolutionary Russia. In Iași, where the Allied diplomatic missions had evacuated together with the Romanian authorities, one could not fall prey to the illusions of the Russian Revolution, as was happening in France “and even more so in England, which financed it for two contradictory reasons, or perhaps non-contradictory only for the British ill logic: on the one hand, to secure the mass uprising of the Russian people against the common enemy (Germany) or, if not, to lift the mortgage reluctantly granted to the old regime on Constantinople.” In Iași, “a better observation post for Russia than Paris or London,” Saint-Aulaire noted, “our Romanian friends saw in communism the Antichrist or the beast of the Apocalypse,” but “the horrors of the future will surpass these visions of horror.”²⁴

Released by Russian soldiers from house arrest in Iași on 1 May 1917 and fleeing by train to Odessa, Dr. Cr. Rakowsky, strongly dominated by resentment against the Roma-

nian ruling class and by the ideas of the international revolutionary movement, left for Petrograd, to put himself precisely in the service of those dark forces that sought to bring the “revolution” to Romania as well.



Notes

1. *Письмо тов. Раковского*, «Известия Петроградского Совета рабочих и солдатских депутатов», 13 апреля 1917 г.
2. *Письмо тов. Раковского ...*
3. *Ideologie și structuri comuniste în România. 1917–1918*, Institutul Național pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, Bucharest: 1995, 232.
4. On 13 January 1915, the German minister in Bucharest, Baron Hilmar von dem Bussche-Haddenhausen, telegraphed to Berlin: “The Romanian socialists, whose leader Rakowsky is closely linked to the Italian socialists, want to resume energetic agitation in the press and at public meetings against Romania’s entry into the war on the side of the Entente. I have the possibility of providing them with money in such a way as not to arouse suspicion... I consider this business important and I ask your permission to spend 10,000 lei on it. I need an answer by Friday morning.” The next day, the Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs telegraphed to Bucharest his approval for the “business” with the socialist Rakowsky. On 14 January, von dem Bussche attached to his report for Berlin about the conclusion of the “deal” a note signed by Parvus (A.L. Helfandt, originally from Russia, emigrated to Germany in the 1890s; together with L.D. Trotsky he had led the Petersburg Soviet during the 1905–1907 revolution, then settled as a businessman in Turkey, becoming a supporter of the German Reich and promoter of the theory of world revolution), which stated: “I discussed with Hristo Rakowsky, whose steadfast position in favor of peace is known. He also admits that Romania will enter the war on the side of the Entente.” Bussche later reported that on 4 July of the same year a demonstration of socialists in favor of peace had taken place in Bucharest, with Rakowsky as the main speaker. The German minister mentioned that “the demonstration was subsidized by me and the Austro-German legation.” In light of these and other documents, it appears that Rakowsky had no qualms about using German marks for anti-war propaganda (Георгий Чернявский, Михаил Станчев, Мария Тортика (Лобанова), *Жизненный путь Христиана Раковского. 1873–1941. Европеизм и большевизм: неоконченная дуэль* (Москва: Центрполиграф, 2014), 78). Rakowsky appears in the reports of the French special services in 1915 “as a German agent.” In the same year, he met in Bucharest with Parvus, who was buying agricultural products from Romania, bringing medicine and medical instruments from Germany. Parvus was suspected even in socialist circles of being in the service of the German government. Similar rumors circulated about Rakowsky. After Romania entered the war on the side of the Entente, suspected of being “paid by the special services in Berlin,” Rakowsky was detained by the Romanian police on 16 September 1916. He was placed under surveillance, forbidden to leave his home, and then imprisoned in the Vaslui prison. After the government fled to Iași, he was forced to reside in the capital of historical Moldavia (Stelian Tănase, *Clienții tanti Varvara* (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2008), 13–14). In 1915,

Georg Spies, the head of a solid espionage network in Bucharest, maintained “close ties” with Rakowsky, through whom he financed “the anti-war propaganda of Romanian socialists” (Claudiu-Lucian Topor, *Germania și neutralitatea României (1914–1916): Studii istorice* (Iași: Editura Universității “Al. I. Cuza,” 2017), 181–180); having close relations with the Italian socialists, Rakowsky entered the employ of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs no later than January 1915. In the same year, he published the brochure “Socialists and the War” in Bucharest. His mission, with the help of the German and Austro-Hungarian legations in Bucharest, was to prevent Romania from joining the Entente. When, in the fall of 1916, he was arrested for anti-war propaganda in favor of the Central Powers, the International Socialist Commission in Bern, formed at the Zimmerwald conference and led by Angelica Balabanova, established in Italy, declared him a “victim of the bloodthirsty Romanian bourgeoisie” (Ева Ингеборг Флейшхауер, *Русская революция. Ленин и Людендорф (1905–1917)* (Москва: Политическая энциклопедия, 2020), 337–338).

5. *Documente privind Istoria Românilor. Colecția Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki. Seria a 3-a. Vol. I. Legația română la Petrograd (1914–1918). Documente.* Eds.: Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, Eugen-Tudor Scifos (Bucharest–Brăila: Editura Academiei Române, Editura Istros a Muzeului Brăilei “Carol I,” 2018), 189.
6. *Ideologie și structuri comuniste în România. 1917–1918*, 223; according to another account, Rakowsky was released from house arrest in Iași by Russian soldiers, who arrived there in several cars (ibid., 226); according to the Count de Saint-Aulaire, the revolutionary demonstration in Iași took place with the participation of Russian units from the city’s surroundings, of “numerous officers from the staff of the commander, General Sakharov,” involving “also the Romanian agitator of Bulgarian origin, Rakowsky, a Germanophile socialist,” released from detention by Russian soldiers (Contele de Saint-Aulaire, *Însemnările unui diplomat de altădată. În România: 1916–1920*, traducere din franceză de Ileana Sturdza, introducere și note de Mihai Dim. Sturdza, Ediția a II-a, revăzută și adăugită, Bucharest: Humanitas, 2016, 122–123).
7. *Frontul Românesc (1916–1917). Culegere de documente*, ed. Dinu Poștarencu, Bucharest: Editura Militară, 2020, 169.
8. *Frontul Românesc (1916–1917). Culegere de documente*, 171.
9. *Frontul Românesc (1916–1917). Culegere de documente*, 170.
10. *Frontul Românesc (1916–1917). Culegere de documente*, 182–183.
11. *Documente privind Istoria Românilor. Colecția Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki. Seria a 3-a. Vol. I. Legația română la Petrograd (1914–1918) ...*, 189, 190.
12. Second Lieutenant Mihai Gheorghiu, known as the lawyer Bujor, was under the surveillance of the Romanian military authorities, liable to be brought before the Court Martial, because at the funeral of “comrade Ottoi, a member of the Executive Committee of the social-democratic party,” a military doctor who died of typhus on 1 April, “he gave a speech at the Israeli cemetery in Iași, in which he said, among other things, that the dead man was a sacrifice for a cause that was neither his, nor that of social democracy, nor that of the country, and he wished that the new era of justice, equality and brotherhood brought by the revolution in Russia would be inaugurated as soon as possible in unfortunate Romania” (*Ideologie și structuri comuniste în România. 1917–1918 ...*, 242–243).
13. *Ideologie și structuri comuniste în România. 1917–1918*, 224.

14. *Documente privind Istoria Românilor. Colecția Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki. Seria a 3-a. Vol. I. Legația română la Petrograd (1914–1918)*, 189–190.
15. *Documente privind Istoria Românilor. Colecția Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki. Seria a 3-a. Vol. II. Documente privind activitatea consulatelor române de la Odessa, Ismail și Moscova în 1917–1919*. Eds.: Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, Eugen-Tudor Scifos, Bucharest-Brăila: Editura Academiei Române, Editura Istros a Muzeului Brăilei “Carol I,” 2019, 52–53.
16. *Frontul Românesc (1916–1917) ...*, 175.
17. *Documente privind Istoria Românilor. Colecția Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki. Seria a 3-a. Vol. II. Documente privind activitatea consulatelor române de la Odessa, Ismail și Moscova în 1917–1919 ...*, 54.
18. *Documente privind Istoria Românilor. Colecția Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki. Seria a 3-a. Vol. I. Legația română la Petrograd (1914–1918). Documente ...*, 198; *Documente privind Istoria Românilor. Colecția Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki. Seria a 3-a. Vol. II. Documente privind activitatea consulatelor române de la Odessa, Ismail și Moscova în 1917–1919...*, 57.
19. *Documente privind Istoria Românilor. Colecția Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki. Seria a 3-a. Vol. I. Legația română la Petrograd (1914–1918). Documente ...*, 216–217.
20. *Documente privind Istoria Românilor. Colecția Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki. Seria a 3-a. Vol. II. Documente privind activitatea consulatelor române de la Odessa, Ismail și Moscova în 1917–1919 ...*, 217; Diamandy brought this case to the attention of the Russian Minister for Trade (ibid., 224).
21. «Одесский листок», 14 мая 1917 г.
22. *Documente privind Istoria Românilor. Colecția Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki. Seria a 3-a. Vol. II. Documente privind activitatea consulatelor române de la Odessa, Ismail și Moscova în 1917–1919...*, 55–56.
23. *Documente privind Istoria Românilor. Colecția Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki. Seria a 3-a. Vol. II. Documente privind activitatea consulatelor române de la Odessa, Ismail și Moscova în 1917–1919...*, 56.
24. Count of Saint-Aulaire, 125.

Abstract

1 May 1917 in Iași: By Whom, How, and Why Was Dr. Cr. Rakowsky Released

This article, based on new documentary sources, analyzes the circumstances of the release on 1 May 1917, from house arrest in Iași, of the socialist leader Dr. Cr. Rakowsky. Attention is drawn to the intercession of some law enforcement officials in Russia, after the February Revolution, with the Romanian Government to free Rakowsky. Freed by Russian soldiers and fleeing by train to Odessa, Rakowsky headed for Petrograd, in order to serve the forces that sought to bring the “revolution” to Romania. The events in Iași of that day outlined the portrait of a militant driven by strong resentments against the Romanian ruling class and by the ideas of the international revolutionary movement.

Keywords

Rakowsky, Ion I.C. Brătianu, Iași, Romanian authorities, Russian revolution, revolutionary army, May 1 rally, Romanian Socialist Republic.