
TRANSYLVANIAN REVIEW

/REVUE DE TRANSYLVANIE

Vol. XXIX
No. 2
Summer 2020

Contents/Sommaire

• Paradigms

- Economic and Financial Implications
of the First World War: Domestic War Loans** 3
Iosif Marin Balog
Ioan Lumperdean
- The Importance of the Treaty of Trianon** 24
Ioan-Aurel Pop
- Trianon in Romania's Contemporary
Public Consciousness (1920)** 30
Alexandru Porțeanu
- The Need for a Law to Declare 4 June
As the Trianon Treaty Day** 47
Titus Corlățean

• Transilvanica

- "I Want You Even if You Do Not Want Me":
Jesuits in Cluj between 1595 and 1610** 64
Ferenc Páll-Szabó

• Profile

- Ioan A. Vătășescu, General Secretary
of King Ferdinand I University of Cluj:
Bio-Bibliographic Clarifications** 72
Alexandru Păcurar

• Tangencies

- Ioannes Novi und Stefan der Große –
Märtyrer und Landesfürst: Zur Ambivalenz
von Erinnerungsverortung in der Bukowina** 84
Kurt Scharr
- Swedenborg on the Exploitation of Salt in
Central and Eastern Europe in the 18th Century** 104
Claudia Tărnauceanu
- Armenia: The Inedited Pages of Recent History
(2002–2018)** 114
Dorin Cimpoșu

ROMANIAN ACADEMY
Chairman:
Academician **Ioan-Aurel Pop**

CENTER FOR
TRANSYLVANIAN STUDIES

On the cover:
Pass of the Paris Peace Conference
issued to EUGENIU NECULCEA
(1876–1954), the secretary of
the Romanian delegation, granting him
access to the signing ceremony
of the Treaty of Trianon (4 June 1920).

• **Fine Arts**

- Artistic Identity and Hegemony in the Establishment of the Painting School of Cluj** 137
Georgeta-Olimpia Bera

• **Book Reviews**

- MIHAI DRAGNEA, *Misiune și cruciadă în teritoriul venzilor (secolul al XII-lea)*
(reviewed by Marco Cassioli) 152

- MARIA VAIDA, *The Great Union in Western Transylvania*
(reviewed by Mircea-Gheorghe Abrudan) 154

- À l'Est, la guerre sans fin 1918–1923*
Edited by FRANÇOIS LAGRANGE, CHRISTOPHE BERTRAND,
CARINE LACHEVRE, and EMMANUEL RANVOISY
(reviewed by George Cipăianu and Ana-Maria Stan) 156

- **List of Contributors** 160

Publication indexed and abstracted in the
Thomson Reuters Social Sciences Citation Index®
and in Arts & Humanities Citation Index®,
and included in the products of EBSCO, ELSEVIER-Scopus,
CEEOL and ERIH PLUS.

ISSN 1221-1249

Printed in Romania by COLOR PRINT
66, 22 Decembrie 1989 St.,

Zalău 450031, Romania
Tel. (0040)260-660598



www.colorprint.ro

Transylvanian Review continues the tradition of **Revue de Transylvanie**, founded by Silviu Dragomir, which was published in Cluj and then in Sibiu between 1934 and 1944.

Transylvanian Review is published quarterly by the **Center for Transylvanian Studies** and the **Romanian Academy**.

EDITORIAL BOARD

CESARE ALZATI, Ph.D.

Facoltà di Scienze della Formazione, Istituto di Storia Moderna e Contemporanea, Università Cattolica, Milan, Italy

MATHIAS BEER, Ph.D.

Institut für donauschwäbische Geschichte und Landeskunde, Tübingen, Germany

KONRAD GÜNDISCH, Ph.D.

Bundesinstitut für Kultur und Geschichte der Deutschen im östlichen Europa, Oldenburg, Germany

HARALD HEPPNER, Ph.D.

Institut für Geschichte, Graz, Austria

PAUL E. MICHELSON, Ph.D.

Huntington University, Indiana, USA

MOMČILO PAVLOVIĆ, Ph.D.

Director of the Institute of Contemporary History, Belgrade, Serbia

ALEXANDRU ZUB, Ph.D.

Academician, honorary director of A. D. Xenopol Institute of History, Iași, Romania

EDITORIAL STAFF

Ioan-Aurel Pop

Daniela Mârza

Ioan Bolovan

Robert-M. Mihalache

Raveca Divricean

Ferenc Páll-Szabó

Maria Chitta

Alexandru Simon

Rudolf Gräf

Florian D. Soporan

Virgil Leon

George State

Translated by

Bogdan Aldea—English

Liana Lăpădatu—French

Desktop Publishing

Edith Fogarasi

Cosmina Varga

Correspondence, manuscripts and books should be sent to: **Transylvanian Review, Centrul de Studii Transilvane** (Center for Transylvanian Studies) 12–14 Mihail Kogălniceanu St., Cluj-Napoca 400084, Romania.

All material copyright © 2020 by the Center for Transylvanian Studies and the Romanian Academy. Reproduction or use without written permission is prohibited.

cst@academia-cj.ro

www.centruldestudiiitransilvane.ro

Economic and Financial Implications of the First World War

Domestic War Loans

IOSIF MARIN BALOG
IOAN LUMPERDEAN



Second war loan bond, 2015.

SOURCE: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:AUSTRIA-WW1_Kriegsanleihe-3-1915-00.jpg.

Iosif Marin Balog

Senior researcher at George Barițiu Institute of History, Romanian Academy, Cluj-Napoca.

Ioan Lumperdean

Professor at the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration of Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca.

Historical and Contextual Landmarks

IN RECENT years, the history of World War I has gained remarkable momentum both in Romania and abroad, given the commemoration of a century since the onset of the great conflagration, generating a rich and varied historical literature dedicated to this subject. Various methodological and thematic perspectives cover a wide range of issues, from classical ones to those that offer new ways of (re)reading and interpreting historical sources. The results have already materialized in dozens of volumes and hundreds of studies and articles covering multiple topics, from political, diplomatic and military ones,¹ to the analysis of the implications of war in demography and family life in all its complexity.² All these perspectives were inspiredly and accompanied by previously less-researched directions in

historiography, such as the cultural impact of the war, the role of the “home front,” the mobilization of the population through propaganda, its transmission and dissemination mechanisms, etc.³ There were also some new directions in Romanian historiography, such as the study of the impact of the war on children and childhood,⁴ on the emancipation of women and their status, substantially altered during the war and after its end.⁵ Other studies addressed in detail the multiple religious implications, the relationship between the secular authorities and the representatives of the denominations, how the church was institutionally involved in the enormous war effort, both spiritually and materially, as well as propagandistically, as a main relay of communication between the higher state authorities and the population.⁶ One cannot leave out of these succinct introductory considerations the numerous volumes of documents and, most of all, correspondence, memoirs and war journals that have brought exceptionally significant information into the scientific circuit and which undoubtedly add value to the knowledge of the multiple facets of a past reality, generated and shaped by the Great War.

On the other hand, in Romanian historiography the economic aspects of the war have been less addressed in recent years, and the reasons behind this relative neglect of the economic component of the war can, certainly, be numerous: it can be considered, for example, that the important economic aspects have already been made public or they possess little relevance to the new research directions; secondly, it can be argued that these issues may be too technical and dull, in their attempt to reflect the complex realities and effects of the war. We have also noticed that, in many cases, statistical data such as the nature and volume of military expenditure, the sources of funding, price developments, and currency devaluation in the new and changing macroeconomic contexts induced by the war are only tangentially, incompletely and sporadically invoked as documentary and supporting material.

Based on these latter considerations, we considered it appropriate to address some aspects of the economic resources involved in the war effort, focusing on how the war loans contributed financially to supporting the needs of the front, on the ways in which the population was called upon to support this effort, and of course on the propaganda of the authorities in this regard. The analysis refers to the Hungarian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, with particular reference to the Transylvanian region, knowing that the two constituent and associated states of the empire, Austria and Hungary, had stipulated in the dualist pact of 1867 separate and legally established economic and financial policies.

During the documentation, we came to realize the difficulty of the task because, first of all, figures and quantitative data must stand on their own; however, despite the dull aspect of such a reconstruction, likely to generate a stereotypi-

cal and linear discourse, the conclusions converge towards the same idea, of the impressive and unprecedented consequences induced by war in modern history.

In the first place, some references to the Austro-Hungarian economic circumstances on the eve of the war are required in order to better understand the evolutions during the conflict and especially its economic implications. It should be noted that in 1914 Austria-Hungary was one of the most important powers in Europe with a population of 58.6 million inhabitants and a GDP of \$1,989 per capita in 1913 (accounting for 13% of the total population of Europe and 10% of its GDP).⁷ The Habsburg Monarchy's economic growth was moderate in both rate and rhythm, more rapid in the Hungarian side, and with a rather robust structure and profile of the industrial production in its western parts. The counterpart, Transleithania, was focused on agricultural development, which evolved more and more clearly towards modern capitalist structures. Viewed in detail, however, the economy of this multi-ethnic state complex also reveals a whole series of vulnerabilities, generated by the development gaps between different regions and provinces, overlapped and accentuated by political and national divergences. There were also debates at that time that generated many polemical exchanges regarding the economic viability of the state and its possibilities to economically and militarily support the ambitions of the political-military alliance it was part of. Both economists and some politicians had warned even before the war that, in a widespread confrontation, the proportion of national income that the Austrian and Hungarian governments could mobilize would not exceed one third of the total national wealth, estimated at \$27.5–30 billion (dollar value in 1913).⁸ Others were even more skeptical, warning that economically, due to structural problems especially of political and national nature, the monarchy would have already been a defeated state before the start of the war.⁹

The outcome of the war in 1918 and the subsequent destiny of the monarchy also led, in the next decades, to numerous inquiries regarding the causes of this failure. Beyond the political and military aspects, analysts, whether historians, economists, or sociologists, have naturally tried to find the most viable answers to the question: "Why did the Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrate?" generating many explanations, some with a strong polemic character.

First and foremost, the national question and its and subjacent issues, political divergences and impediments, have often been cited as responsible for the failure of the monarchy. Historians have argued that the rise of national movements, the aggravation of conflicts between the non-German and non-Hungarian nations, and the failure of the 1867 Compromise to provide an institutional arrangement capable of managing and mitigating these antagonisms were major factors that led to the dissolution. For example, the Austrian historians E. Bruckmüller and R. Sandgruber noted a palpable contradiction between the ad-

vancement of regional economic integration and the rise of national movements that evolved in the opposite direction, opposed to the creation of a collective consciousness that was sufficiently attached to the ideal of a state and a common economic space.¹⁰ On the other hand, Hungarian historians Iván T. Berend and György Ránki ascribed the obvious vulnerabilities of the monarchy on the eve of World War I especially to the fragility of the common economic space, which was accentuated and amplified by the economic clauses of the dualist pact. These provisions, which were supposed to contribute decisively to integration (a customs union and shared contributions to the common budget), were the subject of political bargaining every 10 years. Moreover, the two historians have pointed out that towards the end of the 19th century the idea of an economically independent Hungary became a dominant option among Hungarian politicians, even if it was not supported by economic realities, relying especially on nationalist arguments,¹¹ and we would add that some of these assertions were outright populist. The indisputable discrepancies in development among various regions of the empire were a problem that has preoccupied many historians, to the point where some voices have emphasized this reality and made it responsible for the dissolution.¹² According to historian Edward März, “this situation of major discrepancies, which none of the industrialized European countries was facing, has been an important disadvantage for the economic growth process in the empire as a whole.”¹³ A change of vision regarding the economic modernization of the Habsburg Monarchy during the 19th–20th centuries occurred in the 1970s–80s, when the new generation of economic historians put forward the problem of a deeper re-evaluation through new methodologies generated by economic history. They established that there were nonetheless enough premises in the Habsburg Monarchy for a modern economic growth, which was realized through a gradual process of regional leveling. This trend was evident to authors such as Scott M. Eddie,¹⁴ David F. Good,¹⁵ Thomas Huertas,¹⁶ John Komlos,¹⁷ generating a so-called revisionist research direction,¹⁸ due to the conclusions it entailed, and which partly denied the old conceptions of the economic fragility of the Danube Monarchy as a main cause of its disaggregation.

War Loans: Economic and Military Options and Prerequisites

THE FIRST World War was preceded by a fierce arms race. The Industrial Revolution offered opportunities never before seen in military policies: it favored and supported in developed countries the birth and spread of first military-industrial complexes, which brought together a large number of

engineers, technicians and workers. The arms race also mobilized major capital resources, domestic and foreign: Armstrong and Vickers in the United Kingdom, Krupp in Germany, Schneider-Creusot in France. These complexes were able to carry out military research, but also to produce and supply, predominantly based on state orders, a large quantity of weapons, munitions and military equipment. The economic activities related to arming policies developed rapidly. All this mobilized huge human, material and financial resources, which contributed to economic growth in those countries. According to contemporary data, between 1880 and 1914 the six European powers (Austria-Hungary, Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Russia) tripled their arms expenditures, and their military personnel almost doubled from 2.6 million to 4.5 million people. The market was confronted, for the first time in history, with an active arms trade, on a continental and global scale.¹⁹

The huge military effort raised the issue of financial resources from its outset. States found various forms and financing formulas, most of which had been already practiced throughout history: tax increases, state loans (domestic and foreign), capital injections, financial-banking operations, donations, etc. The start of the First World War accelerated the recourse to these methods, and the belligerent and neutral states became engaged in a huge race to find and mobilize vast financial resources, especially as the myth of the “short war” rapidly eroded. Gradually, as the military operations drew on, the economic model moved from peace economy to war economy. This transfer resulted in the mobilization of financial supplies, raw materials, human and material resources almost exclusively towards military production and activities, by sacrificing the production of goods for the civilian population, by involving the state as a political and administrative body in economic life beyond the admissible limits, distorting the normal and market-generated and induced economic relations. Moreover, in the economic, political and polemological literature, the notion of “war economy” appeared even in the years of the first military conflagration.²⁰ Within its structure are also woven the war loans, as economic instruments and means intended to finance war-specific activities. Although they are sometimes confused with arming expenditure and/or military spending, war loans have their specificity given the targets pursued, their space-time span, institutional handling and financial documentation. Their structure, content and dynamics in relation to the economy and population must not be neglected. The war loans contracted by the two governments in Vienna and Budapest were economically, financially, politically and militarily consonant with those of other states in that period or later: legislative coverage and argumentation, institutional efficiency, advertising, civic involvement, and public manipulation. Positive and negative examples and experiences in the mobilization of public financial resources and the size of

military spending had been collected by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy since the previous centuries, but especially in the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. A pre- or pro-war activity and a specific economy functioned especially after 1848, when the destiny of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was linked to that of Emperor Franz Joseph.²¹ This pro-war economy developed simultaneously with the modernization of economic activity, practice and thought. Positive and negative phenomena in the empire's economy, as well as progress in the field of economic studies generated the Austrian school of economics, represented by Lorenz von Stein and, above all, by Carl Menger, the father of marginal utility theory. In a period of dilemmas and explorations in the economic sciences, ideas were expressed about the need to probe consumer psychology in order to ensure progress and economic balances. These factors would help producers take the right decisions or the owners to implement Schumpeter's ideas specific to entrepreneurship: boldness, anticipation and perseverance, intuition and risk-taking, innovation and adaptation to the economic environment. In fact, it was not only an attempt to consolidate the modern market economy, but also to modernize the dual monarchy or, more precisely, to adapt it to the tremendous rhythm of the changes of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Rapid preparations for arming and war set back the economic, technical and human potential of the monarchy and restricted the possibility of implementing these economic ideas and doctrines into the real economy.

The existence of prestigious economists, as well as the preoccupations for the economic and administrative preparation of the imperial and royal officials, were also reflected in the access to war loans. With the specific meticulousness of the dual monarchy, activities in this area followed the natural course of fiscal and financial mechanisms and policies.

It is known that, at the outbreak of the war in July 1914, the monarchy's finances were unable to support a medium or long-term war effort, as the funds collected from taxes managed to cover only the current civilian state expenses. Naturally, the announcement of armed mobilization caused panic in the economy, requiring urgent state intervention to limit primarily the short-term effects that could have proven disastrous. It was also important that the state did not give the impression that the measures would last for a long time and suggested that the situation would soon return to normal. Rapid intervention meant that the stock market and banking system were offered protection from panic and destabilization. Already on 27 July 1914, the closing of the Vienna and Budapest stock markets was announced, as well as urgent measures to protect the Austro-Hungarian Central Bank and its gold reserves; naturally, given these conditions of financial uncertainty and insecurity, the reference value of the discount rate doubled from 4 to 8% in just a few days.²² The financial and banking morato-

riums were meant to maintain the stability of the banking system, to ensure the largest possible amount of banknotes in the reserves of the issuing bank for the immediate needs of the state, which lacked any possibility to contract a loan for the moment, unless it was from the Central Bank. The first moratorium of this kind was established on 1 August 1914²³; in order not to create the impression of a blocked economy, it was set to have an initial duration of 14 days, although from the beginning everyone was convinced that it would be extended. Later, it was extended six times and was temporarily lifted only in August 1915, being restored at the end of 1916 in Transylvania where it remained in force until October of the following year. The abolition of the moratorium was made on the basis of § 16 of Law-article no. LXIII of 1912 and was motivated by the need to prevent major disturbances generated by mass withdrawals of money from banks and the speculative exploitation of financial instruments. The most important provision referred to the fact that depositors could withdraw up to 200 crowns from bank deposits which on 1 August 1914 did not exceed 2,000 crowns, and in the case of deposits between 2,000 and 4,000 crowns, a maximum of 10% of the amount.²⁴

As immediate measures, the state was also concerned with ensuring the conditions of the functioning of the new war economy, increasing production by any means, meeting the military requirements and providing the fuel and food necessary for the battlefield, but also for the urban population. The imminent danger was the appreciation of prices for all products and a speculative wave that could get out of control. In these circumstances, the immediate need consisted in the implementation of a mechanism for controlling and capping prices. The greatest danger, in its absence, would have been represented by inflation, with catastrophic consequences for the state in the future financing of the war needs. In fact, the outbreak of the war had an immediate effect on grain prices, a phenomenon experienced within a few months. Thus, if in July 1914 wheat was sold on average for 24.45 crowns on the Budapest market, in the middle of November the price rose to 44.20; equally, the price of rye increased from 19.50 to 35 crowns, and significant increases were also recorded for corn, from 15.10 to 24.10 crowns.²⁵ The state's intention was not only to intervene and cap the prices, but also to maintain the market at a reasonable rate of demand and supply, while being cautious not to leave the population with the impression of force or coercion. The authorities were aware of the need for a serious propaganda effort to convince and mobilize the population in this regard.²⁶ It was the patriotic duty of every citizen to support the cause of the war, all these efforts being considered part of a genuine "home front" in which, without exception, all citizens had to be engaged, according to their forces and capabilities. The authorities used many channels of communication and mobilization, and the

church had a particularly important role in the rural world, where “trustworthy priests who were loved by people in all circumstances of life” were called upon to participate in this propaganda process with all their energy.²⁷

The Odyssey and Impact of War Loans

AT THE end of 1914 it was considered that the economy had withstood fairly well the shock induced by the first months of the war, firstly because the year had begun under favorable and optimistic auspices, as the effects of the economic crisis of 1912 had been overcome: the state had intervened by way of investments and massive orders in the war industry, accompanied by active measures meant to boost business activities. The interest rates were affordable, as well as the capital market, while numerous draft laws encouraging the industry started to show their beneficial effects. On the other hand, the crisis of 1911–1912 had somewhat prepared the economy for more serious situations, and prudence in the face of risky decisions had become commonplace, along with the concern to secure reserves of all kinds.²⁸ These were precisely the lessons promoted by the authorities, which had become aware that the state of mobilization would be extended: caution and reserve were the main recommendations from the state to enterprises and banks. The latter were demanded maximum care with regard to the distribution of profits and dividends. Certainly, the state authorities were aware and convinced that they would soon resort to these resources too.

The situation on the front required, doubtlessly, huge expenditures that the state had to deal with. If the budget for civilian spending could be assured, at least in the beginning, from collecting taxes and dues, the financing of the war had to be secured in other ways. There were few solutions at hand: exports that would have provided sufficient resources were no longer available in the new situation; also, access to financing on the international capital market had become virtually impossible under war conditions. As a result, the only viable solution was to resort to national loans, which became a predominant tool used by the state to attract the financial resources needed to support the war effort from the population and the banks. Thus, following the example of Germany, Austria-Hungary started a well-organized campaign to launch such loans on the domestic market every six months.

In order to illustrate the size of the financial effort required by the war, we can state that after only the first six months of conflict, at the end of 1914, the monarchy's balances for this purpose were \$1,125 billion, of which \$375 million came from Hungary.²⁹ According to the financial and budgetary procedures

and policies, which were separate for the two parts of the monarchy, war loans, 8 of them in total from 1914 to 1918, were launched each time separately in Austria and Hungary. To this end, political decision-makers and financial operators developed a real policy management in the field of public lending³⁰ aimed at supporting the war effort, which resulted in:

- a) regulatory and legislative coverage of new financial policies;
- b) the preparation of human resources in state administration, military and financially, including the covering of budget deficits and the timely provision of financial benefits to the holders of government bonds or other paper bond certificates;
- c) the involvement of fiscal and financial operators (the State Treasury, the Bank of Austria-Hungary, commercial banks and credit co-operatives/unions) in the actions for the mobilization of financial resources belonging to economic agents and the population;
- d) devising, printing and putting into circulation specific financial and banking documents and accounts (some of them, intended for the public throughout the monarchy, had security and identity elements as well as the money insignia, and were printed mainly in German and Hungarian);
- e) advertising publicly through posters, flyers, press, public gatherings, ecclesiastical meetings, etc. for the rapid subscription of amounts needed for military equipment and operations. Multi-ethnicity required the use of multiple languages in the transmission of printed messages, which led to distortions in this situation, as it did during military operations.³¹

The first war loan was launched in November 1914,³² shortly after the war began. The approach to this financing option was achieved almost simultaneously with the policies promoted by other belligerent states. On the one hand, there was the common belief in the rapid end of the war.³³ On the other hand, the political and military actors “threw into battle” huge amounts of money after the example of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, confident in the recovery of the amounts once victory was achieved, as Germany had succeeded with the huge war reparations imposed on France.³⁴

The subscription terms were almost similar: the legal basis and subscription payment methods were stipulated in subchapter 17 of Law LXIII. The bonds were worth 50, 100, 1,000 and 10,000 crowns, with an interest rate of 6%, the subscription price being 97.5% of the face value.³⁵ It was anticipated that, for amounts not exceeding 100 crowns, the underwriting should be made on the spot in full; for amounts over 100 crowns, the first rate had to be at least 40% to be paid until 12 December 1914, the second rate until 22 December 1914 and the third until 8 January 1915. The total amount of the loan was estimated at 500 million crowns. It was a first test performed by the government, which

had carried out an intensive campaign among the population, highlighting both the very good profitability of these placement opportunities and, certainly, appealing to the patriotic feelings of the people called to serve the needs of the homeland. The subscription was planned to take place at all the state cash desks at the branches of the Austro-Hungarian Bank, the other commercial banks, as well as at the post offices. The first Hungarian war loan ended on 23 November 1914, and it was considered a major success, as the subscribed amount exceeded one billion crowns, surpassing even the most optimistic expectations.³⁶ It's difficult to estimate the amount gathered in Transylvania; certainly, an exemplary mobilization had been achieved, since only through Albina Bank's cash desks 1,353,350 crowns were subscribed.³⁷

The financial and macro-economic context of 1915 indicated that the war would continue for a period that no one could have anticipated. The high prices became a concern, amid the massive depreciation of the crown: in 1913, the crown was a stable and strong currency in comparison to other currencies of the time. Although it did not benefit from total convertibility, the coverage of the money supply in the Central Bank's gold reserves was 49.7%. At the end of 1915 it had dropped to 9.4%, amid a depreciation of over 45%.³⁸ The rise of the money supply in circulation with nearly 4 billion crowns contributed to the rising inflation, but the government's reason was the need to increase the volume of production and trade, and thus the cash flow needed to support the war effort. In fact, the great challenge for the monarchy in 1915 was the economic isolation to which it was forced by military developments and the unpredictability of the force ratio. The primary concern was to ensure "economic resilience"—maintaining the economy within functional parameters through systematic interventionist measures.³⁹ It was also imperative that actions be taken to ensure that the population and the army received the necessary sustenance. Prices had been capped since the previous year in order to prevent speculation. Procedures for requisitioning agricultural crops through the creation of special bodies had already been established, the most important of them being the Company for the Valorization of Agricultural Products. The propaganda campaign meant to mobilize the population for agricultural production, in the conditions of an acute shortage of labor, was considered a success, based also on a very good harvest in 1915. The involvement of all able-bodied people (children, the elderly) in agriculture was insistently demanded by the authorities and was considered a duty as imperative as that of the soldier to fight on the battlefield. The state considered that the possibility for profit-making was not to be neglected, since absolutely all products intended for the battlefield had a market value. On the other hand, high prices had become a part of everyday life that could no longer be ignored.⁴⁰ Already associated with the first signs of scantiness, penury and

restrictions, the issue of overpriced goods had become a concern and an opportunity to search both for explanations and solutions. First of all, the main cause was the shortage of labor, because “people had been taken from their productive work in industry and agriculture and now, with killing weapons in their hands, try to destroy each other.”⁴¹

According to the plan to launch a loan every six months, during 1915 two war loans were carried out, the first in May and the other in November.⁴² The second loan was launched in identical conditions to the first, with the maturity date set for 1921.⁴³ The subscription period was scheduled for 12–16 May, then extended until 7 June due to “high interest.”⁴⁴ The results were very good, with the subscription of 1,132 billion crowns (\$226,507,000) announced.⁴⁵ The third loan was scheduled for the autumn of 1915, more precisely for 17 October. The authorities took into consideration the closing of the agricultural year and the commercialization of crops to create additional financial resources among the population that needed to be attracted for this purpose. Propaganda for this loan was particularly intense across the country, including the publication of a flyer in all the languages of the monarchy. The call for subscriptions targeted all social categories that had to prove their highest patriotism and, as far as the peasants were concerned, they “with little have to do a lot . . . and each of them to participate in the new loan.”⁴⁶ As with previous loans, money from bank deposits could be subscribed up to 50% of the amount deposited, which was not covered by the moratorium. The final results of the third loan were considered very good, just as the previous ones, as the sum of 1,984,000,000 crowns (\$396,972,000) was collected.⁴⁷

The year 1916 marked the beginning of unprecedented economic complications generated by the huge warfare spending: the monarchy had already spent \$9,870,800,000, of which over 3.5 billion fell on Hungary. The accentuated depreciation of the crown was due to the increase of money supply in circulation by over 435% as compared to the end of 1913.⁴⁸ Foreign markets, especially those of neutral countries until 1916, and especially the Zurich stock market where the crown’s exchange rate was set against the Swiss franc, contributed to the depreciation. Here, at the beginning of 1916, the rate recorded a loss of 30% and at the end of June the same year the depreciation was already 56.73%. This meant that 100 CHF were worth 149.25 crowns instead of 95.29 crowns, a parity set by the 1892 monetary reform.⁴⁹ For the first time, serious difficulties were encountered in the civilian spending budget, which was harder to cover from collecting taxes and dues, while the interest on loans exceeded 240 million crowns per year. Thus, during 1916, the government presented no less than 8 draft laws on the change of taxation.⁵⁰ Three major novelties were to come into force on 1 January 1917: income tax, wealth tax, and a “tax on war gains.”

The income tax had existed before 1916, but the novelty was the introduction of an increased progressive tax scale. The minimum taxable annual income was 10,000 crowns and the tax rate was 2.0%; for incomes exceeding 120,000 crowns, the tax rate was 5%.⁵¹ Property tax referred to real estate, mines, quarries, rolling capital invested in business, bank deposits, dividends, etc., increasing progressively between at least 50,000 and 2,400,000 crowns/year, the tax rate ranging between 0.5 and 0.12%.⁵² The motivation of the authorities to introduce the tax on war gains, which was in fact an over-taxation and a double taxation, was based on the premise that, in most economic areas, boosting production for the needs of the battlefield generated greater gains for economic agents and the population. The tax base was that additional income recorded in 1914, 1915 and 1916 above the average nominal income for the period 1911–1913.⁵³ All revenues over 13,000 crowns/year were subject to taxation; also the surplus from remunerations and pensions was taxed only if it exceeded 30,000 crowns/year and if the surplus in the war years was over 4,000 crowns. As with other types of taxes, the principle of progressive taxation was adopted: after the first 10,000 crowns the tax was 5%, the next 10,000 crowns were taxed by 10%, etc.

The mechanisms of state involvement in the war economy were becoming more and more sophisticated, stemming from the immediate situation of the economy and finances, but also from the need to manage a disrupted economy. More and more voices became convinced that after the end of hostilities, the state would have once again a strong role in restoring economic order. For the year 1916, the fourth and fifth loans were launched, to which 1,953,000,000 and 2,300,000,000 crowns respectively were subscribed.⁵⁴

The analysis of the situation in 1917, in the context of the turn anticipated by the war and amid the general uncertainty—the only certain prediction being that the war would continue—reveals a dramatic situation, if we take into consideration only the general macro-economic indicators: the money supply in circulation was over 18,440,000,000 crowns⁵⁵ (\$3.68 billion) and constantly increasing, which meant that inflation could have gotten out of hand at any time.⁵⁶ Already since 1915 the Austrian and Hungarian budgets as well as central banknote issues were no longer public, the data being accessible only to a small group of decision-makers in the military sphere and at the Issuing Bank. This process increased the distrust in the monarchy's monetary situation, as assessed by the financial-banking circles abroad.⁵⁷ Moreover, under the new practices, the Central Bank's solvency became directly dependent on the preservation of the monarchy itself. In turn, strict censorship kept the real situation of income and expenditure secret from the general public. On the other hand, the certainty of scantiness, high prices, restrictions of all kinds, the deterioration of everyday

life in all its aspects in the cities and villages of the monarchy was a reality that could no longer be covered by any censorship. The prospect of hunger was a threat that became more and more present among the most vulnerable categories: women, the elderly, sick children.⁵⁸

Against this backdrop, the year 1917 saw an unprecedented preoccupation for increased production for military needs, especially in the agricultural field,⁵⁹ as the food supply had become a priority not only for the Austro-Hungarian state but also for its German allies. All parties aimed to cultivate more and more agricultural land in the Austro-Hungarian territory, making significant investments in Hungary and Transylvania—e.g. the opening of a chemical fertilizer plant in Târnăveni (Dicsőszentmárton, Sankt Marton). Property seizure was interrupted by the authorities with an ordinance that drastically limited real estate transactions.⁶⁰ The requisition of harvests, which had started as early as 1915, was now much more strictly regulated. Although in 1917 agricultural production was relatively good, it was acutely necessary to restrict grain trade, to limit and rationalize consumption and redistribution, divided between the battlefield and the big cities. Thus, requisitioning commissions were set up in each county, coordinated by the deputy of the county-head. This official had well-defined attributions, including the setting up of the minimum level of provisions to remain for the sustenance of families, which could not exceed 12 kg of grain/month/family member. For this purpose, the Joint-Stock Company for War Products was organized with the express mission to carry out the requisition and redistribution procedures for agricultural products. Those who were supplied by the authorities received up to 7 kg/person/month.⁶¹ The delivery was to be paid off on the spot at the maximum rates set by the state.⁶² All the technical procedures for the appropriation of cereals, the producers' obligation to harvest (threshing and winnowing included) under the best conditions, as well as the strict registration of all the quantities of cereals were also detailed. Any offense was immediately punished by imprisonment for up to 6 months and a fine of 2,000 crowns.

During 1917, war loans VI and VII were carried out. Against the background of the same intense propaganda, the sixth loan launched in May 1917 was prolonged due to poor results, a sign that the willingness of the population was close to its limits. In trying to cover this, the Romanian press provided partial statistics revealing the involvement of Romanian banks in subscriptions, which however seemed to be quite good since 1.3 million crowns were subscribed via the Albina Bank, out of which the bank alone bought bonds worth 300,000 crowns.⁶³ The final results of the 7th loan revealed that the amount of 2,869,020,000 crowns had been collected, the autumn loan showing better results than the one in May.⁶⁴

The last war loan, the 8th, was announced for June 1918 amid a disastrous economic situation marked by an inflation that threatened to escape control. The shortage of products, first of all food, and the abundance of money without value on the market, produced despondency and panic among the population, whose care had become primarily to ensure their own survival. Although there was a price cap system on most staple goods, in reality the difficulty of purchasing them had generated a black market where prices were at least two times higher.⁶⁵ Another serious problem was also the way the subscription for the 8th loan was announced. Instead of invoking patriotic feelings and the necessary duty to the homeland, it was stated that “working together to achieve this success is a duty that, as in the past, our financial circles will carry out, to the extent that they are allowed to do so and with the provision for the needs of the future”⁶⁶—a future that no one could foresee. Even the bonds were issued with a 5% interest in the form of perpetual rent, a perpetual rent that actually meant “never.” Moreover, in the autumn of 1918, deep concern was expressed about the fate of the war loans and the possibility for the population to recover its contribution to these loans. It was clear that the state alone was responsible for their destiny and for a possible disaster. In anticipation of this imminent disaster, it was stated that “the new states will be unconditionally responsible for the loans contracted by their antecedents, regardless of their nature.”⁶⁷ But no one was responsible after 1918. The final results of the last war loan consisted of the subscription of 3,860,000,000 crowns, which, due to inflation, was worth only slightly more than the real value of the previous loan.⁶⁸

Thus, after eight such steps, the balance sheet of war loans in the Hungarian part of the empire amounted to a total of 18,912,000,000 crowns (\$3,665,546,400).⁶⁹ Compared to Hungary’s total war expenditures, it is estimated that the amount collected through the war loans accounted for approximately 53% of the total expenditures. The rest, at a rate of 5%, was covered by taxes, 37% from government loans to commercial banks and the Central Bank, and 5% from external loans.⁷⁰ In this manner, almost 60% of wartime expenditures were directly funded by the population through loans and taxes, accounting for only a small part, expressed in figures, of the huge financial effort, hardships, hunger and sufferings of a confrontation without precedent in the history of mankind. In this context, it is worth mentioning that the estimated total amount of Austro-Hungarian warfare costs amounted to \$20,623,000,000, which means a cost per capita of \$352, close to the European average.⁷¹

Some Conclusions

THE FIRST World War reshaped not only the political and territorial realities, but also the economic ones which, for the first time in history, came to include the war economy and its specific loans. Political, military and economic decision-makers tried, and sometimes succeeded, to provide plausible and manipulative explanations for their decisions and actions. War loans, among many others, are obvious examples of this. The public opinion in Transylvania was drawn into this “contest” of duty towards country and emperor, also lured by the prospect of rapid enrichment through so-called secure, interest-carrying investments. From the many advertisements and pieces of information published in the press of the time, we take note of the message and words published in *Gazeta Transilvaniei* (The Gazette of Transylvania) on 12 May 1916: “Romanians, subscribe to the 4th war loan” or “Can you get back your money from war loans? and how? The money placed in the war loan is not dead capital. You can gain money from it. If you want to buy land, livestock, farming implements or other tools, seed, fodder, or anything else, you can sell the state paper anywhere at its official price, set that day.”⁷² There were two other significant messages on the same page. The first concerned the national loan initiated in April 1916 by the Romanian government for the same military purposes.⁷³ The second message, in a bordered frame and in partially bolded fonts, claimed: “The patriotic wish of every citizen is to subscribe to the 4th war loan. The most favorable placement of money in state papers! By subscribing to the 4th war loan each man performs an act of honor, conscience and self-preservation. Details in all banks.”⁷⁴ The information is significant in many ways. On the one hand, it features the political and military as well as the economic ideas behind the war effort: the safety and benefit of investment in “state papers.” The authorities attempted, by associating the information with similar actions in Romania, a subtle, but also manipulative formula of transmitting a subliminal mobilizing message for war loans to the public opinion in Transylvania. We have to add that the “state papers” or, in economic-financial language, treasury or government bonds, had circulatory power, like the Austro-Hungarian insignia (crowns), on any market within the whole empire, and they could fulfill a triple role: means of treasury, payment (circulation), and exchange. But, as we have already pointed out, in the end the investments or placements in war loans turned insolvable. The defeat of the Central Powers and the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire meant the nullification of the government bonds. After 1918, the financial market was heavily affected by the concurrent circulation in Romania and the newly-joined territories of seven monetary symbols: the Romanian leu, the German occupation leu, the Romanov ruble, the Bolshevik ruble, the old Austro-Hungarian

crown, the crown of the Republic of Hungary (the so-called “white money” because they were printed only on one side), and the Bulgarian lev. Additionally, there were significant amounts of treasury bonds or government bonds on the market, issued by the belligerent states during the Great War of 1914–1918. Until the monetary unification of 1920 and 1921, the instability and the monetary tensions affected the economy, and some national initiatives and actions, patriotically motivated, were also perturbed by this situation. The words of the great historian Fernand Braudel are entirely true: “Money is unity, but it is also the injustice of the world.”⁷⁵

It is not the intention of the present article to perform an analysis of the indirect costs that the Great War entailed, this would be a much too complicated approach, even at a general level; economic historians have devised different econometric methods whose results are yet confusing and often contradictory.⁷⁶ We conclude with Bogart’s statement, often quoted within the pages of this study, who in his turn attempted to provide data on indirect costs, but who eventually found that

*no one can translate into arithmetic values the agony of the hearts and minds of millions of human lives lost in those five years . . . no one can transpose into graphics the immense economic loss that the world suffered from the deterioration of economic and social moral standards.*⁷⁷




ANNEX

TABLE 1


Year	Banknotes in circulation (thousands crowns)	Growth (%) 1913 = 100	Convertibility stock			Proportion of convertibility (%)	Average exchange rate of the gold crown to paper crown
			Gold	Silver	TOTAL		
1913	2,500	100	1,301	262	1,563	62.6	
1914	5,137	205	1,069	126	1,195	23.3	1:1.19
1915	7,162	286	745	66	811	11.5	1:1.48
1916	10,889	435	296	59	355	3.2	1:1.93
1917	18,440	738	325	57	382	2.0	1:2.28
1918 (31.10)	31,483	1,259					1:2.62
1918 (31.12)	35,600	1,424					

SOURCE: Kirițescu, 2: 240, 244, 248.

GRAPH 1. THE RESULTS OF THE EIGHT WAR LOANS (1914–1918)
IN THOUSANDS OF CROWNS



GRAPH 2. EVOLUTION OF MAXIMUM PRICES
FOR WHEAT, RYE AND CORN (1913–1918)



SOURCE: Teleszky, 373; the data represents the maximum reference prices established by the government, the quantities are expressed in q, and the values in crowns.

Notes

1. Ioan Bolovan, Gheorghe Cojocaru, and Oana Mihaela Tămaș, eds., *Primul Război Mondial: Perspectivă istorică și istoriografică/World War I: A Historical and Historiographical Perspective* (Cluj-Napoca: Academia Română, Centrul de Studii Transilvane; Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2015). It is not our intention, in this context, to perform an exhaustive bibliographic survey; we shall only mention the most important works that have been published in recent years. Moreover, Romania's historiographical yearbook (*Anuarul istoriografic al României*) is the most accessible source in this respect.
2. Ioan Bolovan, *Primul Război Mondial și realitățile demografice din Transilvania: Familie, moralitate și raporturi de gen* (Cluj-Napoca: Școala Ardeleană, 2015).
3. Diana Covaci, "'By Word and Example': Mobilizing People through the Circulars Issued by the Romanian Greek-Catholic Church in Transylvania (1915)," in *World War I: The Other Face of the War*, eds. Ioan Bolovan, Rudolf Gräf, Harald Heppner, and Oana Mihaela Tămaș (Cluj-Napoca: Romanian Academy, Center for Transylvanian Studies; Cluj University Press, 2016), 345–363.

4. Ana Victoria Sima and Mirela Popa-Andrei, “Copiii în vreme de război: O perspectivă transilvăneană asupra Primului Război Mondial,” in *Multiculturalism, identitate și diversitate: Perspective istorice: In honorem prof. univ. dr. Rudolf Gräf la împlinirea vârstei de 60 de ani/Multikulturalismus, Identität und Diversität: Historische Perspektiven: Festschrift für Professor Rudolf Gräf zum 60. Geburtstag*, eds. Iosif Marin Balog, Ioan Lumperdean, Loránd Mádly, and Dumitru Țicu (Cluj-Napoca: Mega, 2015), 501–516.
5. Elena Ioana Ignat-Kisanovici, *Participare și mobilizare în Transilvania în Primul Război Mondial: Perspective socioeconomice și demografice*, foreword by Ioan Bolovan (Cluj-Napoca: Academia Română, Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2015).
6. Bolovan, Gräf, Heppner, and Tămaș.
7. Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, “The Economics of World War I: An Overview,” in *The Economics of World War I*, eds. Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison (Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3–40.
8. Ernest L. Bogart, *Direct and Indirect Costs of the Great World War*, 2nd edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1920), 238.
9. Oscar Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*, 3rd edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); Nikolaus Wolf and Max-Stephan Schulze, “Harbingers of Dissolution? Grain Prices, Borders and Nationalism in the Habsburg Economy before the First World War,” discussion paper, Department of Economics, Free University of Berlin, 2005, p. 5.
10. Ernst Bruckmüller and Roman Sandgruber, “Concepts of Economic Integration in Austria during the Twentieth Century,” in *Nation, State, and the Economy in History*, eds. Alice Teichova and Herbert Matis (Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 159–180.
11. Apud Wolf and Schulze, 6.
12. Edward März, “Some Economic Aspects of the Nationality Conflict in the Habsburg Empire,” *Journal of Central European Affairs* 13, 2 (1953): 128.
13. Ibid.
14. Scott M. Eddie, “The Terms and Patterns of Hungarian Foreign Trade, 1882–1913,” *Journal of Economic History* 37, 2 (1977): 334–336.
15. David F. Good, *The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire 1750–1914* (Berkeley–Los Angeles–London: University of California Press, 1984).
16. Thomas Huertas, *Economic Growth and Economic Policy in a Multinational Setting: The Habsburg Monarchy 1841–1865* (New York: Arno Press, 1977).
17. John Komlos, ed., *Economic Development in the Habsburg Monarchy in the 19th Century: Essays* (Boulder–New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).
18. Max-Stephan Schulze, “Economic Development in the Nineteenth-Century Habsburg Empire,” *Austrian History Yearbook* 28 (1997): 293–307.
19. Ioan Lumperdean, Mihaela Salanță, and Rudolf Gräf, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte: Eine Einführung*, transl. Raluca-Mihaela Leluțiu et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2006), 167.
20. Henry Rousso, “Économie de guerre,” in *Dictionnaire d’histoire économique: De 1800 à nos jours: Les grandes puissances, les grands thèmes* (Paris: Hatier, 1987), 117.

21. Margaret MacMillan, *Războiul care a pus capăt păcii: Drumul spre 1914*, transl. Smaranda Câmpeanu (Bucharest: Trei, 2015), 312–330.
22. Bogart, 237.
23. *Revista economică* (Sibiu) 16, 32 (1914): 371.
24. *Ibid.*, 16, 33 (1914): 375.
25. *Ibid.*, 16, 47 (1914). For the time being, the main causes were the artificial price increase and the lack of supply, amid the general uncertainty.
26. See Covaci.
27. *Ibid.*, 358–363.
28. “Cronica economică a anului 1914,” *Revista economică* 17, 2 (1915): 1–2.
29. Bogart, 238. Figures express the dollar’s worth in 1913. The exchange rate was: 1 crown = 0.2 \$.
30. For public loans in financial theory and practice, including those on armaments and war, see: Iulian Văcărel, ed., *Finanțe publice* (Bucharest: Ed. Didactică și Pedagogică, 1992), 189–199; Costin C. Kirîțescu and Emilian M. Dobrescu, *Moneda: Mică enciclopedie* (Bucharest: Ed. Enciclopedică, 1998), 63–64, 99–100, 111–112, 173, 198–199; Claude Jessua, Christian Labrousse, and Daniel Vitry, eds., *Dicționar de științe economice*, foreword by Ion Gh. Roșca, transl. Delia-Georgeta Bob et al. (Chișinău: Arc, 2006), 760–761; Rousso, 117–118.
31. Paul Kennedy, *Ascensiunea și decăderea marilor puteri: Transformări economice și conflicte militare din 1500 până în 2000*, transl. Laurențiu Ursu, Teodora Moldovanu, Lucia Dos, and Ramona Lupu, afterword by Andrei Miroiu (Iași: Polirom, 2011), 206. Cf. Liviu Maior, *Doi ani mai devreme: Ardeleni, bucovineni și basarabeni în război* (Cluj-Napoca: Școala Ardeleană, 2016), 193–197.
32. Bogart, 252 (the list of all loans with the related amounts in dollars).
33. In July 1914, George Bernard Shaw wrote in the newspaper *New Statesman* that the war would end “in a few weeks,” see Sylvia Nasar, *Geniul economic: Extraordinara poveste a geniilor care au fondat economia modernă*, transl. Paul Mihalache (Bucharest: All, 2013), 179.
34. Kennedy, 260.
35. *Revista economică* 16, 46 (1914): 435.
36. *Ibid.*, 16, 48 (1914): 445.
37. *Ibid.*
38. Complete data in Bogart, 240.
39. “Anul economic 1915,” *Revista economică* 18, 3 (1916): 18.
40. See the Annex on the evolution of cereal prices.
41. *Revista economică* 17, 41 (1915): 399.
42. *Ibid.*, 17, 16 (1915): 181; 17, 41 (1915): 400.
43. *Ibid.*, 17, 20 (1915): 230.
44. *Ibid.*, 17, 22 (1915): 254.
45. A statistic of the first five war loan loans contracted in the Hungarian part of the monarchy was published in *Revista economică* 19, 6 (1917): 58. The values in dollars are taken from Bogart, 252.
46. *Revista economică* 17, 40 (1915): 392.

47. See note 38.
48. See the Annex.
49. Apud Costin C. Kirițescu, *Sistemul bănesc al leului și precursorii lui*, vol. 2, 3rd part, *Sistemul bănesc al leului în perioada 1900–1944* (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1967), 245.
50. *Revista economică* 18, 26 (1916): 283–284.
51. *Ibid.*, 284.
52. *Ibid.*, 285.
53. *Ibid.*, 19, 4 (1917): 27–28.
54. See note 32. For a more eloquent picture, it is worth mentioning that the amount of 2.3 billion crowns was equivalent to 127.777 kg of gold, at the rate of the time of 18,000 crowns/kg (the average crown to gold exchange rate, compared with that of paper, was 1: 1.93 in 1916).
55. On the money supply in circulation and the gold reserve see the Annex.
56. Bogart, 245.
57. Kirițescu, 249.
58. See Sima and Popa-Andrei.
59. The loss of labor force in agriculture was over 50%, accompanied by the lack of traction animals, the impossibility to repair and ensure the operation of agricultural machinery, etc. See, for details, Iván T. Berend and Gyula Ránki, “Ungarns Kriegswirtschaft,” in *Die Habsburgermonarchie*, vol. 1, *Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung*, ed. Alois Brusatti (Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1973), 522–523.
60. “Cronica anului 1917,” *Revista economică* 20, 1 (1918): 2.
61. Ordinance published in *Revista economică* 19, 24 (1917): 272.
62. Starting with 24 July 1917, the wheat price was set at 41.38 crowns/hl, rye at 37 crowns, barley at 35, and oat at 34 crowns. Cf. *Revista economică* 19, 28 (1917): 302.
63. *Ibid.*, 19, 23 (1917): 268.
64. See note 32.
65. For example, at the end of 1917 a pound of bacon had a price capped at 10 crowns—the same product sold on the black market would cost at least double; one pound of pork cost 6.70 crowns, or 16.00 crowns on the black market. Cf. Kirițescu, 254.
66. *Revista economică* 20, 23 (1918): 261.
67. *Ibid.*, 20, 45 (1918): 428.
68. Bogart, 252.
69. See the Annex. For \$ amounts, see Bogart, 252.
70. János Teleszky, *A magyar állam pénzügyei a háború alatt* (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1927), 418; similar data in Kirițescu, 241.
71. Data retrieved from Broadberry, and Harrison, table 8.
72. *Gazeta Transilvaniei* (Braşov) 79, 102 (1916): 3–4.
73. During the period of neutrality and war, the Romanian government contracted 9 loans from the National Bank of Romania. Sometimes, loans from the National Bank of Romania guaranteed and supplemented those obtained from the mar-

ket through government securities. A national loan of 408,000,000 lei was initiated around the 1916 campaign. Cf. Gheorghe Platon, *Istoria modernă a României* (Bucharest: Ed. Didactică și Pedagogică, 1985), 460. See also Cristian Păunescu, Mihaela Tone, and Nadia Manea, *Istoria Băncii Naționale a României în date*, vol. 2, 1915–1918 (Bucharest: Oscar Print, 2009), 21–93.

74. *Gazeta Transilvaniei* 79, 102 (1916): 4.
75. Fernand Braudel, *Structurile cotidianului: Posibilul și imposibilul*, transl. Adrian Riza, vol. 2 (Bucharest: Meridiane, 1984), 262.
76. John Maurice Clark, *The Costs of the World War to the American People* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931). A methodological critique in Broadberry and Harrison, 15–16.
77. Bogart, iii–iv.

Abstract

Economic and Financial Implications of the First World War: Domestic War Loans

This article aims to outline some aspects pertaining to the economic and financial implications of the First World War, the mechanisms and means by which this conflict was financially supported. We will first look at how the war loans contributed financially to supporting the needs of the front, how the population was called upon to support this effort, and of course, the propaganda of the authorities in this regard. Given the economic situation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and in the context of international capital market, the only viable solution was to resort to domestic loans that became a tool used by the state to gather the financial resources needed to support the war effort from the population and the banks. Thus, following the example of Germany, Austria-Hungary launched a well-organized campaign to contract loans on the domestic market every six months. In total, eight loans were made. It was considered a patriotic duty of every citizen to support the cause of the war, all these efforts being considered part of a genuine “domestic front.”

Keywords

World War I, economic implications, Austria-Hungary, Transylvania, war loans

IOAN-AUREL POP

The Importance of the Treaty of Trianon



Trianon, 4 June 1920.

SOURCE: <https://www.mvu.ro/index.php>.

Ioan-Aurel Pop

Chairman of the Romanian Academy, professor at Babeş-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca. Author, among others, of the vol. **A Short Illustrated History of the Romanians** (2019).

CELEBRATIONS, ANNIVERSARIES and commemorations are part of civilized peoples' everyday life. We keep in our mind both defeats and victories, and from time to time we revive their memory because they all are a source from which we can learn. There are political regimes and peoples which emphasize tragedies, and there are others that glorify achievements. Romanians have never dwelt upon their historical failures—and there have been quite a few of those over the course of time!—preferring to remember victories, sometimes too vividly. On the contrary, our Serbian neighbors, for instance, turned the tragic battle of Kossovopolje of 1389 (after which the Turks assumed control over the region) into a moment of reference for their national identity and a symbol of their sacrifice for the faith. Our Hungarian neighbors chose to turn certain defeats in their history into important events or even national holidays: for instance, in the history of Hungary the Modern Era begins in 1526, when the “disaster” of Mohács took place; 15 March 1848 (when, among other things, the union of Transylvania with Hungary was decided) marks the glory

of a defeated revolution; 23 October 1956 is the date of another violently stifled revolution, this time by the Soviet tanks; 4 June 1920 is the day of the “catastrophe” of Trianon, etc.

Lately we have been hearing the name Trianon associated with the signing of a peace treaty a century ago. At the end of World War I, the winning powers, acting together, concluded separate treaties with every single defeated state. That is why, between 1919 and 1920, in Paris and nearby, five documents were signed to officially put an end to the war. The Treaty of Trianon is the last of these five. It is called so after the Grand Trianon Palace, located near the sumptuous Palace of Versailles. If this treaty had not been signed there by the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary, few Romanians would have probably heard of Trianon. The document settled all the problems between the winners and Hungary, which, when the war started, had not been a subject of international law. Actually, for the first time after about half a millennium (1541–1920), Hungary became again an officially recognized independent country owing to this very document. The treaty enshrined, among many other things, the separation from the territory of historical Hungary (“Hungary as it was under the Crown of Saint Stephen”) of all the territories (counties, provinces) in which Hungarians were a minority from the demographic point of view. These territories were mainly Croatia and Vojvodina, Slovakia, and Transylvania, which were recognized as belonging to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Czechoslovakia and Kingdom of Romania, respectively. By these decisions (as well as by those of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye) “historical Hungary” lost about two thirds of its territory in favor of the majority populations, which had chosen their destiny in 1918. This document, whose provisions are generally still valid, is presented by the Hungarian propaganda as “the greatest historical injustice done by the Great Western Powers to eternal Hungary, the ruler of the Carpathian Basin.” This is why many Hungarians consider the Treaty of Trianon as the moment of disintegration for Hungary, after the Great Powers “grabbed” “its historical provinces,” namely Transylvania, Slovakia, Croatia, etc.

What is the reality? Many say today, in the context of relativism, that truth is whatever everyone considers true, which obviously lacks logical consistency. When we speak of the new architecture of Central and Southeastern Europe after World War I, it is imperative to make the distinction between factual and legal realities. Actually, the entire old order of the region collapsed in the year 1918, when four empires fell (German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman) and new states were formed, or others were completed according to ethnic and national criteria. The cause of this huge change was, undoubtedly, the peoples’ fight for national emancipation, initiated in the 18th century and culminating in the “century of nationalities” and in the 1900s. The occasion of

the imminent change was, no doubt, the world war, “the Great War,” which favored the fulfillment of the peoples’ wish, as the Great Powers in the area were defeated. Rightfully, the new order was accepted at international level in the years 1919–1920, through the already mentioned peace treaties.

For the Romanians, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, etc., the culmination of the changes was the autumn of the year 1918. The Treaty of Trianon means for these peoples only the completion of the process, through the international consecration of a pre-existing reality. In these peoples’ vision, the reunification of Romania, Slovakia (with the creation of Czechoslovakia) and Croatia (in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) was not done by the Great Powers, but by the peoples themselves, through their elites, as a result of the national emancipation movements. It is crystal clear for anyone that it was not Trianon that decided the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but the nations that no longer wanted to live in the “prison of nations.”

For the Romanians, the Treaty of Trianon cannot be considered the document that achieved the union of Transylvania and Kingdom of Romania, as it only made an older reality official at international level. The union of the Romanian provinces, Transylvania included, with Kingdom of Romania was not the consequence of the treaties concluded by the victors with the defeated states (and Trianon is no exception); it was due to the national emancipation movements culminating with the decisions made at Chişinău, Czernowitz, and Alba Iulia. The Treaty of Trianon did not decide the union of Transylvania with Kingdom of Romania, it only recognized, at international level, the deed accomplished by the Romanians in 1918. The new borders of united Romania were recognized not only at Trianon, but also at Saint-Germain-en-Laye (Romania’s northeastern border with Poland), and at Neuilly-sur-Seine (the southeastern border with Bulgaria); for the Romanians, Trianon is therefore only a juridical episode connected to the western border of Romania (very important, no doubt) in the epic of the Great Union.

Consequently, the actions organized by Romania on the centennial of the Treaty of Trianon are generally correlated with those of the countries and peoples liberated in 1918 from Austro-Hungarian domination. All these actions refer to the international recognition of the decisions made by the peoples, to the new European architecture after the Great War, which was not the decision of the Great Powers; all the Great Powers did was to recognize the actions of the liberated peoples.

Hungary’s main arguments against the Trianon Treaty were based, in 1920, on historic rights, on the law of the sword, on the “civilizing mission of the Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin.” In fact, in certain documents circulated

by official circles in Budapest, they repeat even today the racist idea that, in 1920, the Great Western Powers gave Transylvania, the “pearl of the Kingdom of Hungary” to “uncivilized Balkan Romania.” The arguments of Romania, Slovakia, Croatia, etc. focus on the ethnicity and the will of the majority population, on the right of peoples to decide their own destiny (the right of peoples to self-determination, supported and imposed by the United States President Woodrow Wilson). Therefore, these are two completely different visions. In international law, in 1919–1920 and nowadays, Hungary’s arguments were not and are not valid, they do not belong to the arsenal of democracy and were not recognized by the international community. Hungary’s position is singular, isolated, while Romania’s position is shared by several actors in the international configuration. Europe’s new political and territorial order is in place since 1918, validated by historical practice, and even if the decision-makers who participated in the Trianon conference of June 1920 had wanted to change that order, they would not have been able to do so.

The decisions to recognize the new states and the ones unified in 1918 were (largely) revalidated after World War II, then later at the Helsinki Conference (1975), and also after the fall of the Iron Curtain. For us, for Romanians, it is painful that the consequences of the Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact (concluded on 23 August 1939) remained in force; although it was denounced, the pact still produces effects. But this serious fact has nothing to do with Trianon. Romania’s western border with Hungary, with the exception of the 1940–1944 episode (which took place under a totalitarian fascist regime, condemned by all international courts), has remained unchanged for a century, being considered the expression of democratic relations and of international principles of peaceful coexistence.

The union of Transylvania with Romania was not the act of an elite (although the elite voted for it), but a democratic act with the character of a plebiscite: 1,228 delegates, elected and appointed by the administrative-territorial units, political parties, churches, professional associations, women, students etc., voted on 1 December 1918 not only in their name, as individual votes, but also in the name of millions of Romanians who delegated their right to vote through documents called “credentials” (recently published in the eight volumes of the monumental work entitled *Building the Great Union*, compiled by Babeş-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca). Therefore, one vote cast in Alba Iulia was actually the vote of tens and hundreds of Romanians, and all the 1,228 votes represent, in fact, the position of all the Transylvanian Romanians. According to the Austro-Hungarian censuses, the Romanians accounted for the absolute majority of Transylvania (including Banat, Crişana, and Maramureş).

After any war, anywhere and anytime in the world, there are winners and losers. The latter were always punished, and the former decided the fate of the countries in their area. But for the first time in history, the winners of the First World War were forced to take into account, overwhelmingly, the will of the peoples involved. The losers, as always, had their frustrations and sufferings, but, in the special case of the Hungarian people, a part of the elite (that of noble extraction) cultivated the mentality of a victim compelled to seek revenge. This frustration of the Hungarian people is real and painful, but its endless cultivation deepens tensions in the area. Consequently, every action taken by Romania in relation with the centennial of Trianon must be understood distinctly, should be treated without bitterness and be placed in the general context of the recognition of the new architecture of Europe through the treaties of Paris (Versailles, Saint-Germain-en Laye, Neuilly-sur-Seine, Trianon, and Sèvres) of 1919–1920. Romania, since 1918, has legitimized itself in the world, and, since then, this legitimation has been recognized by the international courts and reiterated until today.

History is interpreted differently by different peoples. Romanians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians and many other Europeans celebrate the peace treaties of Paris precisely because they accepted the decisions of the peoples to form new national and federal states, on the ruins of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman empires. It is true that these new realities were accepted by the Allied and Associated Powers, who were victorious in the First World War. But this has been happening ever since the world began. Over the past hundred years, other international binding decisions have confirmed—broadly—the treaties of 1919–1920 and the existence of national states in the region. Therefore, any nostalgic discussion about old empires and multinational states becomes obsolete. Especially since today, the states and the peoples of the former communist “Eastern Europe” militate for the fullest possible integration into the European Union. Or, more precisely, in Romania’s vision, they should do so.

There is a difference in accent between the official positions of Hungary and Romania, but the accent is serious. Romania sees the new political-territorial chessboard of Central Europe as part of a process carried out by the peoples (1918) and legitimized by the Great Powers (1919–1920), while Hungary sees only the legitimation and only the 1920 moment, completely neglecting the role of the peoples.

Obviously, the Treaty of Trianon has its international and national importance which is difficult to estimate and impossible to minimize: it legitimized the just will of the Romanian people and consecrated a valuable legacy at inter-

national level. The peoples to whom historic justice was granted by the Treaty of Trianon seek to defend and uphold it, since it was confirmed by all the international treaties that followed. In other words, with the exception of the Russian Empire (always rebuilt under various forms), all the other empires taken apart by peoples in 1918 remain only a historical memory. Instead, the states of the Poles, Romanians, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, etc., created, recreated, unified or reborn after the First World War, have endured and still exist today.



Abstract

The Importance of the Treaty of Trianon

When we speak of the new architecture of Central and Southeastern Europe after World War I, it is imperative to make the distinction between factual and legal realities. Actually, the entire old order of the region collapsed in the year 1918, when four empires fell (German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman) and new states were formed, or others were completed according to ethnic and national criteria. The cause of this huge change was, undoubtedly, the peoples' fight for national emancipation, initiated in the 18th century and culminating in the "century of nationalities" and in the 1900s. Obviously, the Treaty of Trianon has its international and national importance which is difficult to estimate and impossible to minimize: it legitimized the just will of the Romanian people and consecrated a valuable legacy at international level.

Keywords

Trianon, Romania, Hungary, Transylvania, Woodrow Wilson

Trianon in Romania's Contemporary Public Consciousness (1920)

ALEXANDRU
PORȚEANU

Transilvania

An. LI. Iunie 1920. Nr. 2.

CRONICA POLITICĂ

Tratatul de pace cu Ungaria. În sfârșit, s'a încheiat pacea și cu Ungaria. Zădarnice au fost toate uneltirile și svârcoțirile oligarhiei maghiare. Zădarnică toată agitația întreținută atâtă vreme în Elveția, și în timpul din urmă în Italia și Anglia. Zădarnice toate campaniile purtate împotriva noastră în unele consulate și ziare americane. A învins dreptatea. Marele fantaron, *contele Apponyi*, care e unul din politicienii cei mai vinovați ai fostei monarhii austro-ungare, a trebuit să se convingă la adânci bătrânețe, că răbulistica lui nu mai prinde și că întreaga ideologia lor politică a fost un dezasstru. La scurtele lui, că în Ungaria independentă nu va mai fi nevoie de o centralizare forțată ca în Ungaria lipită de monarhia austriacă, dusmanul său de vaxcuri, și astfel chestiunea naționalităților se poate deslega bine în cadrele statului maghiar milenar, prezidentul conferinței de pace, d-i *Millerand* a răspuns, că puterile aliate și asociate nu vor uita partea de responsabilitate ce incumbă Ungariei în deslănțuirea războiului mondial și, în general, în politica imperialistă urmată de dubla monarhie. — Ce privește argumentele sale istorice cu frontierele milenare ale statului maghiar, d-i *Millerand* îi spune limpede, că una-i viețea și alta istoria: „O stare de lucruri, ch' ar milenară, nu are drept de existență, dacă e contra justiției”. A întârziat d-i conte și cu plebiaculul

litație nemaghiare se vor mai lăsa anăgite de senele deia Budapesta. Plebiaculul acestor naționalități s'a întâmplat în Octomvrie și Noemvrie 1918, când poporește asurpite din dubla monarhie au declarat că se unesc cu frații lor liberi din Italia, România, Cehoslovacia și Jugoslavia. Dispozițiunile tardive ale stăpânirii ungurești n'au putut face să dispară din sulețele convingerosa, adânc întemolată pe experiențele politice dureroase, că toate năzuințele politice maghiare erau îndreptate împotriva naționalităților nemaghiare pentru păstrarea situației lor privilegiate, nemeșitate, de pupoi conducător. — S'a tranșat și chestia Ruteniei, alipite la Cehoslovacia, nu la Ungaria, cum speră d-i conte. O singură nădejde mai poate avea Ungaria, redusă acum la proporțiile ei juste, aceea de a fi primită și ea în societatea naționalităților, dacă va împlini leal obligațiunile impuse de tratatul de pace.

Rezultatul alegerilor parlamentare. Între agitațiunile marșale de obicei au decurs, la stârșitul lui Mai și începutul lui Iunie, noile alegeri parlamentare. Agitațiile erau de peșvăzut în momentul când s'a spart solidaritatea și s'a început divizarea pe partide. Cu totul avem până acum 369 deputați, grupăți după partide, precum urmează: Partidul Poporului 214 Federația Democrației Naționale 34 Partidul Național din Ardeal . . . 28 Partidul Tărănăst din Basarabia 23

Transilvania (Sibiu), June 1920.

SOURCE: <http://documente.bcuculuj.ro/web/bibdgit/periodice/transilvania/1920.html>.

Alexandru Porțeanu

Former university professor from Bucharest, historian, founding president of the Association of Former Refugees (AFOR, 1940–1947). Editor of the vol. **Semnificații europene: Unirea românilor 1918: Acte politice și juridice** (European meanings: The 1918 union of Romanians: Political and legal acts) (1993).

IN THE international scientific literature of the field, one cannot find a study devoted solely to the way the Treaty of Trianon was perceived in the countries located in the vicinity of Hungary.

The initial shock—whether over a relatively short or even somewhat longer term—at what Hungary felt like a “dismemberment” of the country, could be nothing but painful, even acutely so. This reaction must be recognized, accepted and respected with honest lucidity, while perhaps acknowledging a nation’s “right to grieve,” a right that can be rejected; however, this kind of right should be accompanied by the mutual acceptance of the principle of the limitations of any right, in conjunction with the rights of the other partners.

These issues did not appear suddenly after the treaty was signed and ratified. The complexity of the negotiations and its clauses, of the internal political evolution of Hungary, including the 1919 communist takeover, came under the intense scrutiny of the public opinion everywhere. The entire period of the preparation and drafting

of the Peace Treaty was accompanied by the preservation of Hungary's last minimal hopes regarding the mitigation of the most sensitive clauses, especially the territorial ones. The necessity of a decisive intervention of the Peace Conference expressed by the well-known "Millerand letter" addressed to Hungary on 6 May 1920, brought about the completion of the process and shattered Hungary's last illusions.

In Romania, on 18 May 1920, an item of information was published regarding the Allies' response to the Hungarian observations on the Peace Treaty, which considered that "the agitated spirits of the Hungarian hornets' nest needed some time to resignedly accept the adamant decisions of the Peace Conference."¹

On 19 May 1920 began the publication of a series of articles and comments on the preparation, content and interpretations of this "Peace with Hungary,"² published by the newspaper *Románul* (The Romanian) in Arad, the most prolific press organ on this topic. The newspaper's permanent foreign correspondent in Budapest sent reports about the street demonstrations and the call of the Hungarian government signed by the champions of Hungarian ultra-chauvinism.

On 20 May 1920, the same correspondent reported on the statements made by the former Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Andrassy the Younger under the headline "Andrassy about the Magyar Peace,"³ and on the emergence of the propaganda newspaper *Nem, Nem, Soha* (No, No, Never)—freely distributed to the population, concluding that "No-nonsense people are convinced of the impossibility of military resistance."

On 25 May 1920, the press communiqué of the Damian Press Agency announced that Hungary had accepted the peace terms.⁴

An interesting correspondence by the same author, published on 26 May 1920, contained information and comments on the "Attitude of Hungary's Germans" in support of maintaining the integrity of Greater Hungary, a position surprisingly shared by some representatives of the Saxons and Swabians living in Romania.⁵

On 27 May 1920, a communiqué from Odorhei (Székelyudvarhely, Oderhellen) informed about the indictment by the Court Martial of the former Hungarian deputy-prefect of the Trei Scaune (Háromszék, Three Seats) County and of the former commander of the Hungarian gendarmerie, for conspiracy and high treason.⁶ Another similar trial took place at the Court Martial in Cluj (Kolozsvár, Klausenburg), for internal and external actions of slandering the Romanian army, and for treason, against a group of Magyar intellectuals.⁷

In Cluj, the magazine *Új Ember* (The New Man), a "critical and political" weekly of the left-wing opposition in Transylvania and Hungary, published on 30 May 1920 the editorial "Signing and Guaranteeing the Peace."⁸ "By signing the Peace Treaty, Hungary must put an end to all these slogans of 'No, no, never,'

marking the end of the imperialist, irredentist politics and the dawning of an age in which peace will be guaranteed by the *government of the Magyar people*.” The positive significance of this Magyar attitude was highlighted in a comment on it, published by *Renașterea română* (The Romanian Renaissance) in Sibiu (Nagy-szeben, Hermannstadt), on the day when the Treaty of Trianon was signed, in the preliminary campaign initiated as a way to promote its rightfulness.⁹

The first signal, fast and consistent, of the way in which the Romanian public reacted to the Treaty of Trianon appeared less than 24 hours after its signing, on 5 June 1920, in the newspaper editorial published by *Dacia* in Bucharest, “Peace with Hungary,” under the signature of Sextil Pușcariu,¹⁰ one of the leading Romanian academics, thoroughly familiar with the realities of Transylvania and Bukovina. The focus of his analysis was on the future of Romanian-Hungarian relations:

Let us not forget that we have a significant number of Magyar citizens with whom we will have to share our daily lives, away from conflicts . . . our future position towards them will depend first and foremost on how they will deal with the situation instituted in the wake of the Peace Treaty coming into force.

The author did not share the concern of some Romanian analysts or commentators regarding the fact that “we have within the borders of the country an irredentist minority that is just waiting for the moment of revenge.”¹¹ Sextil Pușcariu brought in the full force of his personality when he stated that

In a Romania now made Whole, every citizen should know they are able to enjoy all citizenship rights, as individual language and customs are respected . . . but, in our country, there can be no privileges for anyone and our non-Romanian citizens will have to get used to the thought that the Romanian people must acquire all those rights and institutions they were once deprived of.

Such an approach necessarily required creativity and optimism, as “this can be done without curtailing anyone, without impairing either physical wellbeing or national pride.” In this spirit, a horizon based on trust and cooperation could be shaped. Sextil Pușcariu concluded his analytical demonstration in a meaningful way:

*Let us search for all the points of contact with our Magyar fellow citizens, committing ourselves to the common productive work, without pouring salt onto wounds that have not yet closed. We will find them in the fields of science, art, in mutual economic interest. Former national feuds will fade into oblivion.*¹²

This first, immediate, direct echo of the peace with Hungary became an anthological and programmatic text, published in the capital of the new Greater Romania.

In Transylvania, the impact of the event was of special interest. The first general reaction of this kind appeared under the title “The New State of Hungary: The Signing of the Peace Treaty and its Consequences: The New Horizons of Hungary”¹³ in *Renașterea română*, a publication whose director was Eugen Goga, the brother of poet Octavian Goga. After a few brief references to the signing of the treaty, the (anonymous) author did not hesitate to conclude, rather early, that: “In the current situation, Hungary is pitiful. The conditions of the treaty are harsh, but if the Hungarian people pay no heed to those who want to take them back to the wrong paths, they will manage to organize their country . . . Hungary will be able to overcome the hardships.”

On the same day of 6 June 1920, almost immediately after the event, *Tribuna socialistă* (The Socialist Tribune), the mouthpiece of the Socialist Party of Transylvania, Banat and the Hungarian Counties, which appeared every Sunday in Cluj, announced that “Hungary Has Signed the Peace.”

*The Hungarian delegate, with a shaking hand, signed the Peace Treaty. After 9 months of persecution, hesitation and stubbornness of the white terrorists, it was time to sign the peace in order to appease those who believed that the future of Hungary hang on this signature. In the next issue we will resume the topic and elaborate on the signing of the Peace Treaty.*¹⁴

Probably due to the natural backlog of a weekly publication, the editorial never revisited the subject.

In the same vein, on 7 June 1920, *România nouă* (The New Romania), the newspaper of the Society for Citizens’ Education, published the article entitled “How do Hungarians React? The Signing of the Peace Treaty, a Day of National Mourning.”¹⁵ It was the first explicit expression of the realistic understanding of the treaty with Romania, written in from the vantage point of civic educational principles. The Hungarian attitude

is most justifiable for the soul of a people. For, no matter how unfair the form of the state had been . . . no matter how guilty Hungary was for the part it played in the outbreak of the World War, one cannot ask a people to merrily celebrate the day when they signed a document of such national import . . . while a tearful protest in the face of such a historical catastrophe might be more dignified than any manifestations of opportunism or even political cowardice.

On 8 June 1920, the conservative organ *L'Indépendance roumaine* published a severe criticism of an article found in the Italian newspaper *L'Idea nazionale* of 23 May 1920, entitled “La schiantu dei magiari” and another, from *Secolo*, for “their unfair and dangerous attitude.” One should mention their position regarding the necessity of a joint Romanian-Hungarian resistance to the Slavic danger. The Bucharest conservative newspaper considered that it was precisely among the Transylvanians that they would find “the best intermediaries between the two peoples.”¹⁶

On the same day, the daily *Adevărul* (The Truth), under the title “About the Treaty with Hungary,”¹⁷ published a commentary on *Secolo*'s dispatch from Vienna, which evoked the discussions held in Switzerland in March 1920 for the restoration of the Habsburgs in Hungary.

Banatul românesc (The Romanian Banat), a national political newspaper whose director was the activist and publicist Avram Imbroane, published on 8 June the editorial article (unsigned) on “Hungary's Mourning,” a relevant analysis regarding the Hungarian government's decree that declared the day of 4 June 1920 as a day of national mourning.

*The leaders of the Hungarian people are again deceiving their countrymen with phantasms, instead of telling them the truth. I might understand the meaning of the Hungarian mourning if it involved the acknowledgement of the mistakes and sins committed over a thousand years of their rule, but . . . the myopic soul of the conceited magnates, their attempts to elicit pity from the entire world are simply ridiculous and likely to arouse hatred rather than heartfelt reconciliation. Forgiveness . . . this is something that the Magyar cannot obtain by spreading hatred and seeking revenge and retaliation . . . the wisest thing that can be done by the Magyars is to cast out of their soul the faith and the hope that the subjugation and exploitation of other nations might be still possible . . . For us, the Magyar mourning will be a powerful incentive to close our ranks and strengthen ourselves, whilst for them, this might continue to be a source of future disasters.*¹⁸

In the same vein, *Drapelul* (The Flag) of Lugoj (Lugos, Lugosch) published an article on the “Future Army of Hungary.”¹⁹

“Scotus Viator and Peace with Hungary,” an article published in *Banatul*,²⁰ informed readers about R. W. Seton-Watson's article published in the *New Europe* magazine about the harmful influence of Hungarian propaganda in England. The editorial staff of the Romanian publication expressed “thanks and gratitude to this friend of the Romanians.”

On 9 June 1920, the newspaper *România* of Cluj, the mouthpiece of the People's Party, published the article “Peace with Hungary” under the signature

of Constantin Albu.²¹ “Finally, after a few months of dithering, on Friday, 4 June, the Hungarians signed the peace . . . All their attempts, therefore, were thwarted and with their heads down, the Hungarians signed the peace that gave to the peoples the right to the lands they were entitled to.” In the same issue of the newspaper, under the title “Two Worlds, Bucharest–Budapest,”²² there appeared a comment and an update from the “Notes of a Passerby,” written by Octavian Goga in 1911.

Another illustrative text for the contemporary perception of the treaty in Romania appeared on 9 June 1920, unsigned, in the same *România* newspaper, under the title “A Day of Mourning for Hungary.”²³ His author was a knowledgeable person, fully familiar with the topic.

The treaty will weigh heavy on the history of this people . . . This day is rightly considered as a day of national mourning throughout Hungary . . . Of course, we will respect the solemnity of this sad day in Hungary. We are a people who endured too much not to know the pain of defeat and the supreme balm of consolation. But we think that this treaty . . . is merely the fulfillment of a historical sanction. We think that the nationalities of Hungary have experienced harsher times . . .

However, in his considerations, the editor attempted to turn to the present days and to future prospects.

By revisiting these painful memories, on this sad day for Hungary, we cannot refrain from suggesting to our neighbors a little bit of wisdom in the days to come. The experience of the past was too painful to be easily forgotten. History does not forgive any of the sins of the past and the sins of arrogant Hungary are too many and too old to be atoned for and allow them to once again foster the hope of mad and futile revenge.

Indeed, from the immediate perspective of the Treaty of Trianon, such a conclusion seemed acceptable and plausible but, unfortunately, the retrospective of the treaty only a few decades later invalidated it.

In the same vein of general analyses or comments, the *Dacia* newspaper in Bucharest published on 9 June 1920 an interesting editorial signed with the initials A. B., probably those of writer Ion Al. Brătescu-Voinești, entitled “Hungarian Innocence.”²⁴ The author challenged the political theory that ascribed all misfortunes to the old regimes and created the illusion that the new regimes would be sufficient guarantees for the future. “The wave of humanitarianism, beautiful but belated, which has engulfed us, makes us take a superficial look at this false argument . . .” The author referred more explicitly to “Béla Kun’s Hungary and Horthy’s Hungary,” noting that “in today’s grim flying of flags in

Budapest, we see only the agitation of the same thoughts and mindsets of former Hungarian regimes. Will there ever be a real change in the political institution of this state? That remains to be seen. Until then, we cannot be moved . . . ”

Another lengthy but unsigned editorial, entitled “Hungary Signed the Peace,” also appeared on 9 June 1920 in the newspaper *Patria* (The Homeland) of Cluj, the organ of the Romanian National Party, whose director was the writer Ion Agârbiceanu.

The conscience of humanity could not accept that the war that spelt such a horrible reality might beget a peace that is not derived from reality . . . We were so convinced of the legitimacy of our rights . . . that we started to settle down the way one does at home, with no intention of upsetting the Hungarians who live with us, but because we felt responsible for the government of a country we knew to be henceforth our own.

In contrast to this, “instead of recognizing from the beginning that another era begins . . . and join at the right time the ranks of the peoples who understand that rivers never flow back to their sources, the Hungarians thought they could make time stand still.”²⁵ There was still enough hope that

*today, after the signing of the peace, maybe they will open their eyes wider and will see the reality . . . they will see that the nation living by their side is not their enemy, but a people that have been oppressed for centuries. The historical decisions made by the Romanians will convince the Hungarians about our true feelings and principles of life . . . neither shall we rejoice, nor shall we toll the bells . . . We declare in all sincerity and with heartfelt affection for our fellow citizens of a different nationality that the time of national oppression is gone! Join us in the common work for the progress of the homeland and the wellbeing of all its citizens.*²⁶

The greatest Romanian historian and one of the emblematic cultural-political figures militating for Romanian national unity, the “apostle of the nation,” Nicolae Iorga, authored the editorial entitled “Peace with Hungary,” published on 9 June 1920 in *Neamul românesc* (The Romanian People), the newsletter of the Nationalist-Democratic Party, the mouthpiece of the Union for National Democracy, whose director he was. The territory of old Hungary

has been reduced strictly to its national boundaries set in keeping with the principles of justice . . . and with the new spirit that reigns in international life. Instead, Hungary is offered the formal assurance that the League of Nations . . . will be able to ensure that any former Hungarian national compelled today by the fatal result

of old conquests and impositions to live in the shadow of another flag, will be provided with whatever he might need to carry on with living undisturbed according to the traditions of his people, whose ethos he might fully cherish.²⁷

Iorga also expressed his disagreement with the disproportionate Hungarian attitude that went as far as demanding “the reconquest of the old borders.”

I do not speak as a Romanian, but as a man imbued with ethical principles, aware of the material needs of our time, and I can dispassionately state—as I am fully acquainted with the beautiful past and the ambitious culture of the Hungarian people and I am saddened by any undeserved blow dealt to any human being—that the Hungarian people have to do something quite different from recapturing their external borders, namely: restore their inner soul . . . and they will understand that a people does not map out the extent of a territory which they cannot fill and their energy goes well beyond state borders. The Hungarians from Transylvania, from Bačka and from Slovakia can be kept in contact with their origin through an influx of civilization . . . which demands a peace of mind supported by the conscience of what is right for oneself and for others. And then, in the interest of the greater human civilization, we shall be able to understand each other quite well.²⁸

Universul, the Bucharest daily, also underlined, on 10 June 1920, the significance of the fact that

instead of the artificial state that existed until 1918, we are left with a Hungary that reflects the number and significance of the Hungarian people, that is, a national state that will be able to live and will be able to develop quietly, if the people called upon to lead it realize the new kind of European establishment, which will be able to make up for the shortages and be capable to lead the Hungarian people onto the paths of the true European civilization . . . Will the Hungarians take this path? So far, there are not many encouraging signs . . .

In such a situation, the optimistic outlook was encouraged by the new realities of international law and international relations.

We cannot fail to realize the state of mind of the Magyar people, who are now paying for big and burdensome mistakes. It takes some time until spirits are completely appeased, no doubt. We believe, however, that Hungary, which no earlier than last year tested its might against us, did not come out of this without having drawn any useful conclusions.²⁹

România nouă (The New Romania) resumed the debate on these problems in the issue of 10 June 1920. In a first article, referring to “Our Neighbors,” the mouthpiece of the Society for Citizens’ Education commented—of course critically—on the emergence of incidents at the Romanian-Hungarian and the Romanian-Bulgarian borders. The delay in the signing of the Peace Treaties was erroneously attributed by the newspaper to some of the Allied Powers, including England and France.³⁰ An article whose tone was more scathing with respect to Hungary appeared in the Bucharest daily *Adevărul* on 10 June 1920.³¹

The main detailed informative account on the solemnity of the signing of the Peace Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary, held in the afternoon of Friday, 4 June 1920, in the small Trianon Palace in Versailles, appeared on 11 June 1920 in the *Dacia* newspaper in Bucharest under the title “At Versailles: The Treaty with Hungary: Impressions: From Our Special Envoy,” signed by Gabriel Dichter.³² This comprehensive description of the event was then taken over in different forms—synthetically, partially and so on—by other Bucharest news outlets as well as throughout the country. The author outlined the sharp contrast between the atmosphere of huge general interest, the crowds, the high officials and the press, which all required special organizing measures on the occasion of the signing of the first and most important of all peace treaties at Versailles, the one with Germany on 28 June 1918, and the much lower interest in the signing of the Treaty of Trianon. The informative value of the account written by Romania’s special envoy lay in the enumeration of several dozen personalities, representatives, newspapers and public figures who came especially from Romania, France and other areas to attend the event. Equally interesting was the description of the venue chosen for this event, from an architectural, decorative and ceremonial point of view, as well as the impressions referring to the Hungarian signatories of the treaty, and the somewhat nervous attitudes of some Magyar members of the public. The report showed, of course, the author’s subjective perception, and some impressions may be questionable, but he generally provided a conclusive picture of the facts reported. For the purposes of our study, this report is circumstantial in nature, since it took a while after the signing for the Treaty of Trianon to pervade the public consciousness of contemporary Romanians. The rational, deeper perception was particularly influenced by the possibility of a textual analysis of the treaty, after its official publication, in the autumn of 1920, and by its corroboration it with similar or corresponding aspects from other countries, especially from Hungary.

On 12 June 1920, the liberal weekly *Glasul Bihorului* (The Voice of Bihor) from Oradea (Nagyvárad, Großwardein) published the article “Peace Signed with Hungary” authored by Teodor Popa, who, underlining the importance of

the act, declared: "Let us thank the Heavenly Throne, let us be humble in our souls and full of brotherly love for the nations living by our side."³³

On the same day, under the signature of Ion Pescariu,³⁴ the *Turda* Sunday popular gazette also highlighted the major historical significance of the treaty for contemporary world history.

The popular leaflet *Libertatea* (Liberty) of Orăștie (Szászváros, Broos)³⁵ made clear its position on the event by choosing to publish a mock obituary.

The Hungarian country stuck a cross at the head . . . of its own grave, dug during its more than 1000 years-old illness. After its godmother Germany and its god-daughter Bulgaria tried in vain to keep her on her feet, to prop her up during the Great War, there came the great doctors, Romania's soldiers, and closed her lids forever! Now she has signed her peace, like a lock to the door of a grave from which she will never rise again. Dust to heavy dust, for her sins were great.

On 13 June 1920, the special Budapest correspondent of the Arad newspaper *Românul* reported on the news publicized by the Viennese press. The news referred to the discovery made by the Austrian security organs regarding a monarchist plot organized by Magyar officers who were preparing a memo addressed to the Peace Conference, as a "Protest against Hungary's dismemberment," in the hope of reuniting Vienna and Budapest "under the glorious scepter of the Habsburg family" though a real coup d'état.³⁶

Also on 13 June 1920, *Gazeta poporului* (The People's Gazette), a political-cultural leaflet from Sibiu, founded by Nicolae Bălan, Silviu Dragomir and Ion Broșu, published a comprehensive editorial entitled "Romanians and Hungarians," stating:

We Romanians, as good Christians, do not want the death of sinners, nor do we rejoice in their plight. We will not treat them the way they used to treat us when they were our masters. We will not begrudge them, we will not prevent them from following the path to honest and diligent living. Neither their language, nor their faith in God. Let us refrain from repeating the errors lying on Hungary's grave.³⁷

In *Tribuna* (The Tribune) of Oradea, whose owner and manager was the publicist Gh. Tulbure, there appeared an unsigned article, titled "Peace with Hungary," which outlined the more delicate issues of the Romanian-Hungarian relations of that time.

Of course, we all realize the overwhelming reluctance with which Hungary had to comply with the ruling . . . The dejection of our former enemies moves us . . . we

*could have boasted, gloated, celebrated with great frenzy . . . the way they did when the Treaty of Bucharest was concluded. However, we did not do it . . . , we were just happy to enjoy this peace . . . Let them be the usurpers they are, we must show respect for their mourning.*³⁸

In its turn, *Unirea* (The Union) gazette of Blaj (Balázsfalva, Blasendorf) published on 15 June 1920 an article called “Peace with Hungary,” underlining the idea that this act “banishes the sorrows of the past and opens the broad prospects of the future . . . [when] we are called upon to write a new story in complete freedom.” The article expressed gratitude towards the ancestors who made the historical act possible. In this respect, it was natural for *Unirea* to state “that in preparing today’s joy, our Greek Catholic Church and especially our town of Blaj have their good share, from Inochentie Micu to the present day.”³⁹

The newspaper *Románul* published the essential excerpts⁴⁰ from the official text of the Trianon Peace Treaty with Hungary regarding Romania, i.e. articles 45 and 46, which regulated the territorial and border issues, as well as article 47 regarding the financial obligations incumbent on Romania. Of special significance was the publication of Title VI of the treaty, concerning the protection of minorities (Articles 54, 55, 56 and 59).

Under the title “The Fate of Hungary: Peace with Hungary: The Hungarian Opposition: Their Attempts so Far: What the Future Holds,” the morning newspaper *Románimea* (The Romanian Nation) reproduced “almost entirely an extremely interesting article” published in the Italian newspaper *L’Idea nazionale*, from which we shall quote here the warning placed at the end of the text.

*With one hand Hungary signs the peace and with the other spins the tale of a great reactionary plot that aims to engulf the whole of Europe, initially forming a kind of ante bellum status quo in the Danube countries. Let’s pay attention to this threat. Not only are the fruits of victory at stake, but the victory itself.*⁴¹

The sparkling Italian wit evoked the desperate attempts made by Hungarians so that

*either through Bolshevism or through flirtation with the Entente Powers, in the guise of mock Francophiles, then mock Anglophiles, or mock Italianophiles, they might obtain the continuation of the Magyar chauvinist regime. They even advocated an individual union with Romania, a merger with Yugoslavia, an alliance with Poland, with the devil or with God, with the West or with the East, anything that might keep the Holy Crown of Saint Stephen intact.*⁴²

On 20 June 1920, *România nouă*, the newspaper of the Society for Citizen Education, featured a headline printed in large bold type: “The Triumph of Justice: Hungary in its True Borders: How the Treaty was Signed.” The article presented the new map of Central Europe and reproduced the text of the article belonging to “Stephen Lausanne, one of the journalists who in the war years supported the Romanian cause, who gives an account of what happened on the occasion of the signing.”⁴³ This was a useful informative text to supplement the one published in *Dacia* on 11 June 1920⁴⁴ with additional information received in the meantime.

On 23 June 1920, the newspaper *Românul* of Arad denounced the “Persecution against Romanians in Hungary” which, in the context of the Treaty of Trianon, was a harbinger of an acutely felt concern—considering the perspective of future Romanian-Hungarian relations—a concern that has endured, in some respects, up to this day. The Romanians living in Hungary started to be inoculated with the spurious theory that after the union of Transylvania with Romania they were severed from the other Transylvanian Romanians with whom they had lived together until 1918. As for the persecutions, stringently topical, they were particularly serious, including

repeated interventions of the Allied Mission in Budapest addressed to the Hungarian government, resulting in harsher provisions and systematic persecutions against all Romanians. This state of affairs accounted for the permanent increase in the number of Romanian refugees coming from Hungary . . . The prisons are packed with inmates, hungry and beaten, in handcuffs, shackled to walls like cattle.

After 4–5 weeks of such detention the prisoners would be taken to be interrogated, sorted, while

the Romanian and Slovak politicians are being court martialled in Szeged or Debrecen. The executions are daily and public . . . all the Slovak priests—the story goes—were taken to jail, in chains and beaten. The Romanian churches are closed. The Romanian denominational schools were closed down by the gendarmerie. The children of the Romanians were left without books this year. The Romanian population from the Bichiş [Békés] County is still looking forward to the return of the Romanian army.⁴⁵

The same newspaper issue reported on “Agitations for the Re-attachment of the Ruthenian Plateau.” The Budapest correspondent of the newspaper *Közélet* of Satu Mare (Szatmárnémeti, Sathmar) described “the great agitation in the Hungarian capital for the re-annexation by Hungary of the Romanian Maramureş

County and of the Czechoslovak counties of Bereg, Ung, and Zemplén,” for which the Hungarian government set up a General Secretariat ranked as a ministry and led by a certain Miklós Kútkafalvy, an alleged Ruthenian, who was also the president of the League for the Territorial Integrity of Hungary. The *Közélet* text was reprinted in the newspaper *Új Világ* (New World) of Cluj, which sparked off the Romanian puzzlement that the press censorship officially in force in Romania according to the internal and external norms of the time had not done its duty in this case. The critical commentary of the Romanian newspaper was a clear statement in favor of respecting the legal rights of minorities, within the general framework of the national interests of the Romanian state.⁴⁶

Under these circumstances, some Hungarian newspapers in Cluj called for the Hungarians in Transylvania to stay put and not leave for Hungary, which—in the subtext—could also be considered as expressing a hope in the return of the Hungarian rule in Transylvania. The *Libertatea* gazette mentioned this interpretation, emphasizing the Romanian-Hungarian compatibility towards a coexistence in Transylvania, which was not a sign of Romanian weakness. The title “Have a Good Stay!” expressed the positive attitude of the Romanians.⁴⁷ Of interest is also the reproduction of Stephen Lausanne’s article in the *Turda* newspaper, under the title “Peace with Hungary,” which the editorial staff explained as follows: “Some of our members do not believe that the peace has been signed and now they are devising all sorts of theories. To reassure these skeptics, we shall reproduce an article published by a French newspaper.”⁴⁸

In its latest references to the atmosphere and the situation of those days, the newspaper *Românul* of Arad published “A Response to ‘Új Világ,’” which advocated for “bringing the two peoples closer together,”⁴⁹ as well as the note entitled “Take Ionescu about Hungary,” which stated that “until the Peace Treaty with Hungary is ratified, one cannot resume the diplomatic relations with Budapest.”⁵⁰

Last but not least, we should mention the unsigned “Political Chronicle” published by *Transilvania*, the venerable magazine of the Astra Association of Transylvanian Romanians, in the issue of June 1920, with the very title “The Peace Treaty with Hungary.” The text did not intend to analyze and comment on the complexity of the Peace Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary signed at Trianon. The article referred to Hungarian agitations in Switzerland, Italy, England, the USA, and to Count Albert Apponyi’s complete failure in invoking historical arguments, firmly rejected by Millerand. As to the question of “the plebiscite, this happened in October and November 1918, when the peoples oppressed by the dual monarchy declared that they were united with their free brothers from Italy, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.”⁵¹ After presenting the details, the text brought to the fore the con-

sequences of the Treaty of Trianon. “Hungary, now reduced to its just size, has only one hope left, that of being received in the League of Nations, if it loyally fulfills the obligations imposed by the Peace Treaty.”⁵²

It is not by chance that this idea represented the essence of the general, historical and political conclusion expressed in the most valuable Romanian cultural-scientific journal in Transylvania, one of the most representative publications in the whole of Greater Romania. It can also be considered as a credible reflection of the contemporary Romanian perception of the Treaty of Trianon.

On 4 July 1920, *Gazeta poporului* of Sibiu announced the publication of a booklet whose author was Ion I. Lapedatu, which was dedicated to some financial provisions found in the Treaty of Trianon (regulating the takeover of Hungarian public debts, conversion, guarantees, etc.).⁵³

FOR THE entry into force of the Peace Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary, the signatory states had to ratify it, after which the Treaty was to be implemented. The ratification was considered to have been accomplished from the moment when the ratification instruments were submitted by Hungary and several signatory states; after this procedure, the other signatory states could carry out the ratifications without any further procedural delays. Ratification by Hungary, which was the subject of the Treaty of Trianon, was the main condition of the general ratification.

Romania ratified the three main Peace Treaties (with Germany, Austria, and Hungary) in a single extraordinary session of the two Houses of Parliament, in August 1920. The debate on the Peace Treaty with Austria, in whose drafting Romania had a contribution of its own, and the debate on the Peace Treaty with Hungary were more extensive than that on the Treaty with Germany, both in duration and in substance, due to their territorial implications regarding Romania (Bukovina, Transylvania, Banat, Crișana, Maramureș, respectively). The Treaty of Trianon sparked a heated debate that brought forth even some threats of rejection (on account of such issues like the whole of the Banat county, the Romanian-Hungarian border line, historical Maramureș), which placed the very concept of ratification at risk. In that delicate situation, the government and the opposition pledged to act together for the much needed national political clarification which elevated the two leaders, Take Ionescu and Iuliu Maniu, to the status of true men of state rather than mere politicians. Thus, the superior *raison d'état* and the supreme imperative of international peace were recognized, which made the ratification mandatory, above and beyond the “shady parts” of the treaty.⁵⁴

As expected, the ratification by Hungary of the Treaty of Trianon was the most difficult, dragging on until 26 July 1921, which thus became the official

date of the effective, general ratification. In order to fulfill this mandatory objective, particularly consistent political and diplomatic, domestic and international efforts were required, down to the individual level of those involved, including pressures of the Allied Powers, procedural concessions, apparent adjustments, to “package” the vote with that on other laws.⁵⁵

One of the significant consequences of the Treaty of Trianon was revealed after a necessary interval, on 9 June 1921, by the literary-scientific journal *Avântul* (The Impetus) of Buzău, in its inspired collaboration with poet Emil Isac from Cluj, an undisputed, hands-on connoisseur of the new Transylvanian realities, which he encapsulated in the slogan that in Greater Romania “Magyars will remain Magyars,” and there can be no talk about a “Pan-Romanian” orientation at the expense of the Magyars.⁵⁶

The Peace Conference and the Peace Treaties drawn up at that time were contemporary with the emergence in world history of the new communist political regime and of the Third Communist International (Comintern). In this context, the Treaty of Trianon was tangential in principle with the Comintern, but directly intersected the political communist policy regarding Romania, declared a quasi-imperialistic country that annexed foreign territories. Soviet Russia claimed Bessarabia, challenging its union with Romania, while the Comintern extended its political orientation against Romania to all the Romanian historical provinces reunited in 1918, actively campaigning for the “right to self-determination of the oppressed people of Romania,” especially those in Bessarabia, Bukovina, Transylvania, Dobruja, and the Quadrilateral. Romania would be targeted by the revisionist policy of Hungary, the USSR, and Bulgaria, which led to its territorial losses of 1940. Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, Horthy Hungary, communist USSR and an ambivalent Bulgaria (leaning towards both the USSR and Germany) tried to overthrow the international system established in 1919. The most dangerous enemy of Romania was the Comintern, which maintained its orientation through its internal instrument, the Romanian Communist Party.

In such a general framework, the Romanian national political consciousness regarding the historical function of the Treaty of Trianon had an active, specific, special significance. All these data and aspects give us a comprehensive picture of the first historical phase of Trianon’s memory,⁵⁷ the immediate, direct one (1920), with all the interconnections it generated.

Until this very day, each of the ensuing phases of Trianon’s memory (1938, 1945, 1966, 1990) have added their own specificity, including inherently contradictory aspects.



Notes

1. *Banatul* (Timișoara) 2, 55 (18 May 1920): 3
2. *Românul* (Arad) 9, 104 (19 May 1920): 2.
3. *Ibid.*, 9, 105 (20 May 1920): 2.
4. *Ibid.*, 9, 108 (25 May 1920): 1.
5. *Ibid.*, 9, 109 (26 May 1920): 1.
6. *Ibid.*, 9, 110 (27 May 1920): 2.
7. *Ibid.*, 9, 112 (29 May 1920): 3.
8. *Új Ember* (Cluj) 1, 10 (30 May 1920): 2–3.
9. *Renașterea română* (Sibiu) 2, 385 (4 June 1920): 1.
10. *Dacia* (Bucharest) 2, 145 (5 June 1920): 1.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Renașterea română* 2, 386 (6 June 1920): 3.
14. *Tribuna socialistă* (Cluj) 16, 23 (6 June 1920): 2.
15. *România nouă* (Bucharest) 1, 93 (7 June 1920): 1.
16. *L'Indépendance roumaine* (Bucharest) 44, 13531 (8 June 1920): 1.
17. *Adevărul* (Bucharest) 33, 11090 (8 June 1920): 1.
18. *Banatul românesc* (Timișoara) 2, 57 (8 June 1920): 1.
19. *Drapelul* (Lugoj) 20, 170 (8 June 1920): 2.
20. *Banatul* 2, 74 (9 June 1920): 1–2.
21. *România* (Cluj) 1, 37 (9 June 1920): 1.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Dacia* (Bucharest) 2, 148 (9 June 1920): 1.
25. *Patria* (Cluj) 2, 121 (9 June 1920): 1.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Neamul românesc* (Bucharest) 15, 118 (9 June 1920): 1.
28. *Ibid.*
29. “Pacea cu Ungaria,” *Universul* (Bucharest) 38, 142 (10 June 1920): 1.
30. *România nouă* 1, 95 (10 June 1920): 1.
31. *Adevărul* 33, 11101 (10 June 1920): 1.
32. *Dacia* 2, 150 (11 June 1920): 1.
33. *Glasul Bihorului* (Oradea) 1, 24 (12 June 1920): 1.
34. *Turda* 2, 23 (12 June 1920): 1.
35. *Libertatea* (Orăștie) 18, 22 (10 June 1920): 3.
36. *Românul* 9, 123 (13 June 1920): 1–2.
37. *Gazeta poporului* (Sibiu) 3, 23 (13 June 1920): 1.
38. *Tribuna* (Oradea) 2, 28 (13 June 1920): 2.
39. *Unirea* (Blaj) 30, 43 (15 June 1920): 2.
40. *Românul* 9, 125 (16 June 1920): 3.
41. *Românimea* (Bucharest) 3, 455 (18 June 1920): 1.
42. *Ibid.*

43. *România nouă* 1, 104 (20 June 1920): 1–2.
44. See note 32 above.
45. *Românul* 9, 131 (23 June 1920): 1.
46. *Ibid.*, 3.
47. *Libertatea* 18, 24 (24 June 1920): 1.
48. *Turda* 2, 25 (27 June 1920): 1–2.
49. *Românul* 9, 134 (26 June 1920): 1.
50. *Ibid.*, 9, 139 (2 July 1920): 2.
51. *Transilvania* (Sibiu) 6, 6 (June 1920): 254.
52. *Ibid.*
53. *Gazeta poporului* 2, 26 (4 July 1920): 3.
54. Alexandru Porțeanu, “Ratificările Tratatului de la Trianon.” *Academica* (Bucharest) 23, 6 (272) (June 2013): 81–84.
55. *Ibid.* It is generally considered that the historiography on the ratification of peace treaties is insufficiently developed.
56. *Avântul* (Buzău) 1, 1 (9 June 1921): 3.
57. Alexandru Porțeanu, “Fazele istorice ale memoriei Trianonului,” *Academica* 29, 4–5 (342–343) (April–May 2019): 100–103.

Abstract

Trianon in Romania’s Contemporary Public Consciousness (1920)


After the attention paid to the drawing up of the Peace Treaty with Hungary, the first pieces of information on its signing reached Romania less than 24 hours after the event, followed by the publication of the articles in the treaty related to Romania. Analyses and commentaries were published in numerous press organs and were signed by outstanding personalities. They stressed the justness and importance of the treaty for Romania, showing a concern for the promotion of positive Romanian-Hungarian relations, without neglecting certain less favorable Hungarian manifestations in relation to those prospects.

Keywords

Peace Treaty of Trianon, Romanian press, Transylvania, Hungary, minority rights

The Need for a Law to Declare 4 June as the Trianon Treaty Day

TITUS CORLĂȚEAN



SOURCE: <https://www.mvu.ro/index.php/tratatul-dintre-puterile-aliatae-si-asociatae-si-ungaria-trianon-4-iunie-1920>.

Titus Corlățean

Associate professor at the Faculty of Legal and Administrative Sciences, Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University of Bucharest.

Introduction

ON 4 JUNE 2020, Romania will celebrate 100 years since the signing of the Trianon Peace Treaty. This event constituted an essential page in the history of the Romanian nation, which materialized in a peace treaty concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers, including Romania, with Hungary, as a successor state of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a defeated state in World War I. Under the aforementioned peace treaty, the Great Powers acknowledged the union of Transylvania (and the eastern part of Banat) with Romania, as well as the sovereign will of the Romanians from Transylvania expressed through a vote on 1 December 1918, namely, through the Resolution of the National Assembly of Alba Iulia.

The Treaty of Trianon¹ was signed on behalf of “His Majesty the King of Romania”² by Dr. Ion Cantacuzino, minister of state, and Nicolae Titulescu,

A Romanian-language version of this article was published in *Dreptul* (Bucharest), new ser., 31, 6 (2020): 46–61.

former minister, secretary of state, and entered into force on 26 June 1921 as an integral part of the system of peace treaties concluded at Versailles which enshrined the end of the World War I and acknowledged de jure the changes occurred in international relations after years of military conflict.³

The Treaty of Trianon is divided into four parts. The first section includes the Covenant of the League of Nations, a common part of all peace treaties concluded at the end of the World War I. The second part establishes the frontiers of Hungary with the neighboring states, namely with Austria, with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, with Romania (Art. 27 item 3), and with Czechoslovakia. The third part, called “Political Clauses for Europe,” provides a set of clauses regarding the bilateral framework of Hungary’s relations with its neighboring states, acknowledges certain clauses with other European states (Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, etc.), contains rules regarding nationality, as well as the protection of national minorities. Finally, the fourth part, called “Hungarian Interests Outside Europe,” sets out provisions regarding the waiver by Hungary of the treaties concluded by the former Austro-Hungarian Empire with Morocco, Egypt, Siam (now Thailand), and China.

The Treaty of Trianon enshrined the right to self-determination for the nations of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a process which allowed them, after leaving the former empire, to create, after the war, their own national states. As far as Romania is concerned, the aforementioned Peace Treaty meant not only the international legal recognition of the union of Transylvania with the Kingdom of Romania, but also the acknowledgement of the political and civil rights of the Romanians who constituted the majority population on that territory.⁴

The treaty was ratified by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in May 1921 and by France in June 1921. During the debates on the treaty ratification by France, the President of the Council of Ministers, Aristide Briand, confirmed the borders set for Romania and its territorial integrity stating: “France will never intervene with the allied and friend governments to impair Romania’s right to national sovereignty to any extent.”⁵

In this context, it is important to mention that Article 45 of the Treaty provides that:

*Hungary renounces, so far as it is concerned, in favour of Romania all rights and title over the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy situated outside the frontiers of Hungary as laid down in Article 27, Part II (Frontiers of Hungary) and recognized by the present Treaty, or by any Treaties concluded for the purpose of completing the present settlement, as forming part of Romania.*⁶

The international political and legal recognition of the will of the Romanians expressed by vote on 1 December 1918 would probably have been more diffi-

cult to achieve without the proclamation by the President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, of the right (principle) to self-determination of nations (peoples),⁷ as one of the Fourteen Points read by him before the American Congress on 8 January 1918.⁸ Even though, in the end, only four points of his statement were completely accepted in the international regulatory architecture of the postwar reconstruction of Europe and the principle of national self-determination was not included in the Covenant of the League of Nations⁹ despite the efforts of the American president, there is no doubt that the political impact of this important document was crucial for the new international relations that were emerging between state and non-state players in Europe. This principle constituted the foundation for the establishment of new states and the declaration of the right to self-determination, only a few months later, by a number of nations from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, including for the Romanians who were the majority in Transylvania, and also for the achievement of the Great Union on 1 December 1918.¹⁰

The treaty also enshrined the creation of an independent Hungarian state, which had not previously existed within the structure of the dual monarchy, an ideal which had been promoted by the Hungarian revolutionaries of 1848 and contained certain provisions regarding the protection of national minorities.¹¹ As far as Romania was concerned, under Article 47, the Romanian state committed as follows:

*Romania recognizes and confirms in relation to Hungary her obligation to accept the embodiment in a Treaty with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers of such provisions as may be deemed necessary by these Powers to protect the interests of inhabitants of that State who differ from the majority of the population in race, language or religion, as well as to protect freedom or transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of other nations.*¹²

On the other hand, the provisions of the Treaty on the national minorities in Hungary were enforced only partially and temporarily, so that the process of their assimilation continued systematically over the time, often in an aggressive manner, including or especially with regard to the Romanian minority in that country, and therefore the Hungarian state is currently one of the most ethnically homogeneous states in Europe. There are authors in the Hungarian literature¹³ who admit that the protection of national minorities under the Treaty of Trianon had a temporary nature, mentioning, for example, that in 1923 the President of the Council of Ministers, István Bethlen, enacted Ordinance no. 4800, which enforced the relevant articles of the treaty. Thus, three different types of schools were created, the so-called primary schools of categories A, B

and C. However, they functioned only until 1935, until Gyula Gombos's ruling, when these rules began to be respected to a lesser extent.¹⁴

Why Is there a Need for a Romanian Law to Declare a Trianon Treaty Day?

THE PEACE Treaty of Trianon signed on 4 June 1920 has a special significance for the Romanian nation, which must therefore be acknowledged politically, legally, but also symbolically by the Romanian state, especially since on 4 June 2020 the Romanians will celebrate the Centenary of this historical event for the unity of the Romanian nation. And a Centenary can be celebrated only once.

The idea of submitting a draft law to declare 4 June as the Trianon Treaty Day in Romania belongs to the author of this article and it dates back to 2015. At the time, I registered with the Senate the legislative proposal no. L 235/2015. The proposal was supported by 90 senators as co-initiators, representing most of the parliamentary groups, with the exception of Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania. The initiative received the favorable opinion of the government in office at that time¹⁵ as well as of the Legislative Council and the Economic and Social Council. The said legislative proposal received an adoption report and favorable opinions from the relevant senatorial committees. For reasons of internal politics and related to the relations between the parliamentary political groups and the internal power balance within the Parliament, the draft law had to be withdrawn from the Parliament by the initiator on 3 June 2015 before the final vote, as due to political reasons in that circumstance it would not have met the majority needed for adoption in the Senate.

In 2019, the author resumed the legislative initiative and registered it with the Romanian Senate under number L 459/2019. The legislative project was endorsed favorably by the Legislative Council and the Economic and Social Council, and it received the support of the social-democrat government in office at the time, as well as a favorable report and opinions from the relevant senatorial committees. The draft law was adopted by the Senate on 21 October 2019 and submitted to the Chamber of Deputies for debate and adoption. The change of the Romanian Government at the beginning of November 2019 led to the need to request a new point of view of the Executive, within the legislative procedure within the Chamber of Deputies as deciding Chamber. During the meeting held on 16 January 2020, the liberal government led by Prime Minister Ludovic Orban adopted an official point of view stating that it “does not support this legislative initiative.”¹⁶

The draft law has received favorable reports and opinions, generally with a close majority, due to political reasons, from the competent committees of the Chamber of Deputies, and it has been waiting for several months for the plenary debates and final vote of this Chamber.

Essentially, “the legislative proposal aims to declare 4 June as the Trianon Treaty Day and to establish the appropriate steps for the proper celebration of this day at national and local level.”¹⁷ Thus, the draft law proposes that for the celebration in Romania of 4 June as the Trianon Treaty Day, “cultural or educational and scientific events dedicated to raising awareness of the significance and importance of the Treaty of Trianon shall be organized at national or local level.”¹⁸ At the same time, it sets out the manner in which the central and local public administration authorities, non-governmental organizations and representatives of the civil society can be involved in these activities and can be given support, including appropriate budgets for these events. Moreover, the legislative project sets out that the national flag of Romania be flown on 4 June by the central and local public administration authorities. Last but not least, it also states the obligation for “the Romanian Radio Broadcasting Corporation and the Romanian Television Corporation, as public services, to include in their programs shows or footage from the events dedicated to this day.”¹⁹

The Explanatory Memorandum of the draft law provides some of the reasons for tabling this legislative initiative. Without prioritizing, we shall mention some of them.

Firstly, the moment of the 1918 Great Union and that of its international recognition represent the landmarks of a three-year cycle, which, between 2018 and 2020, required a special and privileged celebration as a national symbolism by the Romanian state, circumscribed by the concept of Centenary.

Consequently, especially (and perfectly explainable) 1 December 2018 and the entire year 2018 benefited from a set of decisions and events of a national, political, cultural, scientific and academic nature meant to celebrate the Centenary of the Great Union.

Among them we shall mention the celebration of 4 August 1919²⁰ as a reference date for a political-military event which had taken place 100 years earlier and which was essential for the defense and regional and international consolidation of the reunited Romanian state. We recall in this respect that

the spring of 1919 saw the proclamation of the Soviet Republic of Councils in Hungary, the new power installed in Budapest, dissatisfied with the provisions enforced by the Belgrade Armistice Convention, triggering a series of military actions both in the area of the border with the newly proclaimed Czechoslovakian state, as well as in the area of the Tisza River and the Western Carpathians. Faced with the attacks of the Hungarian army, the High Command of the Romanian army launched

an attack, mobilizing 119 battalions, 6 squadrons, 98 artillery batteries, with a total of approximately 120,000 soldiers, placed under the command of General Gheorghe Mărdărescu. On 27 July 1919, the Romanian army crossed the Tisza line and by 3 August annihilated any form of resistance and occupied Budapest for a few months . . . , an action which led to the collapse of the Soviet Republic of Councils.²¹

Naturally, the date of 4 June 1920 must therefore be acknowledged primarily at the political and legislative level by the Romanian state, declaring this day in our country as the Trianon Treaty Day, thus crowning the entire three-year cycle circumscribed by the Centenary.

The symbolism regarding the life of a nation and a state requires a set of decisions, public policies, the promotion of projects of national breath, whose deep roots can be found in a more distant or closer history, but whose objective is to strengthen the cohesion and solidarity of the nation around the fundamental values defining it. Especially for the younger generations, whose appetite in recent years, for different objective or subjective reasons, for the national historical landmarks has decreased, an effort from the part of the responsible and educated elites to inform and raise awareness is needed. A national day celebrated on 4 June each year can help in this respect.

There are also external, bilateral, regional or international policy reasons requiring the Romanian state to adopt such an attitude and legislative decision. We have mentioned above that the Treaty of Trianon constitutes a political and legal document of special importance for the Romanian nation and an essential element of the current geopolitical reality at European level, one hundred years after its signing. From this perspective, “the Treaty represents, first and foremost, one of the fundamental legal instruments governing the Romanian-Hungarian bilateral relations,” even after a hundred years, but it also has an essential relevance on a wider regional scale, in Central and Southeast Europe.

The observance of its provisions—and of the other relevant rules of international law—is a sine qua non condition for developing relations between the two states, in accordance with the values of a united Europe, freedom, democracy, the rule of law and solidarity. Today, almost all the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire are members of the European Union. Romania and Hungary have a strategic partnership and are an integral part of the same sustainable alliance system and together they contribute to the current European construction, which has proven to be capable of ensuring optimal conditions for peaceful coexistence in Europe.²²

This is why any attempts made in recent years by Hungary, mainly due to internal political reasons (and without neglecting foreign the policy interests of signifi-

cant political actors in Budapest), to impose a distorted view on the significance of the Treaty of Trianon must be treated by the Romanian state at political, diplomatic and legal level in a professional manner, with clarity and firmness, without disregarding the potentially destructive impact of the Hungarian efforts in foreign relations or even within the political and social-ethnic architecture of Romania. “Any attempt to rewrite history, to question it from revisionist positions, cannot be accepted nowadays in the European Union.”²³ In this context, we draw attention to the fact that these actions of the Hungarian authorities constitute permanent challenges and an obvious violation of the letter and spirit of the Treaty of Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighborliness signed on 16 September 1996 by Romania and Hungary,²⁴ starting with the provisions on good neighborliness, relations of mutual trust and respect, continuing with the common legal and political interpretation of the applicable standards in the field of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and, last but not least, of the provisions regarding the observance of the principle of international law related to the inviolability of the frontiers and the territorial integrity of states. Because, for example, public political support for models of self-determination or political “autonomies” based on ethnic criteria in Romania for the Hungarian minority, sometimes with the legislative support of the Hungarian state, is only one of the actual and specific manners of undermining of the foundations of the Romanian-Hungarian bilateral basic political treaty as well as of CSCE Helsinki Final Act of 1975.

We will mention below precisely the actions taken by Hungary in rewriting history, reinterpreting in a revisionist manner the Peace Treaty of Trianon, including through the adoption in recent years of laws that seek to override certain essential provisions and effects of the 1920 Treaty. The lack of any proper reaction of the Romanian state and of the presentation in the national and external public space of Romania’s position and of the historical truth may generate a risk, offering an unrestricted and univocal public platform for the dramatized and structurally revisionist version of the other party. This is another reason for a Romanian law on the Treaty of Trianon.

Hungary and the Revisionist Rewriting of the History and of the Consequences of the Treaty of Trianon

THE PROGRAMMATIC action of Hungary to rewrite and reinterpret the history and the political-legal consequences deriving from the Peace Treaty of Trianon recorded a significant episode in 2010. Not surprisingly, the Fidesz right-wing government led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, with

the support of Jobbik—an extremist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic party—promoted and adopted in the Budapest Parliament, 90 years after the signing of the Peace Treaty, two laws that corresponded to the programmatic action of the Hungarian authorities in this field, namely a law that established 4 June as the day of “the unity of the Hungarian nation” and a second law amending the Hungarian Nationality Law. We will briefly analyze below the two laws and the revisionist content of these regulations.

On 31 May 2010, the Hungarian Parliament passed the Law establishing 4 June as the day of the “unity of the Hungarian nation.” The decision was prepared through the submission on 14 May 2010 by the Jobbik parliamentary group of a legislative initiative to declare the mentioned date as “National Day of Trianon Commemoration.”

The Explanatory Memorandum of the law, an integral part of the normative act adopted by the Hungarian Parliament, states the following:

- the peace treaty signed on 4 June 1920 is described as a “Diktat” and “the main cause of tensions in Central Europe,” a “national tragedy” for Hungary,²⁵ by which 2/3 of the territory was lost, 60% of the general population and 1/3 of the population of Hungarian nationality;
- the need to achieve the objective of self-determination and that of collective rights for the Hungarian “communities” abroad;
- the need to set a day for the “commemoration of the Trianon . . . and to raise the awareness of the Hungarians from the Carpathian Basin that they belong to the Hungarian nation”;
- the main the responsibility for the fate of the Hungarian “communities” abroad belongs to the Republic of Hungary.²⁶

The negative, revisionist political symbolism promoted by the Hungarian Parliament is obvious and it has been shaped, through the reopening of the subject of the Trianon Peace Treaty, by the content of the Explanatory Memorandum and the provocative content of the law itself.

A firm political reaction came at that time from the Foreign Policy Committee of the Romanian Senate, the only institution of the Romanian state which expressed an official public position, as neither the Romanian president nor the government,²⁷ led at the time by Emil Boc, had any reaction, given the known connivance politically motivated by pragmatic and mutual political and electoral interests stemming from the fact that the political leaders of the Romanian and Hungarian state belonged to the same European political family, the EPP.

On 8 June 2010, the Foreign Policy Committee of the Romanian Senate adopted a Resolution,²⁸ highlighting the provocative nature and symbolically revisionist content of the Hungarian law. The Committee also noticed a violation of fundamental principles of international law governing the international relations, such as:

- good neighborliness between states;
- the sovereign nature of the primary responsibility of the home state for its citizens belonging to a national minority;
 - promotion of certain concepts violating the European standards on the rights of persons belonging to national minorities (“self-determination,” “collective rights,” “minority communities”);
 - the rejection by the majority of the Hungarian Parliament of the amendment submitted to the draft law by the Hungarian socialists, which reiterated the principle of observing the inviolability of frontiers, a fact likely to raise the concern of the international public opinion and of the states in the region, including Romania, regarding the intentions of the Hungarian Government.

A comment needs to be made at this stage. We recall the fact that Hungary’s current borders with its neighbors were not established only under the Treaty of Trianon. They originate indeed in the provisions of Article 27, Part II, of the Treaty of 1920, including the border with Romania (art. 27 para. 3), but they were legally and politically reconfirmed after World War II under the Peace Treaty of Paris in 1947, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the bilateral treaties concluded by Hungary with its neighbors in the 1990s. All these actions make the abovementioned Hungarian law even more questionable.

The same Resolution requires the Romanian president, government and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take an official stance. The members of the senatorial committee also stressed the need to organize bilateral Romanian-Hungarian political-diplomatic consultations, in keeping with the imperative of observing the European standards regarding the protection of national minorities in the two countries, and the compliance with the international bilateral and multilateral commitments undertaken by Hungary. Last, but not least, the Resolution reiterated the Romanian authorities’ commitment to strengthen the Romanian-Hungarian cooperation and partnership relations in a European spirit, based on the principle of the good neighborliness, on the common European and Euro-Atlantic interests and on the connecting bridge represented by the Romanian minority in Hungary and the Hungarian minority in Romania.

On 26 May 2010, the Parliament of the Republic of Hungary adopted a draft law amending the Law on Hungarian nationality, in order to preferentially grant Hungarian nationality to any foreign nationals invoking Hungarian ancestry. The resolution of the Foreign Policy Committee also addresses this law.

Thus, the following important aspects emerge:²⁹

a) The Hungarian law was adopted in the absence of prior information and consultations which had to be organized by the Hungarian authorities with the neighboring states in which there was a Hungarian national minority. In doing so, Hungary violated the guidelines set out in the Venice Commission Report

on the preferential treatment of national minorities³⁰ and the Bolzano Recommendations (July 2008) on the role of national minorities in the relations between states. The lack of transparency and openness in dealing with issues with serious bilateral implications may have undesirable effects on the climate of mutual trust in the relationship between Romania and Hungary.

b) The Hungarian law invokes a so-called “reparatory nature” for the new mechanism for granting Hungarian nationality. This position is completely baseless, given that Article 63 of the Treaty of Trianon guaranteed the persons over the age of 18, former citizens of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the possibility to opt freely, for 1 year from its entry into force, to either receive Romanian nationality or the nationality of the new Hungarian state, a process that actually occurred in practice. The same article stated that a husband could also decide for his wife, and the parents for their children under 18. This was a free option, guaranteed under a peace treaty, accompanied by guarantees regarding property rights over movable and immovable goods, as well as by commitments undertaken by the States Parties to the Treaty of Trianon “to put no hindrance in the exercise of the right which the persons concerned have . . .” (Art. 65).³¹ A free option, guaranteed by a peace treaty, cannot generate claims for reparatory actions from one state to its co-nationals, citizens of the other state, neither after one year, nor after one hundred years.

c) The mechanism of “reparatory” granting of Hungarian nationality lacks both rigor and the objective criteria generally found in this type of national legislation or in the international treaties in the matter. A clear ethnic nature may be identified in the granting of Hungarian nationality to people who claim to have this identity. It requires “knowledge of the Hungarian language,” a term that is vague and difficult to apply or evaluate. The law is vague, because it does not determine precisely the degree of kinship or the ancestry limit up to which the persons concerned may apply for Hungarian nationality, so that the usual objective elements enshrined in other national laws in this matter, such as loyalty or fidelity towards a certain identity and a certain state may not be actually identified. Basically, the absence of the real reparatory nature of the preferential naturalization is confirmed.

d) Quite self-evident, from this perspective, is the essentially ethnic foundation, the violation of the provisions of the European Convention on Nationality (Strasbourg, 6 November 1997) to which Romania and Hungary are State Parties, especially those of Art. 5 regarding non-discrimination, including based on the ethnic criterion.³² On these grounds, in the absence of a rigorous procedure, the issue of Hungarian nationality has been appreciated even since 2010 as generating the risk of a mass, collective granting of nationality, which violates the above-mentioned European Convention and the international standards in this matter.

e) It is not specified which Hungarian state is referred to in the text of the law (the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the interwar Kingdom of Hungary?). If reference is made to the period 1939–1944, it should not be ignored that the “Vienna Arbitrations” were declared null and void after World War II under the Peace Convention of 1947.

Historically speaking, the various arrangements adopted under the auspices of the League of Nations established the regime applicable to national minorities either in the form of *treaties especially dedicated to minorities* and concluded by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, on the one hand, with Poland (Versailles, 1919), Czechoslovakia (Saint-Germain-en-Laye, 1919) and other states, on the other hand; special chapters in the peace treaties concluded with Austria (Saint-Germain-en-Laye, 1919), Bulgaria (Neuilly-sur-Seine, 1919), Hungary (Trianon, 1920) and Turkey (Sèvres, 1920; Lausanne, 1923); special conventions, such as those relating to Upper Silesia (Geneva, 1922); statements adopted before the League of the Nations Council by Finland (1921), the Baltic States (1922–1923), as prerequisites for their admission in the organization.³³ The first of the four types of rules enshrined in these treaties or declarations regarding the regime applicable to national minorities is that concerning the modalities of obtaining or losing a nationality.³⁴ The provisions of Articles 63–65 of the Treaty of Trianon, mentioned above, are illustrative and extremely clear from this perspective.

From the perspective of contemporary international law, the specialized doctrine mentions that generally the conditions for granting nationality are left at the discretion of the national jurisdiction of the states.³⁵ However, although states may prescribe the conditions for granting nationality, the international law is relevant, especially where other states are involved. The doctrine quotes as an example Art. 1 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the conflict between the laws on nationality: “It is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognized by other States in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality.”³⁶ Moreover, the International Court of Justice ruled in the *Nottebohm* case that, according to the practice of states, “nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties.”³⁷

The international law refers to the functioning, in general, of the two most important principles (systems) on which nationality is based, namely the descent from parents who have a certain nationality (*jus sanguinis*) or the place or territory of a state where birth occurs (*jus soli*).³⁸

Hungarian Manipulation Regarding the Law on Nationality

EVER SINCE 2010 Hungary has claimed that its new legislation on the issue of nationality is inspired by the Romanian Law on nationality. One of the arguments invoked was that of the Hungarian state's enforcement of the reparatory principle in the process of preferential naturalization, similar to the principle invoked by the Romanian legislation in this matter.

I have shown above that, at least as far as Hungarian law is concerned, such a principle does not apply, given the very clear conditions enshrined in Articles 63–65 of the Treaty of Trianon, but also the actual and verifiable practice of the application of such provisions. In short, it was mere Hungarian political rhetoric meant to provide a pretext in its bilateral and multilateral foreign relations in order to justify the adoption of a law with *an ethnic nature and revisionist symbolism*, at least in connection with the population.

Any attempted comparison with the Romanian legislation on the matter of nationality does not hold water. The Romanian Law on nationality is explicitly based on the *jus sanguinis* principle. In other words, *any person descending from parents or at least one parent with Romanian nationality* will obtain de jure the Romanian nationality from the moment of birth, which means automatically and *ope legis*, even if not proved immediately by a birth certificate, which can be issued later by the Romanian competent authorities. We immediately notice that the ethnic element is not the key factor, as it is the case with the Hungarian law, but that of the legal relationship between the individual and the Romanian state, in other words that of *nationality, regardless of the ethnic identity of the individual concerned* (Romanian, Hungarian, German, Jewish, etc.).

The issue of the reparatory effect of the Romanian legislation was raised in relation to the former Romanian nationals *who had lost their nationality under conditions not imputable to them*, at the end of World War II, due to the political decisions adopted by the Soviet and communist regimes in the states directly affected by this issue. The loss of nationality under such known historical conditions was not the result of personal options, but of political decisions imposed on individuals. The Romanian state considered that it was justified and necessary to adopt *a law with a reparatory moral and legal nature* for this category of people. Mention should be made that, unlike the Hungarian law, this right is limited to the third degree of kinship.³⁹

If we add other elements, criteria and procedures that are objectively different, we will fully understand *the unfounded nature of the statements regarding a so-called similarity between the Hungarian and Romanian laws on granting nationality*.

The Current Relevance and Importance of the Peace Treaty of Trianon

IN A political declaration on the major historical significance of the Treaty of Trianon for the Romanian nation, presented in the plenary session of the Romanian Senate on 6 June 2018,⁴⁰ in my capacity as senator, I mentioned the report presented by Ion I. C. Brătianu, president of the Council of Ministers and minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, during the Paris Peace Conference, on 1 February 1919. The report presented by Brătianu, based on the Memorandum of the Romanian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference⁴¹ stated that “the entry of our country into World War I alongside the powers of Entente had as fundamental purpose the liberation of Transylvania and Bukovina from the domination of Austria-Hungary, while also demonstrating the economic, political and military contribution brought by Romania to the victory of the Allies over the Central Powers.” Brătianu also proved with historical and ethno-demographic arguments that Transylvania and Banat are Romanian territories. We reiterate the fact that the Hungarian statistics mentioned the Romanians as the majority population on these territories. I. I. C. Brătianu emphasized that: “Before the Romanian army entered Transylvania, Romanian deputies from all the counties of this province, by virtue of the right to self-determination, met at the Great National Assembly in Alba Iulia, where they decided the definitive union of Transylvania and the Romanian regions in Hungary with Romania.”⁴²

Within the meeting of 1 February 1919, the Allied Supreme Council decided to form a Committee of experts representing the United States of America, the British Empire, France, and Italy, to study the issues raised by I. I. C. Brătianu regarding the territorial interests of Romania and to submit proposals for the delimitation of the borders with Hungary based “on the ethnic, geographical and economic necessity criteria.”⁴³ Based on these criteria, the Committee of experts submitted to the discussion and approval of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Peace Conference, during its meeting of 11 June 1919, the Romanian-Hungarian border.

It is necessary to mention, in this context, the essential role that the French military troops, in the context of the military operations of World War I (but also later on...), and the military mission led by General Henri Mathias Berthelot, including during the peace talks in Paris, played for the precise drawing of the borders between Romania and Hungary. Moreover,

The Allied Committee took into account the reports of the French Military Mission, including the reports of General Berthelot, related also to the economic aspects, eco-

*conomic viability, railway transport infrastructure in Northwestern Transylvania, those in Satu Mare, Oradea and Arad, to confirm the fact that these administrative-territorial units must be maintained within the territory that was to be united with Romania, including in order to preserve the economic viability, which would have otherwise been destroyed.*⁴⁴

The treaty signed on 4 June 1920 at Trianon was a *peace treaty*. With its entry into force, the “state of war” came to an end. The treaty stated right from its Preamble the objective to achieve a “solid, just and lasting peace.” The provisions of this peace treaty constitute a fair, clear, comprehensive and generous regulation, not only in terms of territorial issues and border setting, but also from the perspective of the rights of the persons directly interested in expressing an option with respect to their nationality, the regime of their movable and immovable goods, the protection regime granted to national minorities or to the creation of the foundation for the settlement of war damages.

The aspects briefly addressed herein clearly show the tendency of Hungary and its political and diplomatic actions to unilaterally reopen and rewrite the significance and consequences of the Treaty of Trianon, a fundamental instrument of peace, as well as of certain episodes from our common history in the region, a tendency constantly manifested over the time, including at present, a century after the treaty was signed, which is not only a hostile action from a diplomatic perspective but also a direct violation of the principles adopted at 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as of the principles on which the European Union was built. Such a tendency creates risks for the efforts meant to ensure a reconciliation, based on the Franco-German model, but also for the processes of European and Euro-Atlantic integration, in the spirit of a united Europe, freedom, democracy, rule of law, and solidarity.

Hungary’s political action to promote complementary laws, meant to question or even challenge the provisions or consequences of the Peace Treaty of 4 June 1920 contradicts the bilateral strategic partnership between the two countries, but also the meaning and spirit of the European construction. For Romania, there is no alternative to the principles and rules of the international law, to good neighborliness, and to the European model of integration, respect and tolerance. This means neither compromise nor denying the foundations of the Romanian state, historical truth, or abandoning the European project.

This is why, once again, celebrating the essential historical landmarks and symbols of the Romanian nation represents a natural conduct and, at the same time, a need also for the generations to come. This is another reason for enacting a Law declaring 4 June in Romania as the Trianon Treaty Day.



Notes

1. Traité de paix entre les Puissances alliées et associées et la Hongrie (Trianon, 4 juin 1920), <https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/traites/1920trianon.htm>.
2. Ibid.
3. “Expunere de motive pentru declararea zilei de 4 iunie Ziua Tratatului de la Trianon” (Explanatory memorandum of draft law no. L 459/2019), <https://www.senat.ro/legis/PDF/2019/191459em.pdf>.
4. Ibid.
5. M. Mușat and I. Ardeleanu, *From Ancient Dacia to Modern Romania*, transl. Andrei Bantaș et al. (Bucharest: Ed. Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1985), 771.
6. Traité de paix entre les Puissances alliées et associées et la Hongrie.
7. M. N. Shaw, *International Law*, sixth edition, third printing (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 251.
8. At the Peace Conference, President Wilson stated that “National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. Self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of actions which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.” W. Wilson, *Messages, discours, documents diplomatiques relatifs à la guerre mondiale*, transl. Désiré Roustan (Paris: Bossard, 1919), 249.
9. Ibid.
10. For further details, see C. Ionescu, “Desăvârșirea unității statale și naționale a României—un proces istoric obiectiv,” *Dreptul* (Bucharest) 12 (2018): 29–30.
11. For further details on the issue of the protection of national minorities, please see I. Diaconu, *Minoritățile în mileniul al treilea: Între globalism și spirit național* (Bucharest: ARED, 1999), 32–36.
12. I.-A. Pop, I. Bolovan, I.-M. Bonda, A.V. Sima, and T. L. Popescu, eds., *Construind Unirea cea Mare*, vol. 3, *De la Marele Război la România întregită (1914–1922)*, eds. M.-O. Groza and C. S. Sabău (Cluj-Napoca: Școala Ardeleană, 2018), 903.
13. G. Hamza, “Traité de Paix de Trianon et la protection des minorités en Hongrie,” *Journal of the History of International Law/Revue d’histoire du droit international* 10, 1 (2008): 147–156.
14. Ibid.
15. Point of view of Romanian Government, <https://www.senat.ro/legis/pdf/2019/191459pv.pdf>.
16. Points of view of Romanian Government regarding certain parliamentary legislative initiatives subjected to debate in the Chamber of Deputies, point, 54, http://www.cdep.ro/proiecte/2019/500/20/1/pvgdPSG33_17.01.2020%20140%20initiativa.pdf.
17. “Expunere de motive.”
18. Lege pentru declararea zilei de 4 iunie Ziua Tratatului de la Trianon, <https://www.senat.ro/legis/pdf/2019/191459fg.pdf>.
19. Ibid.

20. On this date, the Romanian army, after repelling the attacks of the Bolshevik troops led by the communist Béla Kun, entered Budapest and occupied it militarily.
21. Pop et al., 3: 14.
22. “Expunere de motive.”
23. Ibid.
24. Treaty of Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighborliness between Romania and Hungary (with appendix), signed at Timișoara on 16 September 1996, <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201966/volume-1966-I-33604-English.pdf>.
25. Resolution on the position of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Romanian Senate concerning the Law amending the Law on nationality in Hungary and the Law on the unity of the Hungarian nation, Bucharest, 8 June 2010, https://www.senat.ro/pagini/comisii/activitatea%20in%20comisii/Comisia_Politica_Externa/Buletine/Rezolutia%20Comisiei%20pentru%20politica%20externa%20fata%20de%20legea%20de%20modificare%20a%20Legii%20cetățeniei%20maghiare.pdf.
26. Ibid.
27. The respective government had the political support of the Democratic Liberal Party, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania and of the National Union for the Progress of Romania.
28. Resolution on the position of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Romanian Senate concerning the Law amending the Law on nationality in Hungary and the Law on the unity of the Hungarian nation, Bucharest, 8 June 2010.
29. Ibid.
30. Adopted by the Venice Commission during the 48th Plenary Meeting (Venice, 19–20 October 2001).
31. I. M. Anghel, *Tratatetele de la Trianon și Paris din 1920: Documentele prin care s-a consfințit înfăptuirea României Mari* (Bucharest: Ed. Academiei Oamenilor de Știință, 2018), 97.
32. European Convention on Nationality, art. 5: “Non-discrimination—1. The rules of a State Party on nationality shall not contain distinctions or include any practice which amount to discrimination on the grounds of sex, religion, race, colour or national or ethnic origin. 2. Each State Party shall be guided by the principle of non-discrimination between its nationals, whether they are nationals by birth or have acquired its nationality subsequently.” <https://rm.coe.int/COERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016802ed91d>.
33. G. Pentassuglia, *Minorités en droit international: Une étude introductive* (Strasbourg: Éditions du Conseil de l’Europe, 2004), 27–28.
34. Ibid.
35. Shaw, 660.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., 661.
39. Article 11 of The Law of Romanian nationality no. 21/1991 (republished and updated): “(1) Individuals who were Romanian nationals and have lost such national-

ity for reasons that are not imputable to them or whose Romanian nationality was withdrawn against their will, as well as their descendants down to the third degree of kinship, may apply to reacquire the Romanian nationality or it may be granted to them, and they may keep their foreign nationality as well, and either establish their domicile in Romania or keep their domicile abroad, provided that they meet the conditions provided under Art. 8 para. (1) b), c) and e).” <http://legislatie.just.ro/Public/Detalii Document/121439>.

40. Minutes of the Senate meeting of 6 June 2018, <https://www.senat.ro/PAGINI/Stenogramme/Stenogramme2018/18.06.06.pdf>.
41. Pop et al., 3: 877–889.
42. Minutes of the Senate meeting of 6 June 2018, p. 23.
43. *La Paix de Versailles: Questions territoriales (avec de nombreuses cartes et tableaux statistiques)/Tchécoslovaquie-Pologne-Ukraine-Roumanie-Yougoslavie* (Paris: Les Éditions Internationales, 1939), 281–376.
44. Minutes of the Senate meeting of 6 June 2018, p. 24.

Abstract

The Need for a Law to Declare 4 June As the Trianon Treaty Day

On 4 June 2020, Romania will celebrate 100 years since the signing of the Trianon Peace Treaty. This event constituted an essential page in the history of the Romanian nation, which materialized in a peace treaty concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers, including Romania, with Hungary, as a successor state of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a defeated state in World War I. Under the mentioned peace treaty, the Great Powers acknowledged the union of Transylvania (and the eastern part of Banat) with Romania as well as the sovereign will of the Romanians in Transylvania expressed through a vote on 1 December 1918, that is, through the Resolution of the National Assembly of Alba Iulia. Beyond any historical and political-legal meanings of the Treaty of Trianon, this treaty represents in itself a document with strong spiritual connotations for Romanians, which justifies the need to celebrate its signing date through a solemn legislative act adopted by the Romanian Parliament. From this perspective, the author makes reference to a legislative proposal—undergoing its final adoption procedure—aiming to declare 4 June as the Trianon Treaty Day and to establish the appropriate steps for the proper celebration of this day at national and local level. The author also analyzes from a critical perspective two laws adopted by Hungary in 2010, namely a new law on the Hungarian nationality and a law on the “unity of the Hungarian nation,” meant to “commemorate the Trianon Diktat.” The political and legal analysis of the two Hungarian laws reveals the political will and the intent of the legislator from the neighboring country to call into question or even challenge the provisions or consequences of the Peace Treaty signed on 4 June 1920, which have been subsequently included in various major bilateral or multilateral international regulations.

Keywords

Treaty of Trianon, 4 June 1920, Romania, Hungary, national minorities, right to self-determination of nations, nationality

TRANSILVANICA

“I Want You Even if You Do Not Want Me”^{*} Jesuits in Cluj between 1595 and 1610

FERENC
PÁLL-SZABÓ



Emmanuel Neri Italus Soc. IESV. odio Fidei Catholice ab
Amianis cruciatus Claudiopoli in Transilvania. A. 1603. 9. Iul.
C. Sireta d. M. J. C.

EMMANUEL NERI as a martyr.

SOURCE: MATHIA TANNER, *Societas Jesu*
(Prague, 1675), 59.

Ferenc Páll-Szabó

Researcher at the Center for Transylvanian Studies, Romanian Academy, post-doctoral fellow at the Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babeş-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca.

IN THE second half of the 16th century, the Protestant movements gained ground in Transylvania, which then saw the emergence of different confessions. By 1571, when the Catholic Stephen Báthory was elected prince of Transylvania, Catholicism had been almost swept away from the country. In order to recover the lost positions, the prince—meanwhile also elected as king of Poland—brought in the Jesuits, who opened a College in Cluj (Kolozsvár, Klausenburg) which was planned to become the first university of Transylvania.¹

After Stephen Báthory's death, the Jesuits' position became weaker, and although the next prince, the underage Sigismund Báthory, was also a Catholic and was eager to keep the order in Transylvania, they were eventually expelled in 1588.

^{*} The phrase comes from the short story “Alexandru Lăpuşneanul,” written by Romanian author Costache Negruzzi and published in *Dacia literară* (Iaşi) 1, 1 (1840).

The Return of the Jesuits to Transylvania

IN 1595 Sigismund Báthory had enough power—the year before he had imprisoned many of the nobles who had been collaborating with the Ottoman Empire, and executed some of them in Cluj or Gilău (Gyalu, Julmarkt), thus eliminating his opponents, while others were presently afraid to stand against him—to regulate the presence of the Jesuit Order in Transylvania (members of the order had already settled in the country): in May 1595 the Diet of Alba Iulia (Gyulafehérvár, Weißenburg) solemnly invited the Jesuit Order back to Cluj, at Cluj-Mănăştur (Kolozs-Monostor), and returned their confiscated assets.²

Shortly after this decision, Alfonso Carillo, a well-known Jesuit diplomat who had arrived in Transylvania in 1591, interceded with the local council of Cluj, and consequently the Unitarians were forced to give back the buildings that had belonged to the Jesuits in 1588 and which hosted their college. Soon, the number of the Jesuits in the city increased to 12, after the arrival of some prominent members of the order: the well-known Polish Bible translator Jacob Wujek, the rector of the institution in its glory days, who resumed his position, Petrus Maiorius (Maggiore, who later became rector of the institution) from Italy, as well as Claudio Vernelio from France.

Carillo obtained, among others, the payment of the yearly subsidy offered in 1583 by Stephen Báthory, in order to cover the expenses of the seminary, but failed to obtain the same privileges from the pope (as promised two decades earlier), although he sent many letters in this regard (the head of the church feared a new banishment).

Soon the College had four classes, three in grammar and one in humanities, and the number of students was constantly increasing. In 1596 there were 16 Jesuits in the city, out of whom 8 taught at the College, while the others were preachers; it becomes therefore obvious that the Jesuits went beyond the didactic duties for which they had been summoned to Transylvania.

In the same year a plague broke out in the city, killing many citizens. The Jesuits used this pandemic to their own advantage, preaching that the epidemic was the result of the citizens' "heresies." Soon a fifth class, in rhetoric, was introduced.

In 1597 the number of Jesuits grew again, four new fathers arriving in town. Another significant success was the conversion of thirty young Protestant noblemen, students of the College, to Catholicism.

The considerable number of the friars required an administrative change: Petrus Maiorius, one of the College's professors, was appointed as vice-provincial, being responsible for the coordination of the Jesuit activity in Transylvania.

Following this, Cluj became the center of the mission's activity in Transylvania. Soon after, when Wujek decided to retire to Poland, Maiorius became the rector of the College.

Unfortunately for the order, the political context once again nullified the hard work invested in founding the College (and in converting the "heretics"): Sigismund Báthory, the prince of Transylvania, decided once again to abdicate (he made several agreements with Rudolph II who promised him the Silesian duchies of Racibórz and Opole, and a yearly subsidy of 50,000 thalers in exchange for Transylvania), and left the country to his wife, Maria Christina of Habsburg. The city of Oradea (Nagyvárad, Großwardein), the closest major city to Cluj, was under siege by Ottoman troops for more than a month (30 September–2 November 1598, resisting heroically),³ and in this context the parents of the College's students withdrew their children, being afraid that the enemy troops could target Cluj. Before the Ottoman attack, the Jesuits had been expelled from Oradea, where a nobleman, Albert Király, destroyed the order's properties, their lives being saved only by the intervention of the local garrison.

After the danger had passed, the Jesuits resumed their educational activity in Cluj, but the number of students decreased. In spite of this, the level of education increased, new subject matters like philosophy and theology being introduced. The Jesuits also recovered from a financial point of view, as the yearly subsidy of a thousand gold coins was reintroduced, being paid again by the prince; moreover, they were even given two tenancies as a donation from one of the members of the order, Ferenc Sulyok: Bedeciu (Bedecs) and Inucu (Inaktelke),⁴ two villages situated near Cluj, in an area called Călata (Kalotaszeg).

In the month of August of the same year Sigismund Báthory returned to power, but left his throne once more a few months later, leaving the country to one of his cousins, the Polish Cardinal Andrew Báthory. The new ruler was willing to reconcile with the Ottoman Empire, and therefore the position of Michael the Brave, voivode of Wallachia, who wanted to continue the fight, became very difficult.

In this situation, Michael the Brave decided to take a great risk: he occupied both Transylvania and Moldavia (the latter was under the rule of Jeremiah Movilă, who was also willing to reconcile with the Turks), unifying for the first time the three countries inhabited by a Romanian majority. Michael's short rule was beneficial for the Jesuits, as the properties at Macău (Mákófalva, near Cluj, whence the Jesuits had been chased away) were restored to the order.

In 1601 Michael the Brave was killed by the Austrians (General Giorgio Basta was initially sent by the emperor to cooperate with the Wallachian voivode, who ruled in the name of the Habsburgs, but who soon came to be seen as a threat), and a new civil war broke out (the Habsburgs represented by Basta and

some local noblemen fought against the majority of the local noblemen led by the elected Prince Moses Székely, who had the support of the Ottoman Empire).

Although the country was in the middle of a war, the activity of the College continued uninterrupted. In 1600, 24 members of the order were active in Cluj, where they managed to convert many of the College's Protestant students. In the next two years, due to the political circumstances and amid the general confusion, the number of Jesuits decreased to 11, which created the need to increase their number and led to the subsequent arrival of Giovanni Argenti, who was appointed vice-provincial.

These were the last moments of relative calm for the order in Cluj: being considered agents of the Habsburg Empire, the hatred against them grew constantly, as shown by the Macău incident. The situation needed only a spark to get out of control. It came in the summer of 1603.

9 June 1603: The Banishment of the Jesuits from Cluj

EVEN DURING the first expulsion of the Jesuits, in 1588, the situation had been only one step away from violence: only the intervention of the guards sent by Sigismund Báthory had saved the Jesuits from an imminent attack.⁵

In 1603 the order represented a problem for the locals, for two reasons. First of all, they were openly supporting the unification of Transylvania and Hungary under Habsburg rule, an idea which was not accepted by the Transylvanian nobles, who preferred independence and were convinced that Austria could not protect these territories in case of an Ottoman attack (which would certainly come if this scenario was followed). We cannot forget that the pro-Ottoman orientation had a strong tradition in Transylvania, Sigismund Báthory being forced to put to death those noblemen who had opposed to his pro-Austrian policies ten years prior.

The other reason for which the Jesuits were so unpopular in the country was the success of the Academy, associated with the conversion of many young Protestant noblemen who were its students.

In the summer of 1603, the tragedy was imminent. The Austrian General Basta stationed his troops in Cluj, but soon Moses Székely approached the city with Turkish and Tatar troops. Avoiding a decisive confrontation, Basta moved his troops to the well-equipped and easily defended fortress of Gherla (Szamosújvár, Neuschloss), and he himself went in the direction of Satu Mare (Szat-

márnémeti, Sathmar), hoping to get help from the emperor. In spite of leaving the city of Cluj, he left behind a strong garrison of 350 soldiers.

The inhabitants of Cluj had other plans: in order to avoid a new siege, and inevitably the destruction of the area around the city, they made an agreement with Székely and warned the imperial garrison to leave the city. The Austrian troops agreed to withdraw, especially considering that their captain, Carol Göllnitz, had suddenly died. They left on 9 June.

This was the moment that triggered the unfortunate events that were about to come. The Jesuits were unpopular among the Protestant inhabitants of the city, and the fact that Basta (the Austrian general who was hated in Transylvania due to his violence and crimes) had favored them openly (when he was in the city) did not help them either.

In the Sunday before the garrison left the city, the Unitarian bishop (or a priest, according to Argenti) stirred the crowd, stating in his sermon that the time had come to expel the Catholics. Rector Maiorius, who found out what was about to come, complained to Imre Gellyén, the local mayor, but the answer was again that the Jesuits had nothing to fear. The Unitarian preachers were also present at this meeting and their advice was that the Jesuits should return to their premises and not show themselves in public, in order to prevent potential conflicts.

On the second day, early in the morning, the garrison left the city and the armed locals followed them in order to forestall a possible attack. After the Austrians left the city, the armed locals, together with the inhabitants of the nearby villages, who were seeking shelter inside the city because of the war, gathered at the house of the Unitarian bishop, located in the central square, where Bishop Mathias Toroczka and priest Paul Góczy Nyiró made them swear that they would not lay down their weapons until the Jesuits left the city.

Around eight o'clock, the crowd led by the Unitarian priests and their students attacked the buildings of the church, the seminary, and the College, being organized in three different groups, destroying the altar and the statues of the saints, and everything else which stood in their way. The Rector and Father Argenti were among the first who saw what was happening, and they went to warn the others using two different routes. The rector was attacked by a man, but the blow struck with an axe was not powerful enough to kill him. Another priest who arrived from a nearby village was more severely injured. Rector Maiorius was saved by a local captain and his men, who were accidentally in the area, and two other ill Jesuits were also saved, but suffered injuries. The only Jesuit killed was Joannes Niger (or Emmanuel Neri),⁶ the sacristan, who was responsible for taking care of the sick. He was shot in the chest, then in the head. He was buried the next day by the College's students, and was considered a martyr.

Argenti arrived at the building of the College and hid together with other members of the order. The destruction of the church, according to his description, was complete: the crowd beheaded Virgin Mary's statue, shot the saints' images, and even destroyed the benches. After such an ordeal, the Jesuits considered it a miracle that only one monk had been killed.

The College rooms were also heavily vandalized: the beds, doors, windows, bins were destroyed, and the books were burnt, torn up or stolen. Among the books that disappeared on that day we mention a codex from the famous library of Matthias Corvinus, the *Bibliotheca Corviniana*, which belonged to Stephen Szamosközy, historian and humanist, who had lent it to Father Antonio Marietti.⁷

Eventually, the riot was ended by a local counselor, who ordered the Jesuits to leave the city. In a report sent to Rome, the Jesuits complained about the humiliating treatment they received after these events: they were not allowed to dress properly, although it rained heavily, and dirt was thrown at Father Argenti several times.

The destruction continued in the following period due to the fact that the Rector Maiorius, who expected an attack, demanded the concealment of the order's belongings in different places, in the walls and under the floorboards. After the locals found out about this, a real treasure hunt began, which led to the destruction of the building.

Later, the inhabitants used the walls of the College as a stone quarry for their buildings. The church was also destroyed: the upper vault was demolished, killing 14 Protestants in the process.⁸

After they were expelled, the Jesuits were sent to the Tatars' camp (the Tatars had joined Prince Moses Székely in this mission, following the orders of the Ottomans), from where they went to the prince who welcomed them, although the rumor was that he was behind the banishment of the Jesuits (who were considered to be too close to the Habsburgs). The prince, a true diplomat, appeared to be profoundly disturbed by the events and promised support in the future, but stated that because of the unfavorable popular opinion his hands were tied for the moment. He did only one thing for the Jesuits: he ordered the safekeeping of their belongings in Cluj, and he returned their horses and chariots.

Later the Jesuits were taken under the protection of Johannes Bogáti, a Catholic nobleman from Székely's army, who sent them to safety in the fortress of Gurghiu (Görgenyszentimre, Görgen).⁹

In the autumn of 1603 the Jesuits were back in Cluj: they arrived together with Basta, and the Austrian general gave them the Unitarian church (Saint Michael's church), and the Unitarian school buildings in the Old Town (Óvár)—today the building of the Franciscan monastery—in order to compensate them

for the previous losses. Basta severely punished the citizens of Cluj: those responsible for the destruction of the Jesuits' assets were executed (some of the perpetrators, especially the priests, had managed to leave the city before Basta's arrival), the executions being stopped only by the intervention of the Jesuit rector, who begged Basta to put an end to them (however, this statement must be treated cautiously, because it belongs to a member of the Jesuit order).¹⁰ According to Basta, Emperor Rudolph had ordered for the entire city to be wiped out, but Basta was satisfied with the payment of an enormous penalty.¹¹

Although in the following year the Jesuits had 260 students and it seemed that they would settle down again for a long time, a new turn of events decided otherwise: Basta was driven away for good, and the Jesuits were also forced to leave, this time for a longer period. In 1605 Prince Stephen Bocskay issued a decree of expulsion, but he died soon afterwards.

In 1606 the last Jesuit refugees in the area of Cluj left Mănăştur. In the following year a new decree against them was issued, this time by Sigismund Rákóczi. This decree remained in force through the whole century, although the Jesuits managed to remain in Transylvania during almost all this time.

The reign of Gabriel Báthory proved to be fatal for the Jesuits; in 1610 the last two members of the order left Transylvania, mainly because they were suspected of being involved in the conspiracy of two Catholic noblemen, Stephen Kendi and Boldizsár Kornis, who sought to murder the prince. The exile of the Jesuits was once again short: after a few years, due to the tolerant religious policy of Gabriel Bethlen, they returned to Transylvania.

□

Notes

1. For this period see Ioan-Aurel Pop and Liana Lăpădatu, "Les Débuts de l'Université moderne à Cluj: le Collège jésuite entre 1579 et 1581," *Transylvanian Review* 18, 4 (2009): 3–20.
2. *Erdélyi Országgyűlési Emlékek*, vol. 3 (1576-1596), ed. Sándor Szilágyi (Budapest, 1877), 472.
3. István Szamosközy, *Erdély története (1598-1599, 1603)*, transl. István Borzsák, ed. István Sinkovics (Budapest, 1977), 137–140.
4. Endre Veress, "Oklevéltár a kolozsvári Báthory-egyetem történetéhez (1579–1603)," *Erdélyi Múzeum* (Kolozsvár), new ser., 1 (23), 5 (1906): 374–375: the donation was conditional: the properties had to be returned to a member of the Sulyok family if the Jesuits emigrated or if they were expelled.
5. "Ismeretlen jezsuita: a jezsuiták erdélyből való kiűzetésének története," in *Erdély öröksége: Erdélyi emlékirók Erdélyről*, vol. 2, *Sárkányfogak 1572–1602*, ed. László

Makkai, contrib. László Cs. Szabó, <http://adatbank.transindex.ro/cedula.php?kod=1087>.

6. The events related to the murder are presented in Mathia Tanner, *Societas Jesu usque ad sanguinis et vitae profusionem militans, in Europa, Africa, Asia, et America, contra Gentiles, Mahometanos, Judaeos, Haereticos, Impios, pro Deo, fide Ecclesia, pietate sive vita, et mors eorum, qui ex Societate Jesu in causa Fidei et Virtutis propugnatae, violenta morte toto Orbe sublatis sunt* (Prague, 1675), 59.
7. The extent of the destruction is exaggerated in the Jesuit descriptions: the vast majority of the library books were saved. The Corvina Codex was probably destroyed because it was in the room of the Jesuit and not in the library.
8. This information must be treated cautiously, as it appears only in Endre Veress, “A kolozsvári Báthory-egyetem története lerombolásáig, 1603-ig (Második, befejező közlemény),” *Erdélyi Múzeum*, new ser., 1 (23), 4 (1906): 264.
9. “Nagy Szabó Ferenc memorialéja,” in *Erdélyi történelmi adatok*, vol. 1, ed. Imre Mikó (Kolozsvár, 1855), 39–169.
10. “Ismeretlen jezsuita: a jezsuiták erdélyből való kiűzetésének története,” 2: 79–86.
11. *Erdélyi történelmi adatok*, 1: 195.

Abstract

“I Want You Even if You Do Not Want Me”: Jesuits in Cluj between 1595 and 1610

In this article we discuss the presence and activity of the Jesuit order in Cluj (Kolozsvár, Klausenburg), between 1595 and 1610. Located in Transylvania, with an overwhelmingly Protestant population, Cluj was the home of a reputed Jesuit College. Unfortunately, the political context did not favor the order's presence in this area: in the summer of 1603, the monks were banished from the city after a citizens' riot.

Keywords

Jesuits, Cluj (Kolozsvár, Klausenburg), Catholics, Protestants

P R O F I L E

**Ioan A. Vătăşescu,
General Secretary of King
Ferdinand I University
of Cluj**
Bio-Bibliographic Clarifications

ALEXANDRU PĂCURAR



IOAN A. VĂTĂŞESCU
(1897–1980)

Alexandru Păcurar

Associate professor at the Faculty of Geography, Department of Human Geography and Tourism, Babeş-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca.

IT IS a well-known fact that Romanians do not seem to value enough the preservation and celebration of the memory of their ancestors; this often comes as a rather fragmented effort, since in the case of many personalities that distinguished themselves and left a mark in the life of their communities and the institutions they worked in, at a local, regional and even national level, oral history and evidence were the only sources we could use in building their profiles and completing their bio-bibliographical data. There is a (far too) long series of outstanding personalities who are waiting for their contribution to the prosperity of the community and/or of the institution they were part of, as the case may be, to be at least known, if not recognized—the latter would mean much more, and rightly so. It is true that in “the decade of collapses (1940–1950)”¹—the phrase belongs to Mihai

Pelin—and in the one that followed, under the new ideological conditions promoted by proletkultism, the authorities of that time did everything to erase, ridicule, and render anonymous the contribution of the forerunners, who have therefore long been disregarded and overlooked.

After 1990, when we regained our right to memory, it has been incumbent on us, as a holy duty, to recover and reinstate the bio-bibliographical profiles of these illustrious forefathers. Ioan A. Vătășescu² is part of this gallery of “forgot-



FIG. 1. IOAN A. VĂTĂȘESCU, general secretary of King Ferdinand I University of Cluj (first on the left, top row), in a group portrait of the members of the University Senate, dressed in ceremonial robes, in the inner courtyard of the Academic College before the inauguration visit of King CAROL II, 13 June 1937.

Bottom row, from left to right: Prof. DUMITRU MICHAÏL, dean of the Faculty of Medicine; Prof. EMIL HAȚIEGANU, dean of the Faculty of Law; Prof. FLORIAN ȘTEFĂNESCU-GOANGĂ, rector of the University; Prof. NICOLAE DRĂGANU, vice-rector and dean of the Faculty of Letters; Prof. ALEXANDRU BORZA, dean of the Faculty of Sciences.

Top row, from left to right: Dr. IOAN A. VĂTĂȘESCU, general secretary of the University; Prof. IULIU MOLDOVAN, dean of the Faculty of Medicine; Prof. IACOB LAZĂR, deputy dean of the Faculty of Law; Prof. THEODOR CAPIDAN, dean of the Faculty of Letters; Prof. VICTOR STANCIU, dean of the Faculty of Sciences.

SOURCE: The Museum of Babeș-Bolyai University History, courtesy of Dr. ANA-MARIA STAN, scientific researcher, to whom I also take this opportunity to express my thanks.

ten” personalities. He was the last democratically elected general secretary of the University of Cluj, when it was still called King Ferdinand I University. He held the office of general secretary from 1937 until he was abusively removed in May 1947, during the loathsome Stalinist purges.



His abusive removal from the University at the request of the Union of Public Employees of Cluj City and Cluj County, as well as the suspicious and disgraceful rush—not to mention the servile attitude—with which Rector Emil Petrovici put into practice the official letter issued by the “union” on 28 May 1947, are all sensitive topics worth being investigated by researchers.

In our research, a complex series of archival records allowed us to partially reconstruct the life and activity of Ioan A. Vătășescu; additionally, after the telephone call we had with Mrs. Liana-Dacia Sabo-Vătășescu, M.D., his youngest daughter, other issues were clarified as well.³

Ioan A. Vătășescu was born on 22 October 1897 in the village of Arefu, close to the “foothills of the Carpathians,” in the administrative subdivision Curtea de Argeș, in a family of “poor peasants who worked hard to earn a living throughout their entire lives”⁴; he passed away on 10 January 1980, in Bucharest. By 1909, while still living with his family, he had attended and graduated five primary school grades, “being ranked top of his class”⁵ in the 5th grade, from among all pupils attending the schools of Corbeni village. Due to family hardships and difficulties, he had to drop out of school in order to help his parents maintain their household. After the outbreak of World War I and Romania’s entry into the war, he lost both his parents and his home was totally destroyed during the battle of Arefu: “His home village was the theater of fierce military campaigns,”⁶ as he remembered years later in his “Short Autobiography.” Young Vătășescu showed a “strong desire for enlightenment and progress,”⁷ and thus, with the elation and enthusiasm of youth, he “began the difficult undertaking of great effort and long-lasting work”⁸ as he himself declared, with the long term aim of overcoming his condition and “becoming a spiritually evolved man.”⁹ Besides his strong determination and iron will, he also benefited from the support of the Romanian society of those times, when a very complex institutional network was implemented to help the tens of thousands of war orphans. After attending and graduating high school in Romania, he took the classic baccalaureate (in letters and philosophy) at the University of Nancy (France), “acknowledged and validated by the Ministry.”¹⁰

He subsequently studied letters at the universities of Grenoble, Nancy, Strasbourg, and Paris, completed by a bachelor degree in letters at Sorbonne University in Paris, with a major in French and a minor in Romanian language and philosophy. These degrees were subsequently recognized by the Faculty of Letters of Cluj, and then also “endorsed and recognized by the Ministry.”¹¹

Ioan A. Vătășescu also graduated from the Pedagogic Seminary in 1934; he claims to have gained “three other higher education degrees from French Educational Institutes in order to be able to master the teaching profession.”¹² On 17 December 1934 he obtained his doctorate at the University of Paris, defending “L’Œuvre de Victor Hugo en Roumanie”¹³ as his main thesis and “Bibliographie critique des traductions en roumain de Victor Hugo”¹⁴ as the second thesis. With regard to this latter aspect, he mentions in his “Short Autobiography” that: “The two doctoral theses recorded under my name in the ‘Annales de l’Université de Paris’ (1938, p. 447) are numbered 938 and 939”¹⁵ (sic!, when in fact, the actual numbering was 987 and 988).¹⁶



In the source quoted above by Ioan A. Vătășescu, namely *Annales de l’Université de Paris*,¹⁷ on page 447, under the category “Relations littéraires franco-roumaines et franco-hongroises,” his name is mentioned under headings 987 and 988; surely, his memory had tricked him, given the fact that his “Short Autobiography” was written more than twenty years later.

While completing his studies, Ioan A. Vătășescu was also working in the Romanian public service since 1 April 1922. Between 1 November 1924 and 31 December 1927, he worked as an archivist at the University of Cluj. Ioan A. Vătășescu served as a secretary in the Rector’s Office from 1 January 1928 to 31 March 1937, and on 1 April 1937 he was promoted and appointed general secretary of the University by High Royal Decree no. 1883/1937. He held office until 30 May 1947, when he was “discharged” from office, as a result of the “work” done by

FIGS. 2.–3. The first and last pages of the “Short Autobiography,” a handwritten document by IOAN A. VĂTĂȘESCU, former general secretary of King Ferdinand I University of Cluj (1 April 1937–30 May 1947).

SOURCE: Archives Services, Department of Cultural Heritage of Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca.

the... Union of Public Employees of Cluj City and Cluj County. He was succeeded in office by Liviu Gomboș.¹⁸ The brief and vague decision of the Rector's Office states: "We hereby discontinue all of Mr. Ion A. Vătășescu's work duties and tasks he has so far undertaken as general secretary, only allowing him to remain in office as the director of the Academic College."¹⁹

This is all that Professor Emil Petrovici,²⁰ the rector in office at the time, could do, given that the so-called "union," in fact a mere annex of the NKVD, demanded the total removal of this outstanding official. This is our logical inference, since the Decision further states: "As regards the permanent dismissal of Mr. Vătășescu, as demanded by the Union through the aforementioned notice, we decline our competence by submitting their request to the Higher Competent Authorities."²¹ The text refers to notice no. 345 of 28 May 1947, of the so-called "union," which, among other things, announced the exclusion of Ioan A. Vătășescu from all union organizations. Therefore, we can infer that the influence and force of this "union" was similar to a legally binding law, for only two days later the rector finally dismissed the loyal high-ranking official from all offices he had previously held. As director of the Academic College, a position that he was allowed to continue to hold, and which was also referred to in the Decision, Vătășescu served for less than two months, since the powerful "union" eventually succeeded in removing him completely from the university's structures. All the substantial and high quality work that Ioan A. Vătășescu had carried out in his career as a senior official did not make any difference, although for his meritorious work at the University of Cluj he was decorated with the Order of the "Crown of Romania," being awarded the Order of Merit in the rank of knight, by High Royal Decree no. 1445/1942. He also received Les Palmes Académiques, which was a national order bestowed by the French Republic upon distinguished academics and figures in the world of culture and education. To sum it all up, he was the director of the Academic College between 1936 and 1940, as well as between July 1945 and 1947, when he was "removed" from office by the Ministry of Education.²²

The handwritten document called "Short Autobiography" we referred to and discovered in the Archives Services at the Department of Cultural Heritage of Babeș-Bolyai University outlines some of the outstanding achievements of the former general secretary,²³ such as reorganizing, restructuring and simplifying the central administrative services of the university, as well as organizing and running the Academic College, including the university canteen and the Foreign Guest Service Unit. For this "honorable" service, meaning unpaid, Vătășescu directs us to the University Yearbook of 1938/39, pp. 341–355, where reference is made to his work. The document reads as follows:

This institution being a distinct Department under the authority of the Rector's Office, its administration and leadership were entrusted to Mr. Ioan A. Vătăşescu, general secretary of the University, who was assisted in this capacity by Mrs. Victoria I. Vătăşescu, who dealt with the multiple activities of the College requiring feminine competences, all the elements pertaining to guest services such as: comfort and snacks, household provisions and the aesthetics of the building, banquets, the preparation and supply of buffet meals at academic gatherings and balls, ballroom decorations, canteen management (menu, staff, etc.).²⁴

As a result, “the Students’ Campus Committee . . . decided to express their thanks and gratitude to Mr. I. A. Vătăşescu, for the beautiful work done and the wonderful results achieved during the first year of functioning of the Canteen within the premises of the Academic College.”²⁵

Ioan A. Vătăşescu ensured the smooth coordination of the refuge of Cluj University to Sibiu and Timișoara, after the Vienna Dictate (30 August 1940), organizing the uninterrupted activity of the university (1940–1945) and the “restoration and return of the institution to Cluj” (1945–1946), an activity he describes as “exceptional and of major proportions in both time and space.”²⁶

He also published articles, studies, syntheses, books, as well as the *Thirteen Yearbooks of the University for 1926–1942*, which were large printed volumes “of 220–800 pages each.”²⁷ Regarding this latter aspect, the author modestly asserts that in order to ensure a better external visibility of the University of Cluj, “from 1932 onwards, I had the initiative to add an Analytical Summary in French”²⁸ (to each volume of the yearbooks). In 1928, Ioan A. Vătăşescu published the *Guide de l'étudiant à Cluj*, comprising 263 pages and 1 chart, updated annually, which he refers to as being: “the first work of its kind in Romanian higher education, published independently. . . and widely disseminated in the coun-




FIG. 4. The Cluj University Rector’s Office decision to dismiss IOAN A. VĂTĂŞESCU from the position of general secretary of the university at the request of the Union of Public Employees of Cluj City and Cluj County.

SOURCE: Personal file of IOAN A. VĂTĂŞESCU, Archives Services, Department of Cultural Heritage of Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca.

try, free of charge or below cost,” which he considers a “fruit of the experience acquired . . . on my own at notable universities abroad,” with the observation that in the countries he visited during his studies abroad, “such works are undertaken by a separate Secretarial office,” finally concluding that “this Guide has brought great services to the generations of students that succeeded one another from 1929 to 1940 . . . which contributed to the institution’s good reputation.”²⁹

In 1939, in order to increase the international visibility of the University of Cluj, he published a large documented article in French about the University of Cluj, in the *Latinitas* magazine of Paris.³⁰ Along similar lines, in January 1944, towards the end of the Second World War, Ioan A. Vătăşescu published in Sibiu *L’Université roumaine réfugiée de Cluj*,³¹ describing the challenges he had faced when coordinating the refuge and striving to organize the uninterrupted activity of the university in the new locations in Sibiu and Timișoara. The publication of this work was widely echoed abroad, as evidenced by the letter he received from Alf Lombard on 31 March 1944. The Swedish philologist specializing in Latin languages wrote to him, as a correspondent member (1947) and posthumous honorary member of the Romanian Academy (1992), as follows: “August 1940 was a great injustice that required this— hopefully temporary—move of the University. A revolting injustice, let it be told by a friend of your cause, a friend who, in the remote Sweden, does not miss any opportunity to give the proper explanations, to make the facts known and the simple truth shine.”³² Among the studies he published on his own, Ioan A. Vătăşescu also mentions “a work . . . for limited use” concerning the establishment, organization and achievements of the Romanian University of Cluj “between 12 May 1919 and 12 May 1933,”³³ drafted at the request of Nicolae Titulescu, royal minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, “for personal research and documentation in the famous process of the Hungarian counts in Geneva.”³⁴

“In the field of library and documentation science,” his “long-standing” experience³⁵ facilitated “a close and long-lasting contact with the Department for International Inter-university Exchanges of Publications” which was materialized in “the mutual exchange of theses and scientific works.”³⁶ He was also involved in the organization within the premises of the Rector’s Office of the Library Department for Information and Documentation³⁷ in the field of higher education, the initial core of the future University Office. He was also directly involved in organizing a library in the reading room of the Academic College, all these endeavors being “strongly appreciated and praised by the Rector of the University of Paris, Professor Sébastien Charléty,”³⁸ as well as by the University Senate. He ensured the yearly publication of a chapter on the Library of the University, in the University Yearbook, in which, according to the author, “every year, we have continued to support with orientation material” and assist

*the publications of the library's scientific staff, librarians' conferences, library works and advancements (the alphabetical catalogue, the topographic catalogue, the subject-oriented catalogue, the increase in scientific contributions, the circulation of documents and the affluence and frequency of readers, the historical archive, exhibitions, the popular library and so on).*³⁹

In July 1947, after being completely removed from the higher education structures, including from the office he held as director of the Academic College and almost literally thrown out in the street, Ioan A. Vătășescu managed to obtain a teaching position at the Girls' High School no. 3 in Cluj, for the 1947–1948 school year.

Then, from 1948 until 1954, when he wrote his “Short Autobiography” which was a mandatory document for him to land a job as a librarian at the Medical and Pharmaceutical Institute in Cluj, he worked at the Technical Secondary School no. 1 in Câmpina. Referring to this last aspect, the former general secretary of the University of Cluj states:

*As I made my descent from Cluj to Câmpina, amid the great reform of 1948 in the field of education, I moved from higher education to lower education. Here, after making my own contributions to the organization and running of the extensive network of vocational schools and qualification schools belonging to the former Muntenia Oil Company (1948–1950), for which my work was appreciated and awarded, I continued to function as a Romanian language teacher at the vocational School no. 1 in Câmpina, up to the present.*⁴⁰

Apart from providing information about his organizational skills and subsequent career path, the text above conveys, first and foremost, the regret for his departure from Cluj, as he uses the expressions “As I made my descent from Cluj to Câmpina”—with subtle irony—“amid the great reform of 1948 in the field of education,” in fact a mere political “purge” in the purest Stalinist style, or “I moved from higher education to lower education.”

Ioan A. Vătășescu married teacher Victoria I. Marin, “the daughter of a petty clerk,”⁴¹ born on 5 January 1912 in Rotbav (Brașov). The couple had two daughters: Maria-Lorena (1936) and Liana-Dacia (born 1938) both graduates of the University of Medicine and Pharmacy of Cluj, in connection to which the former general secretary of the King Ferdinand I University of Cluj wrote his letter of intent.

His eldest daughter, Maria-Lorena, went to live in Paris, France, where she practiced medicine, and the youngest daughter, Liana-Dacia, practiced medicine in Bucharest. After the death of her husband in 1980, Victoria Vătășescu joined her eldest daughter in France.

In addition to Ioan A. Vătășescu's qualities and skills highlighted above, we can consider those of a caring, loving father, as highlighted during his attempt to find employment at the Medical and Pharmaceutical Institute in Cluj, when he emphasized his "every thought,"⁴² as he himself declares, that he was mainly motivated by his "strong desire to guide, support and tutor my daughters in Cluj,"⁴³ modestly daring to demand it as compensation—"as I have always been viewed by so many generations of students."⁴⁴ With disarming honesty and youthful elation, the "petitioner" justifies his request by stating that he is "driven" by "a sincere, impetuous and earnest desire" to "give and pass forward" to the medical and pharmaceutical education system in Cluj the experience he had accumulated over the years. With respect to the Institute's Library, where he was hoping to be employed as a librarian, he stated that: "I have conceived a large-scale plan for the reorganization, the endowment with publications, the systematization and management of this library, as well as other secondary activities."⁴⁵

THIS IS, in brief, the profile of Ioan A. Vătășescu, a high-ranking state official who through merit and hard work managed to overcome his initial social condition and reach his goals in life. The Romanian society of his time, still driven by sound, solid bourgeois principles, rewarded him in the sense of ensuring his fair access to the positions he deserved. During its second decade of activity, King Ferdinand I University of Cluj made remarkable institutional and material progress and managed to create a beautiful heritage, as the whole country seemed to have experienced an exceptional development: the institutes of the university managed to erect their own buildings, the Botanical Garden grew and expanded beautifully, the Students' Sports Park was established and became operational, the modern building of the Academic College was erected, and still remains an emblematic edifice of the interwar period of Cluj.

Nonetheless, the beautiful and rapid development of the university was disrupted by shameful political games, and for a while the institution had to face the challenges of the refuge to Sibiu and Timișoara, and subsequently the return, but under particularly aggressive Soviet occupation conditions. These events and achievements are strongly linked to Ioan A. Vătășescu, and this is one of the main reasons why we consider him most deserving to enter the honorable gallery of the general secretaries of the university, joining "founders" such as Dr. Ștefan Jarda⁴⁶ and Dr. Constantin Jurcan⁴⁷ who worked hard to lay the institutional and material foundations and ensure the development of King Ferdinand I University of Cluj.

Our modest contribution to the clarification of various bio-bibliographic aspects of the life and activity of Ioan A. Vătășescu is part of a rehabilitation effort and an invitation to a thorough research of this personality of the University of

Cluj, who deserves an extensive monograph, especially since he is not mentioned at all in the dictionary of Cluj personalities,⁴⁸ which in itself is a regrettable act of omission.



Notes

1. Mihai Pelin, *Deceniul prăbușirilor (1940–1950): Viețile pictorilor, sculptorilor și arhitecților români între legionari și stalinisti* (Bucharest: Comania, 2005), 667.
2. We decided to use the form “Ioan” for Vătășescu’s first name, since in his “Short Autobiography,” he himself seems to prefer using this variant, although in Wallachia, Oltenia and Moldavia, the alternative form, “Ion,” was very well-established.
3. The data concerning civil status and other family-related aspects have been provided and confirmed by Mrs. Liana-Dacia Sabo-Vătășescu, M.D., to whom I also take this opportunity to express my thanks.
4. Ioan A. Vătășescu, “Scurtă autobiografie” (1954), 15-page manuscript, Archives Services, Department of Cultural Heritage of Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, p. 1.
5. *Ibid.*, 2.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*, 3.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*
16. I want to take this opportunity to thank Professor Christian Germanaz of the University of La Réunion (France) who gave me access to the French bibliographic source cited herein.
17. *Annales de l’Université de Paris* 13, 1 (1938).
18. On 30 May 1947, Liviu Gomboș, J.D., succeeded Ioan A. Vătășescu in office as general secretary of King Ferdinand I University of Cluj.
19. Decision of the University Rector’s Office, Personal file of Ioan A. Vătășescu, Archives Services, Department of Cultural Heritage of Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca.
20. Emil Petrovici (1899–1968), linguist, university professor, rector of the University of Cluj (1945–1951), member of the Romanian Academy (1945).
21. Decision of the University Rector’s Office, Personal file of Ioan A. Vătășescu.
22. Vătășescu, “Scurtă autobiografie,” 4.
23. *Ibid.*, 4–8.

24. *Anuarul Universității Regele Ferdinand I din Cluj 1938–1939* (Cluj: Tipografia Car-tea Românească, 1940): 351.
25. Ibid., 354.
26. Vătășescu, “Scurtă autobiografie,” 5.
27. Ibid., 7.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 5–6.
30. Ibid., 7.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., 7–8.
33. Ibid., 6.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., 9.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., 10.
38. Sébastien Charléty (1867–1945), French historian and university professor, rector of the University of Paris (1927–1937). He visited King Ferdinand I University of Cluj on 26–27 November 1934.
39. Vătășescu, “Scurtă autobiografie,” 10–11.
40. Ibid., 14.
41. Ibid., 1.
42. Ibid., 15.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., 14.
45. Ibid., 14–15.
46. Dr. Ștefan Jarda (1883–1927), lawyer, the first general secretary of University of Cluj (1 October 1919–6 March 1927). See Alexandru Păcurar, “Dr. Ștefan Jarda, the First Secretary General of Dacia Superior University in Cluj,” *Philobiblon: Transylvanian Journal of Multidisciplinary Research in Humanities* 1, 23 (2018): 73–92.
47. Dr. Constantin Jurcan, lawyer, the second general secretary of the University of Cluj (1 June 1927 until his retirement on 31 March 1937). Doctor of Laws of the Hungarian University in Cluj, after graduation he joined the public service (1 Oc-tober 1898); towards the end of his career, he held the office of general secretary of the University of Cluj. See Alexandru Păcurar, *Lucrările Institutului de Geografie al Universității din Cluj/Travaux de l’Institut de Géographie de l’Université de Cluj (Roumanie): Monografie* (Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut, 2019), 648.
48. *Clujeni ai secolului 20: Dicționar esențial* (Cluj-Napoca: Casa Cărții de Știință, 2000).

Abstract

Ioan A. Vătășescu, General Secretary of King Ferdinand I University of Cluj:
Bio-Bibliographic Clarifications

Ioan A. Vătășescu (1897–1980) brilliantly completes a series of general secretaries of the University in Cluj, taking office after Dr. Ștefan Jarda (1919–1927) and Dr. Constantin Jurcan (1927–1937) and carrying out a most worthy and deserving activity for over a decade (between 1 April 1937 and 30 May 1947). Having lost both his parents in early childhood, Ioan A. Vătășescu proved to have a great thirst for knowledge, taking his baccalaureate in France and obtaining a university degree in letters in the same country. He subsequently defended his doctoral thesis in 1934 at Sorbonne University in Paris. As early as 1922 he joined the Romanian public service, succeeding by merit to take up the position of general secretary of King Ferdinand I University of Cluj. In the difficult moments of the university's refuge to Sibiu and Timișoara (September 1940) and of its return to Cluj (summer–autumn 1945), he took over the heavy responsibility of organizing these large-scale actions. In the context of the military occupation of the country by the Red Army and after Romanian society fell under communist rule, Ioan A. Vătășescu was abusively removed from the university's structures.

Keywords

Ioan A. Vătășescu, the University of Cluj, general secretary, higher education system, marginalization

Ioannes Novi und Stefan der Große – Märtyrer und Landesfürst Zur Ambivalenz von Erinnerungs- verortung in der Bukowina

KURT SCHARR




ABB. 1. Ikone des Heiligen STEFAN, dargestellt als Kirchenstifter nach der Kanonisierung durch die rum.-orth. Kirche am 20. Juni 1992.

Kurt Scharr

Univ.-Prof. an der Leopold-Franzens-Universität Innsbruck. Seine neueste Monographie: *Der griechisch-orientalische Religionsfonds der Bukowina 1783-1949* (2020).

DIE BUKOWINA, bis 1918 östlichstes Kronland des Habsburgerreiches, hatte spätestens seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts in steigendem Maße mit der nationalen Frage zu leben. Konfessionell überwog in der Provinz der orthodoxe, nicht unierte, christliche Glauben. In demographischer Hinsicht hatten die Ruthenen begonnen, der rumänischen Bevölkerung allmählich an Zahl den Rang streitig zu machen.¹ Das beidseits wachsende nationale Bewusstsein führte nicht nur zu einer zunehmenden ethnischen Ausdifferenzierung innerhalb der Bewohner des Kronlandes, die zuvor kaum für solche Facetten Interesse gezeigt hatten. Die Rumänen der Bukowina und im Besonderen ihre Eliten sahen zudem die Kirche mehr und mehr als

This work was supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research, CNCS-UEFISCDI, project number PN-III-P-4-ID-PCCF-2016-0131.

die eigentlich ihre an. Vielen galt sie daher nicht mehr „griechisch-orientalisch“ – wie der offiziell in der Habsburgermonarchie gebräuchliche Wortlaut – sondern bereits als „rumänisch-orthodox“. Aus dem großrumänischen Blickwinkel der Jahre nach 1918 verstand sich die orthodoxe Kirche der Bukowina nicht nur als eine des Staates (die sie vorher, innerhalb der Habsburgermonarchie, in einem ganz anderen Sinne war) sondern v.a. als eine Institution des rumänischen Volkes. Vielmehr noch betrachtete sich diese Kirche aus ihrem Selbstverständnis heraus als Träger des historischen Gedächtnisses der Rumänen. Eine Funktion, über die sie, solange das Volk über keine eigene Staatlichkeit verfügte, eine zentrale Position in der Gesellschaft behauptete.² Im Altreich (Regat) war sie seit Alexandru I. Cuza (1820-1873) hingegen weitgehend auf eine dem Staat untergeordnete Funktion reduziert und konnte sich auch nach 1918 davon nur schwer emanzipieren.³

Vor 1918 stellte sich die Situation in der Bukowina differenziert dar. Im südlichen Landesteil lebten vorwiegend Rumänen (Moldauer). Hier befanden sich mit den Klöstern die bedeutendsten kirchlichen Denkmäler ihres Glaubens und ihrer als Kollektiv erinnerten Vergangenheit. Putna, als eines der wenigen von Kaiser Joseph II. nicht aufgehobenen Klöster der Bukowina, war Grablege des Moldaufürsten Stefan des Großen (Stefan III., rum. Ștefan cel Mare; ca. 1433-1504). Sein Widerstand gegen das Vordringen osmanischer Heere im 15. Jahrhundert sicherte ihm in der kollektiv verklärten Erinnerung der Moldau einen Platz ganz vorne, besonders in Zeiten vermeintlicher Unfreiheit und Fremdherrschaft. Als heroisch stilisierte Fürstengestalt entwickelte sich Stefan bzw. seine Grabstätte seit den 1850-er Jahren für Intellektuelle zu einem Kondensationskern national-rumänischer Sehnsüchte. Johannes der Jüngere (rum. Ioan cel Nou, dt. auch Ioannes Novi de la Suceava; † 1332) wurde seit Beginn des 15. Jahrhunderts in Suczawa (rum. Suceava) als Märtyrer und Landesheiliger (später der Bukowina) verehrt. Beide, Märtyrer und Landesfürst, fanden in der (moldauischen) bäuerlichen Bevölkerung über die Bukowina hinaus Anerkennung. Sie waren schon in der Vormoderne Teil der Volkstradition und gleichermaßen beliebt. Trotzdem spielten beide Erinnerungsorte – Putna wie Suczawa – bis zum Ende der Habsburgermonarchie eine teilweise ganz unterschiedliche Rolle im Alltag der Bewohner. Während der Landesheilige als solcher von den Bauern verehrt wurde, pilgerten intellektuelle selbstbewusste Rumänen nach Putna, wo sie in der Nähe der Grablege von nationaler Einheit träumten.

Hier ist nunmehr danach zu fragen, wie sich diese Erinnerungslandschaft und ihre Denkmäler in der Wahrnehmung durch die Bevölkerung seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, vor dem nationalen Hintergrund veränderten. Welche Akteure, dazu zählte auch die österreichische Verwaltung, übernahmen welche Rolle? Wie instrumentalisieren diese Gruppen diese Orte für ihre jeweiligen

Ideen und wie erfolgreich – im Hinblick auf die intendierte Mobilisierung der Bevölkerung – war man dabei tatsächlich? Methodisch soll der Beitrag aus historischer Perspektive lediglich einen Anstoß dazu liefern, über die Frage nach dem „Volk“ sowie seiner vorgestellten Existenz über die Rolle des historischen Ortes – als personifizier- und greifbare Erinnerung – hin zu einem politischen Raum zu gelangen; einem Raum, der wie im Fall der Bukowina sowohl nationale als auch imperiale Identitätsangebote für seine Bevölkerung bereithielt.

Zwischen Imperium und Nationalstaat

WIE MAN es jetzt zu sehen, wie zu verstehen habe, ist bei uns die allerwichtigste Frage, in ihr liegt unsere ganze Zukunft beschlossen, ja, ihr kommt sozusagen jetzt allerpraktischste Bedeutung zu. Dennoch ist das Volk für uns alle noch immer Theorie und auch weiterhin ein Rätsel. Wir alle, die das Volk lieben, betrachten es wie etwas Theoretisches, und wohl keiner von uns liebt es, wie es wirklich ist, sondern nur, wie es sich jeder von uns vorstellt. (F. M. Dostojewski, *Über die Liebe zum Volk*⁴)

Die „Liebe zum Volk“, wie sie Fjodor M. Dostojewski reflektiert, umreißt im Groben die zeitgenössische Ausgangssituation eines Bewusstseinsbildungsprozesses, der Vorstellung von Volk, angesiedelt zwischen Imperium und Nationalstaat. Da stehen städtische Eliten einer in ihrem Alltag zunächst noch weitgehend bäuerlich verfassten Gruppe gegenüber, die an der Wende vom 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert in der Habsburgermonarchie z.T. noch über 70%⁵ der Gesamtbevölkerung ausmachte. Gerade dieser Teil der Gesellschaft rückt mit neuen Ansätzen der Forschung vermehrt in den Fokus historisch wissenschaftlichen Interesses.⁶ Zudem hat sich gezeigt, dass die zunächst favorisierte Zentrum-Peripherie-Dependenz als Erklärungsmodell vielfach zu kurz griff. Bald wurde klar, dass die soziale Stratigraphie der Gesellschaft unterschiedliche Zugänge zu diesen hierarchisierten Raumstrukturen bot. Eliten der Peripherie waren dem betreffenden politischen Machtzentrum des Staates wesentlich näher und mit ihm vernetzter, bzw. formten dieses in Konsequenz sogar entscheidend mit – als etwa die außerhalb der Städte wohnende, agrarisch dominierte Landbevölkerung.⁷ Darüber hinaus entstand im Entstehungsprozess des modernen Staates in der Vorstellung seiner Eliten eine „dem Volk“ zugeordnete virtuelle Räumlichkeit, mit eigenen Identitätsprojektionen als Orientierungshilfen. Räumlichkeit, Imagination und die darin kondensierte Identität verschmolzen in dieser Konzeption idealerweise zu einem scheinbar natürlichen Amalgam, dem Natio-

nalstaat. Die Ausweitung politischer Partizipationsprozesse an der Wende zum 20. Jahrhundert, besonders im cisleithanischen Reichsteil der Monarchie, dynamisierte außerdem diese Prozesse, geriet doch damit die bäuerlich strukturierte Bevölkerung vermehrt ins Blickfeld politischer Akteure, die sich in Parteien zu organisieren begannen, die ihrerseits wiederum Legitimität suchten.⁸ Die erfolgreiche Umsetzung politischer Ideen hing nunmehr maßgeblich von einer gelingenden Mobilisierung dieses Potentials ab.

Orte wie die beiden Bukowiner Klöster mit ihren Grabstätten können jedoch nicht mit ebenso klaren Bedeutungen identifiziert werden. Die Konzeption der angesprochenen kollektiven Identität ist vielmehr das Ergebnis von Überschneidungen und zugleich einer parallelen Existenz von *Sakralgemeinschaft* (die über ein historisches Glaubens-Narrativ eine Einheit formt), *Imperium* (das sich als inklusives, supranationales Gemeinschaftsmodell versteht) und *moderner Nation* (die versucht, sich ethnisch, historisch, kulturell und über die religiöse Zugehörigkeit als homogene Einheit zu definieren).⁹ Hinter der Naturalisierung des Gedächtnisortes im physischen Raum verbirgt sich daher mitunter ein Facettenreichtum an Bedeutungen, der jeweils unterschiedlich erinnert werden kann und unterschiedlich zugänglich ist.¹⁰

Die im Beitrag fokussierten Orte Putna und Suczawa boten in Form der beiden Grabstätten im übertragenen wie realen Sinne ausreichend Vergangenheit als Baumaterial für staatliche Legitimität. Imperial wie national denkende Eliten in der Habsburgermonarchie versuchten daher als Akteure mithilfe dieser Orte – die sich gewissermaßen als ideologische Kondensationskerne anboten – ihre jeweiligen Identifikationsangebote im Realraum zu verankern und davon ausgehend eine gerichtete Dimension des (neu) zu gestaltenden politischen Raumes abzuleiten; mit anderen Worten, diese Dimension kollektiv für breite Bevölkerungsgruppen physisch erfahrbar und räumlich sichtbar zu machen.¹¹ Der empirische Nachweis einer Existenz von kollektiver Identität innerhalb der bäuerlichen Bevölkerung in der Bukowina soll hier nicht geführt werden. Es ist auch fraglich, ob man in diesem Segment der Bevölkerung überhaupt davon sprechen kann.¹² Sehr wohl können aber die Schichtungen verschiedener Identitätsangebote und das Gedächtnis sozialer Gruppen¹³ am konkreten Ort bzw. Objekt sichtbar gemacht werden. Dieser Aspekt ist bei der vergleichenden Betrachtung von Putna und Suczawa als spezifische Gedächtnisorte, in ihrer jeweiligen gesellschaftlichen Reichweite sowie ihren Handlungsräume, auf dem durch die Eliten umkämpften sozialen Feld, zentral.

Die Protagonisten: Verehrungsort, Wirkungsraum und Klientel

DIE ABSTRAKTE Raumebene des Politischen differenzierte sich seit der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts in der Habsburgermonarchie zunehmend aus. Das Aufbrechen vormoderner Zuordnungen bzw. Loyalitäten mündete nicht nur in einem Bewusstseinswerdungsprozess und einer Neuausrichtung politischer Agenden in Bezug auf die Bevölkerung. Es erweiterte sich auch das Feld des Agierens für die Eliten. Waren etwa die Bezugspunkte rumänischer wie ruthenischer Eliten zunächst noch vornehmlich auf das Herrschaftszentrum Wien ausgerichtet, so stellte sich dieses Verhältnis um 1900 bereits erheblich komplexer dar. Einerseits weitete St. Petersburg seine panslawischen Bestrebungen zunehmend über die eigenen Reichsgrenzen hinaus aus und bot damit, besonders für die Gruppe der Altruthenen in der Bukowina (und Galiziens), ein alternatives Identitätsmodell an. Die Basis dafür, eine spirituelle Renaissance der Ostkirche, hatte schon Katharina II. geschaffen. Während dieser Zeit entwickelte sich auch Putna zu einem vergleichsweise bedeutenden überregionalen geistlichen Zentrum.¹⁴ Zum anderen zeitigte nunmehr aber auch die Siebenbürger Schule ihre Wirkung. Die Fürstentümer Moldau und Walachei hatten sich 1861 erfolgreich in einem Fürstentum vereinigt und zwei Jahrzehnte später (1881) zum Königreich Rumänien (Regat), als einem, sich weitgehend ethnisch definierenden, Nationalstaat zusammengeschlossen. Die Spannung zwischen einem auf Modernisierung der Gesellschaft aufbauenden Nationalismus einerseits und doktrinären wie traditionellen Positionen andererseits hingegen blieb für das Regat charakteristisch.¹⁵ Die Folge war, dass bislang zumeist präordial strukturierte Identitätsmuster, die vielfach mit der orthodoxen Kirche in Verbindung standen, allmählich durch eine vergleichsweise erfolgreiche moderne Nationsidee aufgebrochen wurden.

Nach M. Schulze-Wessel lassen sich in diesen Prozessen der Neuorientierung, die zunehmend größere Teile Bevölkerung erfassten, zwei politische Handlungsfelder hervorheben, die sich allerdings nicht immer trennscharf voneinander unterscheiden lassen. Zum einen kam es zu einer „Nationalisierung der Religion“, also einem Anpassungsprozess, in dem der an sich religiöse Mensch das „Wertesystem der Nation in sein Denken und Handeln“ einbaute. Zum anderen fand eine „Sakralisierung der Nation“ statt, d.h. eine „Übertragung von Funktionen und Ausdrucksformen“ aus der ursprünglichen Sphäre des Religiösen auf die Nation.¹⁶ Die Suche nach einer gemeinsamen, national konnotierten, aus der Vergangenheit heraufreichenden Tradition bzw. der Bezug auf einen Glauben für die (jeweils) angesprochene Bevölkerung musste sich dabei allerdings nicht selten der Realpolitik unterordnen. Auf Landesebene ergaben

sich dadurch fallweise neue Koalitionsmöglichkeiten. So arbeiteten in der Bukowina etwa Jungruthenen mit den rumänischen Demokraten zusammen und orientierten ihre Politik entlang sozialer Gesichtspunkte gegen die (zumeist rumänischen) Großgrundbesitzer. Die alten rumänischen Eliten indes setzten dem wiederum Koalitionen mit den nach Russland orientierten Altruthenen entgegen. Insgesamt übte sich jedoch die politische Elite des Kronlandes weitgehend in österreichischem Patriotismus, ebenso blieb das „rumänische“ Dorf bis zum Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkrieges den Habsburgern gegenüber loyal.¹⁷

Im Jahr 1775 erlangten die Habsburger die Herrschaft über die vormals „Obere Moldau“, die nunmehrige „österreichische“ Bukowina. Man erachtete sich, ganz im Rechtsverständnis der Zeit, als legitimer Nachfolger der moldauischen Landesfürsten.¹⁸ Darin gründete zugleich eine besondere Verantwortung für die Grablegen in den Klöstern von Putna und Suczawa. Einerseits hatte der Woiwode selbst über die Moldau geherrscht, andererseits wurden die sterblichen Überreste des Märtyrers Ioannes durch einen anderen Landesfürsten, Alexander den Guten (Alexandru cel Bun; † 1432, regierender Fürst seit 1400), nach Suczawa überführt. In die Tradition von beiden hatten sich jetzt die Habsburger gesetzt. Um in der Folge eine Kontextualisierung der „Protagonisten“ im Rahmen nationaler Bewegungen des 19. Jahrhunderts vornehmen zu können, sind die ausgewählten Verehrungsorte in ihrem Verhältnis zum habsburgischen Staat sowie der politische Raum der Bukowina in seinem Wandel während dieser Periode zu skizzieren. „Klientel“ ist hier im verkehrten Sinne zu verstehen. Den toten Protagonisten kam freilich keine Aktivität zu, wohingegen sich die „Klientel“, aus jeweils eigenem Interesse heraus, die passive Wirkmächtigkeit der historischen Personen sowie ihrer Erinnerungs- bzw. Verehrungsorte nutzbar zu machen versuchte.

Stefan der Große und Putna

STEFAN III. hatte sich durch seine kriegerischen Aktivitäten gegen die vorrückenden Osmanen im 15. Jahrhundert einen Namen gemacht, der bereits zeitgenössisch weit über die Landesgrenzen hinausreichte.¹⁹ Als Gründer zahlreicher Klöster und religiöser Stiftungen²⁰ gelang es ihm, sein Andenken über die Zeit hinweg zu bewahren und v.a. in der Moldau zu verankern. So erfolgte denn auch seine Beisetzung 1504 im von ihm gestifteten Kloster Putna. Heute versteht sich diese Einrichtung nicht nur als ausschließlich religiöses Zentrum, sondern auch als Träger der „weltlichen“ Erinnerung an den Moldaufürsten.²¹ Die von der rum.-orth. Kirche nach dem Sturz des sozialistischen Regimes betriebene und 1992 durchgeführte (erste eigene) Heiligsprechung

markiert das vorläufige Ende einer längeren Entwicklung, Stefan als Nationalpatron oder gar als Staatsheiligen zu positionieren. Als Ort von Herrscher-Legitimität galt Putna schon zuvor.²² König Ferdinand I. (reg. 1914-1927, *1865) hielt sich anlässlich der Wiedervereinigung der Bukowina am 16. Mai 1920 in Putna auf, wo er sich in seiner Rede auf die historischen Persönlichkeiten und die Ereignisse von 1871 bezog.²³ Nicht zuletzt deswegen ist der Besuch des Klosters durch den rumänischen König Michael/Mihai (reg. 1927/30 u. 1940/47; 1921-2017) in den Jahren 1990 und 1992 als bewusst symbolischer Akt zu werten, zumal Michael/Mihai unmittelbar zuvor, nach seiner versuchten politischen Rückkehr aus dem Exil, in Bukarest von der neuen „postsozialistischen“ Regierung dezidiert abgewiesen worden war.

Für die Periode der Habsburgerherrschaft in der Bukowina bis 1918 stellt sich die Position Stefans anders dar. In Folge von dringend notwendig gewordenen Restaurierungsarbeiten erfolgte im Kloster Putna 1855 – unter Aufsicht österreichischer Behörden – eine Öffnung der Grablege.²⁴ Im Zuge dessen kamen auch jene Gebäude innerhalb des Klosters hinzu, die heute das Museum beherbergen.²⁵ Schließlich ließ die Kommission nach den durchgeführten Arbeiten ein Denkmal in der Klosterkirche aufrichten. Die Grabstätte sollte belassen, jedoch „mit einer eisernen Falltür versehen [...] den Besuchern des Klosters zugänglich gemacht werden“.²⁶ Von Feierlichkeiten rieten die Behörden angesichts der politischen Situation in der benachbarten Moldau strikt ab. Die 1859 erfolgte Wahl von Cuza in Personalunion löste in den nunmehr vereinigten Fürstentümern eine Welle nationaler Euphorie aus, die Wien in der Bukowina nicht unbedingt zusätzlich anzufeuern gedachte. Die Landesregierung begründete dies in einem Schreiben an den Bischof der Bukowina, Eugen Hackmann (1793-1873), „womit die beabsichtigte Festlichkeit einer Zeit vorbehalten werde, in welcher nach dem Laufe der Ereignisse ein jeder diesen Akt der Pietät sowie die loyale Gesinnung der Bukowinaer überhaupt in irgendeiner Richtung verdächtige Deutung ausgeschlossen sein wird“. Hackmann akzeptierte das, war er doch in erster Linie an der raschen Errichtung eines für die Gläubigen zugänglichen Denkmals interessiert.²⁷ Wien hingegen forderte Loyalität gegenüber dem angestammten Herrscherhaus der Habsburger ein. Vom passenden Zeitpunkt konnte allerdings selbst ein Jahrzehnt später noch immer nicht die Rede sein, als 1870 das Kloster, dessen Bau 1466 begonnen worden war, sein 400-jähriges Kirchweihfest vorbereitete. Der Igu-men des Klosters, Arkadius Czuperkowicz (rum. Arcadii Ciupercovici, 1823-1902), ab 1896 Metropolit und Erzbischof – selbst ein dezidiertes Mitglied gegenüber loyalen Priestertums – wollte eine nationale Vereinnahmung dieser Feier verhindern.²⁸ Mittlerweile hatten sich in der Reichshauptstadt jedoch „junge Romanen“ organisiert, „um das romanische Nationalgefühl zu stärken“, wie das vom Bu-

kowiner Landespräsidium gesehen wurde, das sich in der Angelegenheit um Rat an die Wiener Stellen wandte, formulierte.²⁹ Zudem engagierte sich zur Unterstützung der Wiener Studentenverbindung „Romania“ in Czernowitz ein Festkomitee, das von, in der damaligen Öffentlichkeit durchaus bekannten, Damen wie der Baronin Ana Vasilco, Maria Criste, Catinca de Gafenco, Catinca de Giurgiuvanu und Efrosinia Hurmuzaki getragen wurde.³⁰ Das Innenministerium schlug indessen dem Landespräsidenten vor, die Feier (neuerlich mit der gegenwärtigen politischen Situation begründet) um ein Jahr auf den 27. August 1871 zu verschieben. Sollte hingegen dennoch eine Versammlung stattfinden, so das Ministerium, dann müsse man dieses auch im Sinne der Verfassung von 1867 ermöglichen.³¹ Die Feierlichkeiten selbst wurden schließlich vertagt. Im Rahmen des Kirchweihfestes fand jedoch trotzdem ein Gedenken statt, an dem – wie ein dafür abgestellter Beobachter schildert – „der Durchzug von nach Putna [sic!] reisenden inländischen und fremden Gästen derart auffallend groß“ war. „Anstößiges“ – so der Beamte weiter – wurde „im Verlaufe der ganzen Feier nicht wahrgenommen“.³²

Die nationale Aufladung von Putna und der Grablege Stefans des Großen ließ sich auf Dauer nicht mehr wirksam unterbinden. Bereits 1871 versammelten sich um den Feiertag im Koster neuerlich junge rumänische Intellektuelle. Zum Teil studierten diese Wien, oder besaßen in der Öffentlichkeit schon einen gewissen Namen – wie der junge Schriftsteller Mihai Eminescu (1850-1889). Spätestens jetzt mischten sich an diesem Ort „weltliche und sakrale Elemente“ erkennbar und bereiteten das Fundament für den modernen Stefanskult.³³ Das Grab des Woiwoden sollte zum „Jerusalem des rumänischen Volkes“ werden und Putna ein Ort für den jährlichen Kongress rumänischer Studenten aus ganz Europa. Eminescu verband damit im Sinne der Studentenbewegung „Junimea“ eine idealisierte aber auch kritisch interpretierte Vision der Vergangenheit, geprägt durch unabhängig agierende Fürsten und die Vorstellung von gerechter Herrschaft, jedoch zunächst noch nicht von den Habsburgern distanziert.³⁴ Die für das Jahr 1904 anstehenden 500-Jahr-Feiern gerieten vor dem Hintergrund wachsend nationaler Spannungen im Kronland zu einer Gradwanderung für die österreichischen Behörden. Schon seit Jahren schwelte innerhalb der Bukowina ein nationaler Konflikt zwischen Ruthenen und Rumänen, der sich regelmäßig – parteipolitisch dynamisiert – an der nationalen Zugehörigkeit der griechisch-orientalischen Landeskirche, ihrer angestrebten Teilung (und der Verfügungsgewalt über ihr Vermögen) entzündete.³⁵ Putna stellte in dieser Situation einen zentralen Schauplatz und das Jubiläum bot dafür den Zeitpunkt. Die Vertreter der österreichischen Idee, dazu gehörte als wichtigstes Organ dieser Teilöffentlichkeit auch die *Czernowitzer Allgemeine Zeitung*³⁶, versuchten die Feier entsprechend einzupassen und als Teil eines größeren Österreich-Bewusstseins zu

positionieren. Das mehr oder weniger subtil angebrachte Zahlenspiel mit dem Jubiläum und der Zugehörigkeit der Bukowina zu den habsburgischen Ländern unterstrich dieses Ansinnen nur.

Vierhundert Jahre sind auch in dem Leben eines Volkes ein langer Zeitraum [...] Seit fünf Vierteljahrhunderten gehört jener Teil des ehemaligen Stefan'schen Herrschaftsgebietes, in dem der Nationalheros des rumänischen Volkes mit Vorliebe weilte und in dem er für das Glück seines Volkes strebte und wirkte, zur Habsburg'schen Monarchie [...] und wenn heute die Männer der Politik und der Wissenschaft aus dem Königreiche Rumänien zum Grabe Stefans pilgern, werden sie sich überzeugen können, daß ihre Stammesbrüder innerhalb ihres Volkes festhalten, ihrer Nation treu geblieben sind treu bleiben durften und daß die Gebeine Stefans des Großen nicht in der Fremde ruhten.³⁷

Kaiser Franz Josef I. war lediglich in Form einer Büste, die das Festzelt für die geladenen Ehrengäste schmückte, präsent. Die symbolische Präsenz des Landesfürsten, wie auch die Rede des Metropoliten und Erzbischofes Wladimir v. Repta (1842-1926) auf den Kaiser, verwiesen auf unbedingte Legitimität und Loyalität. Dass zudem der Landespräsident von der in Massen „aus allen Teilen des Reiches und aus dem Königreiche Rumänien“³⁸ anwesenden Bevölkerung dabei mit „Să traească“-Rufen empfangen wurde³⁹, darf nicht über die zeitgleich unterhalb dieser scheinbar glatten Oberfläche spürbaren Spannungen hinwegtäuschen. Die bevorstehenden Landtagswahlen zeichneten sich bereits ab.



Leider ging man einer Bestätigung des Landesgedankens vorsätzlich aus dem Wege, und schon die Zusammensetzung des Festkomitees stempelte den Erinnerungstag an Stefan III. zu einer einseitigen Parteifeier [...] Die Bukowina aber geht im Österreichertum auf.⁴⁰

ABB. 2. Das rumänische Volk der Bukowina, Titelblatt der von N. IORGA verfassten und nach den Putna-Feiern 1905 publizierten Schrift. Die Bild- und Symbolsprache (Karpaten, Stefan, Putna, Huzulen, Volkstracht, Ornamentik und Schrifttyp) ist unmissverständlich auf ein wie es in dem seit 1848 existierenden Text der späteren Nationalhymne heißt „Erwache, Rumäne!/Deșteaptă-te, române!“ gerichtet.

Nicht alle „Männer der Politik“, die aus dem Königreich Rumänien nach Putna anreisten, teilten indes diese Ansicht. Bei der Feier traf das imperiale Identitätsangebot bereits auf eine national-irredentistische Elite unter den Rumänen zu beiden Seiten der Grenze. Sie vertraten, wenngleich noch eine Minderheit, eine klare politische Gegenkonzeption, die auf das Regat gerichtete Irredenta. Der ideologisch und politisch im Regat einflussreiche Historiker Nicolae Iorga (1870-1940) förderte offen eine ausgesprochen antisemitische und antiösterreichische sowie extrem nationalistische Position, wie das Beispiel seiner Beschreibung des rumänischen Volkes der Bukowina zeigt (Abb. 2).

Aici în noaptea car-î poate fi mantie, el era cu noi, Ștefan, Ștefan al nostru, Voievodul, Împăratul nostru cel drept, el și nu „Francisc-Iosif întîilea“ [...] Sfînt și Împărat al tuturor țerilor, al tuturor oamenilor Romînimii, al tuturor celor ce cuminecă în această limbă!⁴¹

Damit erwies sich der Versuch, den Woiwoden als Teil eines imperialen Identitätsangebotes aufzugreifen, als durchaus zwiespältig und vergleichsweise schwer umzusetzen. Selbst der schon früher unternommene Versuch, den in der bäuerlichen Bevölkerung der Bukowina durchaus verehrten Kronprinzen Rudolf (1858-1889) als legitimen Nachfolger Stefans in Spiel zu bringen, konnte die allmählich nationale Aufladung dieses Ortes nicht einbremsen. Das nationale Konstrukt des Moldaufürsten hatte zu diesem Zeitpunkt bereits begonnen, sich zu verfestigen.




ABB. 3. Kronprinz-Rudolf-Säule in Suczawitza, Abbildung aus dem Kronprinzenwerk über die Bukowina 1899. RUDOLF hatte 1887 die Bukowina bereist. Das Denkmal befindet sich heute, vernachlässigt, unweit des Klosters. Die österreichisch-ungarische Monarchie in Wort und Bild. Bukowina, Wien 1899, S. 154; vgl. dazu KURT SCHARR & GUNDA BARTH-SCALMANI: „Mit vereinten Kräften!“ Raumkonstruktion und politische Kommunikation im Kronprinzenwerk. In: Österreich in Geschichte und Literatur 55/2, 2011, S. 92-108; zur Reise des Kronprinzen vgl. Bukowiner Rundschau Nr. 386 v. 7. Juli 1887, Titelseite, Willkommen, S. 2-4, Zum Empfang des Kronprinzen in Czernowitz, Programm; Nr. 387 v. 10. Juli 1887, S. 1-3, Die Reise des Kronprinzen in der Bukowina.

Ioannes Novi und Suczawa

IM SCHATTEN des Stefansfestes von 1904 fand im Sommer nahezu zeitgleich, von der überregionalen Öffentlichkeit vergleichsweise unbemerkt, am Grab des Märtyrers in Suczawa die alljährliche Johannesfeier statt. In einer schmalen Zeitungseinrückung wird kolportiert, dass aus Czernowitz dafür eigens 1800 Wallfahrer mit Extrazügen angereist seien.⁴² Und dennoch, der bereits seit langem verehrte Heilige schien aus der Perspektive der österreichischen Behörden weit mehr als der Woiwode das Zeug dazu zu haben, breiten Bevölkerungsschichten der Bukowina ein räumlich greifbares und mit dem Bewusstsein erfahrbares Identitätsangebot machen zu können. Die Lebensgeschichte und sein historischer Wirkungskreis kamen dem von Wien favorisierten Österreichertum geradezu entgegen.

Der aus Trapezunt stammende Kaufmann durchlebte im 14. Jahrhundert sein Martyrium in Akerman (rum. Cetatea Albă, heute ukr. Білгород-Дністровський), im bessarabischen Bugeac gelegen, das zu diesem Zeitpunkt bereits zur osmanischen Oberherrschaft gehörte.⁴³ Zu Beginn des 15. Jahrhunderts ließ Alexander der Gute seine sterblichen Überreste nach Suczawa überführen. Etwa 150 Jahre später gelangten diese mit der Einrichtung einer Metropole in Jassy (rum. Iași) dorthin, allerdings gilt das nicht als gesichert.⁴⁴ Während des letzten Viertels des 17. Jahrhunderts dürften die Reliquien gemeinsam mit religiösen Gegenständen der Metropole – um sie dem drohenden Zugriff osma-



ABB. 4, 5. Kreuz zu Ehren von IOANNES NOVI im Kloster von Suczawa, errichtet 1882 unter der Regierung von Kaiser FRANZ JOSEF I. (Detail). Aufnahme K. SCHARR, Juli 2017.

nischer Armeen zu entziehen – im Gefolge des polnischen Königs Jan Sobieski (1674-1696) nach Zolkiew (poln. Żółkiew, heute ukr. Жовква) gelangt sein, wo sie schließlich im griechisch-katholischen Kloster ihre vorläufige Ruhe fanden. Erst 1783 verbrachte man die Reliquien wieder nach Suczawa. Die volkstümliche Überlieferung schreibt die Rückführung einem direkten Befehl Josefs II., der sich im April 1783 in Suczawa aufgehalten hatte, zu.⁴⁵ Das bewertete man allerdings schon im 19. Jahrhundert als „Lieblingwunsch des gr.-or. Clerus und Volkes der Bukowina“.⁴⁶ Jedenfalls kam die Überführung den Absichten der österreichischen Landeseinrichtung durchaus zugute, verfügte doch der Hl. Ioannes Novi über eine räumlich wie konfessionell (auch die gr.-kath. Ruthenen verehrten ihn) große Bandbreite. Eine abgegrenzt nationale Vereinnahmung hingegen wäre ohne größere Widersprüche kaum möglich gewesen. Regelmäßige Prozessionen unter Mitführung der Reliquien fanden seit 1889 jeweils am 24. Juni statt.⁴⁷ Der Czernowitzer Universitätsprofessor für Österreichische Geschichte Ferdinand Zieglauer (1829-1906)⁴⁸ liefert uns dafür eine ausführliche Schilderung. Schon in der Einleitung zu seiner historisch-kritischen Darstellung bettet Zieglauer den Heiligen eindeutig in die gesamtösterreichische Staatsauffassung ein. Noch griffiger formulierte das eine Wiener Zeitung (zweiter Textausschnitt).

Alljährlich [...] lenken Tausende frommer Wallfahrer ihre Schritte der Stadt Suczawa zu, wo die Ruhestätte der Gebeine des Heiligen sich befindet. Nicht nur aus der Bukowina, auch aus allen Nachbarländern, aus Galizien, Rumänien und Bessarabien ergießt sich ein Strom von Pilgern nach dem Wallfahrtsorte, denn bei allen Völkern des Ostens, die den griechisch-orientalischen Glauben bekennen, ist das Ansehen dieses Mannes groß, leuchtend und weitverbreitet. Mit ganzer Inbrunst sind sie seiner Verehrung zugethan [...] Als der Gang der Weltverhältnisse Galizien und die Bukowina dem Scepter des Hauses Habsburg unterworfen hatte, da leuchtete im Buchenlande mit Recht die Hoffnung auf, es werde jetzt die Rückerstattung der Gebeine des hl. Johannes bei der Centralregierung, in Wien erstritten und endlich das erreicht werden können, was bisher trotz vieler Bitten die Ungunst der Verhältnisse versagt hatte.⁴⁹

Was Lourdes und Mariazell für die Katholiken des Westens, ist Suczawa für die Orthodoxen der Bukowina und Ostgaliziens, Siebenbürgens und Rumäniens. Nicht nur die Griechisch-Orientalischen, sondern auch die Griechisch-Katholischen wallfahren dorthin. An manchen Tagen [...] beträgt die Anzahl der Suczawaer Wallfahrer mehr als 20.000. Aus allen Orten kommen die Gläubigen zu Fuß, auf Wagen oder mit Separatzügen der Eisenbahn.⁵⁰



Abb. 6. Sanzenfeier in Suczawa. Prozession mit den Reliquien des Hl. JOHANNES NOVI, um 1898. Photo J. CHRZANOWSKI. © OeNB-Wien, <http://data.onb.ac.at/rec/baa15763420>, Photographische Studie, vgl. Kronprinzenwerk, Band Bukowina, 1899, S. 225.

Selbst während des Ersten Weltkrieges änderte sich diese Haltung nicht grundsätzlich, wie der obige Textausschnitt zeigt. Allerdings mussten die Reliquien vor den heranrückenden russischen Truppen in Sicherheit gebracht werden. Auf Beschluss der Wiener Regierung evakuierte man die sterblichen Überreste im Herbst 1914 in einem bewachten Sondertransport über Dorna Watra (rum. Vatra Dornei) und Ungarn in die Reichshauptstadt, wo sie bis zum 25. Juli 1918 in der griechisch-orientalischen Kapelle in der Löwelstraße 8⁵¹ eine „Zufluchtstätte vor den Zwischenfällen des Krieges“ fanden.⁵² Nach einem feierlichen Te Deum in der Kapelle durch den anwesenden Metropoliten Wladimir v. Repta begann die „Heimreise“ des Hl. Ioannes Novi in die Bu-



Abb. 7. Ein Heiliger des Ostens. JOANNES NOVUS aus Suczawa in Wien: Eine Ansicht des Heiligen, seines Sarkophags und des ihn bewachenden Mönches SIDOROVITSCH. Bericht und Bild einer Wiener Zeitung aus dem Jahre 1914. Wiener Bilder Nr. 43 v. 25. Okt. 1914, S. 6 u. 11.

kowina.⁵³ Die *Czernowitzer Allgemeine Zeitung* kommentierte das „historische Ereignis seltener Art“ als ein „Zeichen des kommenden nationalen und konfessionellen Friedens“.⁵⁴ Die Erwähnung des Huldigungstelegrammes an den Kaiser und der Umstand, dass auch die Juden von Suczawa ebenso ihre Glückwünsche darbrachten, worauf die Zeitung extra hinwies, brachte wohl die ungebrochene Hoffnung in den österreichischen Staat zum Ausdruck. Die zu diesem Zeitpunkt bereits katastrophale Lage der Monarchie im Allgemeinen und der Bukowina im Besonderen schien man indes nicht wahrhaben zu wollen. Für den 3. Oktober 1918 wird noch über eine Bauernwallfahrt nach Suczawa sowie ein patriotische „Kundgebung der Bauern“ berichtet.⁵⁵ Das Reich hatte allerdings bereits begonnen sich aufzulösen und die Frage nach einem gesamtösterreichischen Standpunkt, wie ihn Ioannes Novi als Heiliger bis dahin einigermmaßen begünstigt hatte, war nicht mehr aktuell.

Zusammenfassung

DER NACHWEIS der Existenz von kollektiver Identität eines Großteils der bäuerlichen Bevölkerung der Bukowina, im Raum verortet am Beispiel der Grabstätten von Putna und Suczawa konnte an dieser Stelle nicht geführt werden. Wohl aber wurde versucht, die auf diese Örtlichkeiten bezogenen Schichtungen imaginierten Identitäten bzw. Identitätsangebote und ihrer Präsenz im Gedächtnis sozialer Gruppen sichtbar zu machen. Die zielgerichteten Interessen der Akteure lassen zeitgenössisch einen Rückschluss auf die vermutete Wirkung, den erhofften Erfolg zu, um damit letztlich ein wie auch immer existierendes kollektives Bewusstsein zu steuern, zu instrumentalisieren.

Stefan, der Landesfürst und Ioannes, der Heilige gehören in die Bukowina, haben ebendort ihre zentralen Erinnerungsorte. Spätestens seit dem ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert gerieten beide zum Angelpunkt von zwei über die Eliten imaginierten wie unterschiedlich intensiv propagierten, sich allerdings zunehmend gegenseitig ausschließenden Ideen staatlicher Einheit: jener des Nationalstaates und jener der habsburgischen Reichsideologie, die ihrerseits versuchte, ein vormodernes Konzept des Supranationalen an neue Herausforderungen anzupassen.

Der Aufbau bzw. die Diskussion um die rumänische Identität, ihre Inhalte und Bezugspunkte am Wechsel vom 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert erstreckten sich vereinfacht zwischen zwei Konzepten des Ortes als Kristallisationspunkt⁵⁶: einerseits die neoromantische Vorstellung der politischen und intellektuellen Klassen. Das spricht für den Versuch rumänischer Eliten, Stefan den Großen und mit ihm Putna als greifbaren Grundstein für den Aufbau einer gesamtru-

mänischen Identität anzusehen. Den Ausgangspunkt bildet dabei die Grablege im Kloster Putna. Der Raum wurde jedoch dynamisch gedacht, für das ganze rumänische Volk und ein größeres Territorium aller Rumänen, gegebenenfalls als Nationalstaat, der sich 1881 zunächst als Königreich abzuzeichnen begann und Ende 1918 in Großrumänien mündete. Andererseits existierte parallel als zweites – dem ersteren nahezu diametral gegenübergesetztes – Konzept: die traditionelle Vorstellung von Identität der „rumänischen“ Bauern in der Bukowina, die durch einen starken lokalen bzw. regionalen Zugang u.a. über das historische Gedächtnis charakterisiert war. Daraus ließ sich in der Vorstellungswelt der Betroffenen nur bedingt ein regional übergeordneter, homogener Zusammenhang für einen etwaigen „nationalen Körper aller Rumänien“ ableiten. Der Heilige Ioannes Novi von Suczawa verkörpert diesen Standpunkt idealtypisch und erschien wohl auch deshalb nur beschränkt für die Verankerung einer modernen Nationsidee geeignet, passte aber als Baustein vor Ort umso mehr in die Vorstellung der Habsburgermonarchie von einem supranationalen Staat, von rumänischen, ruthenischen wie orthodoxen Untertanen, die sich loyal gegenüber dem Kaiserhaus verhalten. Aber auch Stefan der Große wird zwar als „sakralentkoppelte nationale Identifikationsfigur von einer Vielzahl von Rumänen erinnert“⁶⁵⁷ ein Staatspatron Rumäniens ist er dennoch bislang nicht geworden. Seine 1992 erfolgte Heiligsprechung verweist vielmehr innenpolitisch auf den Versuch einer bewussten Bedeutungsaufwertung der autokephalen rumänisch-orthodoxen Kirche, die sich – nach dem Zerfall des sozialistischen Systems – ihren ersten eigenen Heiligen schuf.



Anmerkungen

1. Vgl. Anonymus: Die Ergebnisse der Volks- und Viehzählung vom 31. Dezember 1910 im Herzogtume Bukowina nach den Angaben der k.k. statistischen Zentral-Kommission in Wien (XVII. Heft der Mitteilungen des statistischen Landesamtes des Herzogtums Bukowina), Czernowitz 1910.
2. Dazu ausführlich bei Hans-Christian Maner: Multikonfessionalität und neue Staatlichkeit. Orthodoxe, griechisch-katholische und römisch-katholische Kirche in Siebenbürgen und Altrumänien zwischen den Weltkriegen (1918-1940) (= Forschungen zur Geschichte und Kultur des östlichen Mitteleuropa 29), Stuttgart 2007, S. 278f.; vgl. Kurt Scharr: Die Bukowina als historische Region. In: Oliver Jens Schmitt & Michael Metzeltin (Hrsg.), Das Südosteuropa der Regionen, Wien 2015, S. 411-437.
3. Vgl. George Enache: Church, Society, Nation, State in the Interwar Romanian Thinking. In: Analele Universității Dunărea de Jos din Galați, Seria Istorie 5, 2006, S. 143-153.

4. Fjodor Dostojewski: Tagebuch eines Schriftstellers 1873 und 1876-1881. Eine Auswahl. Aus dem Russischen von Günther Dalitz und Margit Bräuer, Berlin 2003. Hier: Über die Liebe zum Volk. Ein notwendiger Vertrag mit dem Volk, S. 94-99, hier S. 97. Für den freundlichen Hinweis auf diese Textstelle möchte ich an dieser Stelle Frau Univ.-Prof. Andrea Zink herzlich danken!
5. In Österreich betrug der Anteil der in Land- und Forstwirtschaft tätigen Bevölkerung um 1900 etwas mehr als 50%, wohingegen dieser in der Bukowina durchschnittlich noch über 70% erreichte; Roman Sandgruber: Die Agrarrevolution in Österreich. In: Alfred Hoffmann (Hrsg.), Österreich-Ungarn als Agrarstaat. Wirtschaftliches Wachstum und Agrarverhältnisse in Österreich im 19. Jahrhundert (= Sozial- und Wirtschaftshistorische Studien 10), Wien 1978, S. 197; B. M. Botuschanskij/Ботушанський: Сільське господарство Буковини (друга половина XIX – початок XX ст.), Чернівці 2000 (Die Landwirtschaft der Bukowina, 2. Hälfte des 19. bis zum Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts, Tscherniwzi), Tab. 20, S. 271.
6. So orientierte sich etwa das Phänomen des ‚Agrarismus‘ abseits der homogenisierenden Nationalstaatsideen „an den imaginierten Werten und Handlungsweisen der bäuerlichen Familienwirtschaft und der Dorfgemeinschaft“, die er zugleich als „Ideal für die gesamte Gesellschaft betrachtete“; Eduard Kubü et al. (Hrsg.): Agrarismus und Agrarelit in Ostmitteleuropa, Berlin 2013, S. 16.
7. Vgl. Martin Aust & Frithjof Benjamin Schenk (Hrsg.): Imperial Subjects. Autobiographische Praxis in den Vielvölkerreichen der Romanovs, Habsburger und Osmanen im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert, Wien u.a. 2015.
8. Vgl. Gary Cohen: Neither Absolutism nor Anarchy. New Narratives on Society and Government in Late Imperial Austria. In: Austrian History Yearbook 29, 1998, S. 37-61; Peter M. Judson: Guardians of the Nation. Activists of the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria, London 2006.
9. Vgl. Frithjof Benjamin Schenk: Die Nationalisierung des kulturellen Gedächtnisses? Das Alexander Nevskij-Bild in Rußland im 19. Jahrhundert. In: Martin Schulze Wessel (Hrsg.), Nationalisierung der Religion und Sakralisierung der Nation im östlichen Europa (= Forschungen zur Geschichte und Kultur des östlichen Mitteleuropas 27), Stuttgart 2006, S. 70.
10. Moritz Csáky & Christoph Leitgeb (Hrsg.): Kommunikation und Gedächtnis Raum. Kulturwissenschaften nach dem „Spatial Turn“, Bielefeld 2009, S. 7.
11. Vgl. Aleida Assmann: Geschichte findet statt. In: Csáky & Leitgeb (Hrsg.), Kommunikation, 2009, S. 15f.
12. Michael Portmann: Die Nation als eine Form kollektiver Identität? Kritik an Konsequenzen für eine zeitgemäße Historiographie. In: Marija Wakounig, Wolfgang Müller & Michael Portmann (Hrsg.), Nation, Nationalitäten und Nationalismus im östlichen Europa (= Festschrift für Arnold Suppan zum 65. Geburtstag), Münster 2011, S. 37.
13. Vgl. dazu im Überblick Christian Giordano: Power, Legitimacy, Historical Legacies. A Disenchanted Political Anthropology (= Freiburger Sozialanthropologische Studien 43), Zürich 2015, S. 51-67.
14. Daniel Niță-Danielescu: Empress Catherine II of Russia’s Foreign Policy and Its Influence upon the Romanian Orthodox Church in Moldavia. In: Analele Științifice

- ale Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza“ din Iași, Teologie Ortodoxă 1, 2009, S. 67-82, hier S. 15.
15. Vgl. Kurt Scharr: Der Griechisch-orientalische Religionsfonds in der Bukowina. Kulturkampf und Nationsbildung im Spiegel einer Institution. In: Andreas Kappeler (Hrsg.), Die Ukraine. Prozesse der Nationsbildung, Wien u.a. 2011, S. 255-267; Dinu Balan: Statul național român și naționalismul modern (1866-1918). Aspecte comparative. In: Anuarul Institutului de Istorie „A. D. Xenopol“ XLIII-XLIV, 2006, S. 79 u. 99; auch Radu-Florian Bruja: Ștefan cel Mare în imagologia legionară. In: Codrul Cosminului 10, 2004, S. 93-97 sowie zuletzt Oliver J. Schmitt: Căpitan Codreanu. Aufstieg und Fall des rumänischen Faschistenführers, Wien 2016.
 16. Martin Schulze-Wessel: Die Nationalisierung der Religion und die Sakralisierung der Nation im östlichen Europa (Einleitung). In: dslb. (Hrsg.), Nationalisierung der Religion und Sakralisierung der Nation im östlichen Europa (= Forschungen zur Geschichte und Kultur des östlichen Europa 27), Stuttgart 2006, S. 7.
 17. Mihai-Ștefan Ceaușu: Die Bukowiner Rumänen zwischen 1914-1918. Vom Loyalismus zum Irredentismus. In: Anuarul Institutului de Istorie „A. D. Xenopol“ XLIII-XLIV, 2006, S. 139f.
 18. Vgl. Kurt Scharr: „Die Landschaft Bukowina“. Das Werden einer Region an der Peripherie 1774-1918, Wien 2010.
 19. Vgl. Ștefan Ștefănescu: Ștefan cel Mare și remodelarea puterii domnești. In: Analele Bucovinei (Rădăuți) XI 1, 2004, S. 7-13; Dimitrie Vatamaniuc: Ștefan cel Mare și Sfânt și vremea sa. Cronica germană din 1502. In: Analele Bucovinei XI 1, 2004, S. 15-19.
 20. Vgl. Vasile M. Demciuc: Ștefan cel Mare. „Un vero Atleta della fede Cristiana“. In Codrul Cosminului 10, 2004, S. 3-12; ders., Un „Palladium“ al Moldovei. Sfântul Ioan cel Nou de la Suceava, Bacău 2004.
 21. Vgl. dazu Centrul de Cercetare și Documentare Ștefan cel Mare, Mănăstirea Putna, <https://www.centrulstefancelmare.ro/ro/>.
 22. Vgl. Krista Zach: Stefan der Große. Landesfürst, Nationalheld und Heiliger in Rumänien. In: Stefan Samerski (Hrsg.), Die Renaissance der Nationalpatrone. Erinnerungskulturen in Ostmitteleuropa im 20./21. Jahrhundert, Köln-Weimar-Wien 2007, S. 152-180. Für die Situation in der heutigen Republik Moldau vgl. Daniel Ursprung: Umdeutung eines Helden. Tradition von Erfindung und nationale Identität in der Republik Moldau. In: Edda Binder Iijima & Vasile Dumbrava (Hrsg.), Stefan der Große. Fürst der Moldau. Symbolfunktion und Bedeutungswandel eines mittelalterlichen Herrschers, Leipzig 2005, S. 15-60.
 23. Cuvântul Regelui Ferdinand la Mănăstirea Putna. In: Glasul Bucovinei (Czernowitz) Nr. 424 v. 17. Mai 1920; abgedruckt in Radu Economu: Unirea Bucovinei 1918, Cernăuți 2011, S. 193-195.
 24. Arhivele Naționale ale României Suceava (= ANS), Mitropolia Bucovinei, Fondul 11, 1251-1851, Öffnung der Gruft Putna, u.a. Auszug aus dem Commissions-Protokolle über die Eröffnung der Putnaer Klostergrüfte, fol. 12-15; vgl. Ion Zugrav

- & Vasile M. Demciuc: Commissionsprotokoll über die Eröffnung der Klostergrüfte von Putna. In: *Codrul Cosminului* 2, 1996, S. 380-408.
25. Gheorghe Moisescu: *Das Kloster Putna. 500 Jahre seit der Gründung 1466-1966*, Wien 1966, S. 63.
 26. ANS, Vortrag Landesregierung v. 29. Jänner/11. Februar 1857, fol. 44-46.
 27. ANS, Schreiben an Bischof Hackmann v. 15. Juni 1857, fol. 58-59; die Hervorhebungen sind im Original doppelt unterstrichen; ANS, Bischof Hackmann an Konsistorium v. 8./20. Juni 1857, fol. 61-62.
 28. Der Igumen hatte „vom Hörensagen vernommen, dass am 15./27. August dem Tage der S. Maria Himmelfahrt, des klosterkirchlichen Kirchweihfestes, eine größere Anzahl von Romanen Klosterorts sich zu dem Zwecke zu versammeln gedenken [...] das 400-jährige Erinnerungsfest abzuhalten“; weiter spricht sich der Kloostervorsteher in diesem Schreiben aus finanziellen Gründen gegen eine solche zusätzliche Veranstaltung aus, „zumal dem Convente ohnehin, mit der [...] alljährlichen oberührten Tage, üblichen Kirchweihfestlichkeit [...] sehr große und unerschwingliche Auslagen bevorstehen“; Staatliches Archiv der Oblast Tscherniwzi (= DACO) 3/1/3432, fol. 1, Igumen Kloster Putna an Consistorium v. 12./23. Mai 1870.
 29. DACO 3/1/3432, fol. 9, Landespräsidium Bukowina an Ministerium für Cultus und Ministerium für Inneres v. 7. Juni 1870.
 30. DACO 3/1/3432, fol. 5, Schreiben Festkomitee v. 18./30. Juni 1870. Die Damen baten insbesondere um Bereitstellung einer ausreichenden Stoffbahn für die einzuweihende Urne.
 31. DACO 3/1/3432, fol. 9, Ministerium des Inneren an Landespräsidenten der Bukowina v. 18. Aug. 1870.
 32. DACO 3/1/3432, fol. 18, Bezirkshauptmannschaft an Landespräsidium v. 31. Aug. 1870.
 33. Zach: Stefan der Große, S. 157.
 34. Klaus Bochmann: *Conceptul de patriotism în cultura română*. In: Victor Neumann & Armin Heinen (Hrsg.), *Istoria României prin concepte. Perspective alternative asupra limbajelor social-politice*, Iași 2010, S. 118; Liviu Maior: *Habsburgi și români. De la loialitatea dinastică la identitate națională*, București 2006, S. 54f; vgl. ebenso u.a. Lucian Boia: *Geschichte und Mythos. Über die Gegenwart des Vergangenen in der rumänischen Gesellschaft*, Wien 2003, S. 66-71.
 35. Vgl. Scharr: *Der Griechisch-orientalische Religionsfonds in der Bukowina*, S. 255-267.
 36. Vgl. Kurt Scharr: *Im Anderen das Eigene. Die außenpolitischen Ereignisse der Jahre 1905 und 1907 in der Czernowitzer Allgemeinen Zeitung*. In: *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 64, 2016, S. 199-227.
 37. *Czernowitzer Allgemeine Zeitung* Nr. 165 v. 17. Juli 1904, S. 1, Die Stefansfeier.
 38. *Bukowinaer Rundschau* Nr. 4544 v. 19. Juli 1904, S. 2, Das Stefansfest in Putna.
 39. *Czernowitzer Allgemeine Zeitung* Nr. 165 v. 17. Juli 1904, S. 3f., Reisebericht.
 40. *Bukowiner Post* Nr. 1634 v. 17. Juli 1904, S. 1, Ein historischer Gedenktag. Die Zeitung brachte dazu ein Feuilleton von D. Onciul über Stefan. R. F. Kaindl steuerte eine Glosse über das Kloster Putna bei; *Bukowiner Post* Nr. 1634 v. 17. Juli 1904, S. 1f. und 2f.; Nr. 1635 v. 19. Juli 1904, S. 1f.

41. Nicolae Iorga: Neamul românesc în Bucovina, București 1905, 146f.
42. Czernowitzer Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 156 v. 7. Juli 1904, S. 4, Johannesfeier.
43. Zur Heiligenvita vgl. Anonymus: Acatistul Sfântului Marelui Mucenic Ioan cel Nou de la Suceava, o.J.; Anonymus: Viața, Minunile și Acatistul Sf. Mare Mucenic Ioan cel Nou de la Suceava, cu un scurt istoric privind Mănăstirea Sf. Ioan cel Nou, Suceava 1990; Rudolf Ernst Neubauer: Die Legende von St Johannes (Novi). In: Erzählungen aus der Bukowina, Czernowitz 1869, S. 21-27; Simeon Fl. Marian: Sântul Ioan Cel Nou de la Suceava. Schiță istorică, Bucuresci 1895, http://sfantul-ioancelnou.ro/carti/Simeon_Florea_Marian/Santul_Ioan_cel_Nou.html.
44. Neubauer: Erzählungen, S. 26; Zieglauer gibt als Jahr für die Überführung nach Jassy 1630 an; Ferdinand v. Blumenthal Zieglauer: St. Johannes Novi von Suczawa. Studie. Separat-Abdruck aus dem Bukowiner Nachrichten Kalender 1897, Czernowitz 1897, S. 3. An anderer Stelle datiert Zieglauer die Überführung nicht vor 1666; Geschichtliche Bilder aus der Bukowina zur Zeit der österreichischen Militärverwaltung (Vierte Bilderreihe. Die Jahre 1783 und 1784), Sonderabdruck aus den Bukowinaer Nachrichten, Czernowitz 1897, S. 123. In der neueren rumänischen Literatur fehlt jedoch ein klarer Hinweis darauf. Die Reliquien des Heiligen haben sich, diesen Angaben zufolge, von 1415 bis 1686 durchgehend in Suczawa befunden; Florin Grigorescu: Sfântul Ioan cel Nou de la Suceava în viața credincioșilor, Suceava 2003, S. 123; Demciuc, Palladium.
45. Anonymus: Viața, Minunile și Acatistul, S. 32f; Neubauer: Erzählungen, S. 27.
46. Zieglauer: Bilder, S. 121. „Es war ein merkwürdiger Zufall, daß wenige Tage nach der Abreise des Kaisers ein langgehegter Herzenswunsch der griechisch-orientalischen Glaubensgenossen in der Bukowina seine Erfüllung fand [...] Die Erfüllung dieses Lieblingswunsches hängt mit der Kaiserreise durchaus nicht zusammen, aber das Volk hat den Schleier der Sage um das Ereigniß gewoben und die Übertragung der Reliquien mit dem Aufenthalte des Kaisers in Suczawa in die engste Verbindung gebracht“; ders.: (Landesgeschichte) Seit der Besitzergreifung. In: Die österreichisch-ungarische Monarchie in Wort und Bild, Bukowina, Wien 1899, S. 135f.
47. Diese Prozessionen (ausgenommen Unterbrechungen während des Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieges, sowie während des sozialistischen Staates) finden seit 1989 wieder regelmäßig statt; Grigorescu: Sfântul Ioan cel Nou, S. 160.
48. Vgl. Kurt Schar: „Vom Standpunkt des Österreichers und Historikers“. Leben und Werk des Ferdinand Zieglauer von Blumenthal (1829-1906). In: Andrei Corbea-Hoisie & Sigurd Paul Scheichl (Hrsg.), Kulturen an „Peripherien“ Mitteleuropas (am Beispiel der Bukowina und Tirols) (= Jassyer Beiträge zur Germanistik XVIII), Iași-Konstanz 2015, S. 237-264.
49. Zieglauer: Johannes Novi, S. 56 u. 70.
50. Neues Wiener Tagblatt (Tages-Ausgabe) Nr. 287 v. 17. Oktober 1914, S. 10, Ein Heiliger des Ostens. Die Gebeine des Joannes Novus in Wien, Text Dr. Max Rosenberg.
51. Grigorescu: Sfântul Ioan cel Nou, S. 128.
52. (Neuigkeits) Welt Blatt Nr. 170 v. 28. Juli 1918, S. 4, Die Heimreise der Gebeine des griechischen Landespatron der Bukowina aus Wien.

53. Grigorescu: Sfântul Ioan cel Nou, S. 130.
54. Czernowitzer Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 301 v. 1. Aug. 1918 (gemeinsame Kriegsausgabe), Der heilige Johannes novi nach Suczawa zurückgekehrt.
55. Erich Prokopowitsch: Das Ende der österreichischen Herrschaft in der Bukowina (= Buchreihe der Südostdeutschen Historischen Kommission 2), München 1959, S. 23.
56. Vgl. M. B. Kirtschanow/Кирчанов: Воображая Румынию пространственно и телесно: «национальный локус» и «национальное тело» как изобретаемые традиции румынской идентичности второй половины XIX в. (Imagining Romania spatially and bodily: «national locus» and «national body» as inventing traditions of Romanian identity in the second half of the 19th century). In: Петербургские славянские и балканские исследования 2, 2016, S. 185.
57. Zach: Stefan der Große, S. 180.

Abstract

Ioannes Novi and Stephen the Great of Moldavia: Martyr and Local Ruler:
On the Ambivalence of Memory Localization in Bukovina


Until now, it has been impossible to identify any evidence of the existence of a collective identity for the major part of the peasant population of Bukovina, despite some previous attempts at highlighting these imagined identities and their presence in the memory of social groups. Both Stephen, the sovereign, and Ioannes, the saint, belong to Bukovina and have their central memory places there. The Romanian elites tended to look upon Stephen the Great and Putna as a tangible foundation for building an all-Romanian identity. There is also a second concept—almost diametrically opposed to the former one: the traditional notion of identity of the “Romanian” peasants in Bukovina, likely engendering in the local imagination a regionally superior, homogeneous connection with a possible “national body of all Romania.” Saint Ioannes Novi of Suceava embodies this perspective and was probably only of limited suitability in anchoring the modern idea of nation. However, even Stephen the Great is remembered as a “sacral decoupled national figure of identification by a large number of Romanians,” and did not become a patron saint of the country. On the contrary, his canonization in 1992 is rather an attempt to highlight the importance of the autocephalous Romanian Orthodox Church, which—after the collapse of the socialist system—created its first saint.

Keywords

collective identity, Bukovina, Stephen the Great, historical memory, Saint Ioannes Novi of Suceava

CLAUDIA
TĂRNĂUCEANU

Swedenborg on the Exploitation of Salt in Central and Eastern Europe in the 18th Century



EMANUEL SWEDENBORG,
*De sale communi hoc est De sale fossili
vel gemmeo marino et fontano*
(Philadelphia, PA, 1910)

Claudia Tărnăuceanu

Associate professor at the Faculty of Letters, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași. Author, among others, of the vol. **Limba latină în opera lui Dimitrie Cantemir: Vita Constantini Cantemirii: Studiu lingvistic și literar** (The latin language in Dimitrie Cantemir's works: *Vita Constantini Cantemirii: A linguistic and literary study*) (2008).

ONE OF the most reputed scholar-philosophers of the 18th century, a polyglot encyclopaedist and, in later years, a theosophist, Emanuel Swedenborg (1688–1772) wrote, in the first part of his life, a series of scientific treatises on topics from very different fields (e.g. geology, chemistry, mineralogy, mathematics, etc.). His oeuvre was published in Latin, the international language of the European scientific community of his time. From his theories regarding the *principia naturalia* that have caught our attention, we shall focus on *theoria salis communis* (the theory of common salt), developed in *Prodromus principiorum rerum naturalium: Pars undecima* (Amsterdam, 1721). The Swedish scientist was interested not only in the origin and composition of ordinary salt, but also in its quality, the areas where it could be found, and the methods of

This work was supported by a grant of Ministry of Research and Innovation, CNCS-UEFISCDI, project number 151/2017, PN-III-P4-ID-PCE-2016-0759.

obtaining it. All these inquiries were gathered into an entire treatise, completed around the year 1728 but unpublished during the author's life (this happened only in 1910, under the title *De sale communi hoc est De sale fossili vel gemmeo marino et fontano*).¹ Containing 60 chapters of variable length, the treatise contains methods, some of them empirical, through which one can approximate the quantity of salt that exists in water or soil, and its quality. The work continues with the regions where salt can be found, mentioning the *montes salini*, *lacus salini*, *aqua marina*: Poland, Catalonia, Hungary, Austria, England, Ormis Island, China, America (*in comitatu Brasiliae*), Russia, Egypt, India, Norway, etc. Further on, procedures and techniques for obtaining salt are discussed for different geographical areas, including the methods proposed by the authors of specialized treatises in previous periods (e.g. Georgius Agricola, G. Himselius, F. Hoffmann etc.). He then addresses the evidence provided by various authors regarding the existence of salt in specific regions, presents details about the appearance, form, density, properties of salt, the methods of obtaining different chemical compounds, experiments regarding salt corrosiveness, etc.

As a work of scientific ambition, *De sale communi* is a global and pragmatic approach to the exploitation of this vital natural resource. The author's great interest in the topic draws on Sweden's need to import salt (from Portugal) at a high price at the time, and on finding a method to obtain it locally, which would have been extremely useful.²

Although it remained in the stage of a manuscript written in Latin until 1910, and although it had a very low impact later on because Latin had not been used as language of science for a long time, Swedenborg's work is illustrative of the trend towards a technological specialization of the monographic approaches regarding salt at a global level, which prevails today.

Despite all these, the approach to the matter is not subjected to the rigor of modern scientific research, the scholar often taking over a great deal of information from the bibliography consulted without directly checking it or comparing it to that provided by other authors. Writing in an era when there was little circulation of books and people, the Swedish scholar mainly had to draw on the works at his disposal (finding out from them about the results of other pieces of research conducted in the same field or adjacent ones; this also holds true for other works more or less connected to the topic in question).

According to the custom of the age, Swedenborg often mentions only the name of the author quoted,³ sometimes the work, as well (with or without reference to the book or chapter in question,⁴ rarely adding the year or page⁵). Most of the time, he does not mention the source of his information. The author prioritizes the regions on which he has more information,⁶ despite the fact that he had not visited them, opting for the random order of their review. He does

not consider their geographical position on the world map, but the salt's location (mountain, lake or sea) and a series of details concern Central and Eastern European countries. When dealing with mountain salt piles, the author mentions the salt mines in Poland, Hungary and Transylvania (under Habsburg rule at the time).

Particular attention is given to the two salt mines (*fodinae salinae*), near Krakow, *non procul a Cracovia* (*De sale*, 16), Wieliczka and Bochnia.⁷ The data provided are selected from various sources, consulted directly or via an intermediary,⁸ and judiciously organized. The author starts by specifying the mines' depth,⁹ their age (thus alluding to legendary elements he does not properly understand¹⁰), the quantity of salt extracted over time, as well as the areas in which it was used¹¹ and the revenues obtained from the exploitation.¹² The interior of a salt mine is described thoroughly, with the numerous paths and ways, *plures semitae et viae* (*De sale*, 16) which make the crossing of the mine very long, *adeo ut multum temporis requiratur, antequam illam integre liceat permeare* (*De sale*, 16).¹³ Salt columns, which prevent the mine from collapsing, offer a wonderful view according to the author, *pulcherrimum praebent prospectum* (*De sale*, 16), because, when touched by light, they become like the brightest crystal, *instar chrySTALLI nitidissimi* (*De sale*, 16).

Interestingly enough, the author reveals a part of the picturesque details he found in the sources, such as the existence of the salt cathedral of King Augustus II sculpted in salt in the Wieliczka mine; he also unveils shocking details, such as the use of horses that never see daylight, *equi numquam vident diem* (*De sale*, 16), the great number of technical installations in the depths of the mine, *machinamenta plura in abySSO fodinae hujus* (*De sale*, 16), or the fact that even children are born here, *multi etiam homines dicuntur ibi nasci* (*De sale*, 16).¹⁴

However, the scientist has a critical attitude towards such information and seems to doubt its truthfulness; thus, he prefers to prudently introduce words such as "it is said" (*dicuntur*) or "it is believed" (*fidem superat quod*). The same attitude can be seen when there is reference to the information on the existence of a river in the middle of the mountain which provides the people and the animals inside with very pure water, without any salt in it, *quae purissima est, nec ullum praefert saporem salinum* (*De sale*, 17); also mentioned are the miners' superstitions on the sounds that can be heard from galleries with flammable gas leaks.¹⁵ It seemed necessary to him to include considerations on these galleries, as well; salt could not be extracted from them because of the danger of combustion and the gases spread.¹⁶

As to the details regarding the hydrogeologic conditions inside the mine, the scholar mentions that there is no other source of water in the mine due to the dry climate (*sicca temperies*—*De sale*, 17) and no leak from above (*nec illabitur aqua e*

loco superiori—*De sale*, 17), despite plentiful rainfall (*maxima pluvia*—*De sale*, 17) and the presence above of marshland (*terra . . . paludinoso*—*De sale*, 17).¹⁷

On the aspect and quality of the salt, he presents several opinions (without revealing the sources), simply mentioning that “some enumerate only two <types>,” *aliqui numerant tantum duo* (*De sale*, 17), or “others have enumerated more types,” *alii vero enumerant adhuc plura genera* (*De sale*, 17). According to the specialists in the first category, these salt mines contained both rock and transparent salt with perfect crystals, as well as a less compact type which can be used particularly in the household, whereas others distinguish between a hard and a rock salt type, such as crystal; there is another hard, yet very transparent type, along with a third fragile one, very white and clean, and a softer fourth one. A fifth type is also included, namely one of black color, similar to coal or liquid tar, *genus colore nigro carbonis instar sive fluidi picis* (*De sale*, 17).¹⁸

With respect to the means of extraction and processing, there is record of stones of various dimensions being extracted from the mine and hammer-crushed, and the salt transported and sold either ground into powder,¹⁹ or as larger or smaller chunks scraped off cylinders, which the Poles used in the household.²⁰

Intrigued by a piece of information according to which salt from those mines would become heavier in contact with air, Swedenborg (this time, drawing on bibliography²¹) argues that there have been experiments to clear up this aspect, and some of the scientists (e.g. Dobelius) showed that there was no difference in weight, with respect to the salt weighted in the underground and on surface (*De sale*, 18).

The scientist, however, does not always have such abundant information and sometimes needs to be satisfied with what he can find in various bibliographic sources, thus trying to structure the material following the same parameters. Of the salt mines in the mountains of Hungary we find out from a single phrase, with information on both the geographic position—two miles from the town of Eperjes (today Prešov) in county Sáros, close to the Tarcza River²²—and depth (of 555 cubits, *profunditas est 555 ulnarum*—*De sale*, 19).²³ The details further provided concern the way in which the thick salt veins resemble metals in their positioning, yet surrounded by earth, not stone, *non aliter quam solent metalla, suntque circumdatae terra non vero petra* (*De sale*, 19); moreover, to be more easily taken out from the mine, they are crushed into giant blocks (*moles*²⁴),²⁵ which are cut into two-foot long and one-foot wide rectangular pieces, *in partes quadratas longitudine 2 pedum, et crassitie unius* (*De sale*, 19).²⁶ These fragments, in their turn, are crushed into smaller pieces and sent to the salt mill, *franguntur et submittuntur molae* (*De sale*, 20).

On the aspect of the salt of grey color, *ad griseum vergit* (*De sale*, 20), in halite state, the text reads that after grinding, it becomes as white as it gets, *sed*

cum commolitum est, candescit (*De sale*, 20). With respect to the quality of the salt in Hungarian mines, the author adds that there are several types of crystal clear white, yellow or bluish hard salt in which various figures may be carved.²⁷ Yet, the cold wet environment makes it difficult for the salt to turn into powder. Furthermore, almost black salt is said to be used after the salty water is sprayed on fire, *ex ipsa aqua . . . quae per evaporationem super ignem abjicitur, obtinetur sal* (*De sale*, 20),²⁸ to feed animals that put on high quality fat, *ex quo pinguescunt*.²⁹ These pieces of information, despite being included by the author after the ones on the salt mine in Dej (Dés, Desch), actually regard the salt mine (probably Solivar) near Eperjes.³⁰

We also notice that the author does not refer to the workforce used in the extraction of salt.

Herein, Swedenborg also includes a piece of information about the salt mine in Dej, *Desiensi dicta* (*De sale*, 20), Transylvania, which drew his attention, most likely on account of the convincing exemplification of the conservative qualities of salt. This concerns the discovery of a very big oak log in the salt, so hard that it could be barely cut with iron implements and which, when touched by air, decomposed so fast in four days only that it turned into dust at the touch of a finger (*De sale*, 20).³¹ Although he quotes the work that contains the story, *De admirandis Hungariae aquis* (told to be anonymous³²), Swedenborg actually draws on an intermediary source authored by Robert Boyle,³³ according to his own testimony at the end of the fragment.

In fact, it is not the only passage that draws on *De admirandis Hungariae aquis Hypomnematation* as its primary source. Other objects still found in salt in Transylvania, mentioned in this work and reviewed in another chapter, are the following: iron implements, wood (*instrumenta ferrea ac ligna—De sale*, 124), and a perfectly preserved hen sitting on eggs.³⁴ The intermediary bibliographic source is the work *De Thermis* by Andreas Baccius,³⁵ which mentions Wernher's name (*Vernherus*), but not the title of the work.³⁶ As a result, Swedenborg does not realize that this is the same work cited by Boyle, who considered it anonymous. The fact that it used a different bibliographic source may be an explanation for including these details on Transylvania in a different chapter (Ch. XLV, “De aquis aliis salsis, lacubus et rupibus quorum mentionem passim faciunt auctores”), not in the ones devoted to the mines in Hungary. Listed among “curiosities” by the scholar and the author he draws on, both showing reluctance to them, *vulgare fere est* (*De sale*, 124), they are accompanied by considerations on the quality of fossil salt from Transylvania, more transparent than any salt.³⁷

The chapter devoted to the salt mountains in Hungary ends with considerations on the quality of salt in the Carpathians, in general, and Transylvania, in

particular, *nitidissimum pellucidum sal* (*De sale*, 20), yet selected from a different bibliographical source (Friedrich Hoffmann).³⁸ Swedenborg also takes over the errors from Hoffmann, because he did not know the area—e.g. *in Transylvaniae comitatu Colossensi et Derenburgi* (*De sale*, 20)—“in the county of Cluj and Turda in Transylvania,” where Derenburg is probably mistaken for Thorenborg.

Drawing on a rich bibliography, Swedenborg paraphrases, interprets or transposes *ad litteram* entire fragments from the works he consulted. The result is actually a compilation, as the author takes up ideas, images and schemes from the models in his readings; however, the treatise is compiled with the scientific rigor of a scholar from a period when indicating one’s sources was not always a priority.

The work lists many experiments, definitely of interest in the era; they aimed at uncovering some properties of the salt, data collection on density, corrosiveness, salt quality, etc. Unfortunately, since it remained in manuscript for almost two centuries, the work was completely ignored by specialists. Given its global vision and comprehensive scope, it could be an important landmark in understanding the manner in which the issue of salt was approached at the beginning of the 18th century.



Notes

1. Emanuel Swedenborg, *De sale communi hoc est De sale fossili vel gemmeo marino et fontano*. Emanuelis Swedenborg opus posthumum. Ad fidem exemplaris manu scripti ex autographo in Bibliotheca Regiae Academiae Sueciae asservato nunc primum edidit Alfred Acton (Philadelphia, 1910). Our research draws on the Latin text of the first edition, from which we selected the passages on salt exploitation in Central and Southeastern Europe, adding our translation.
2. David Dunér, *The Natural Philosophy of Emanuel Swedenborg: A Study in the Conceptual Metaphors of the Mechanistic World-View* (Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind), transl. Alan Crozier (New York–London, 2013), 260.
3. E.g. *Ex Boyleo. Verba eius sunt . . .* (*De sale*, 138): “From Boyle. His words are . . .”; *Haec a Plinio, Baccio, Barba aliisque auctoribus collecta sunt . . .* (*De sale*, 125): “They have been taken from Pliny, Bacci, Barba and other authors . . .,” etc.
4. E.g. *Haec posteriora ex Hoffmanni Opusculis Physico-Medicis* (*De sale*, 65): “the latest <were excerpted from> Hoffmann’s *Opuscula Physico-Medica*”; *Georgius Agricola in libris suis De Re Metallica tradit . . .* (*De sale*, 32): “Georgius Agricola, in his books *De Re Metallica* argues . . .”; *Haec Anonymus Gallus in Nouveau Cours de Chymie* (*De sale*, 134): “they <are mentioned> by an anonymous French author in *Nouveau Cours de Chymie*,” etc.
5. E.g. . . . *ut in Actis Lipsiae, an. 1682, p. 386* (*De sale*, 89); *De his vide Nova Litteraria Maris Balthici*, anno 1698 (*De sale*, 82).

6. A great part of information comes from works written in modern languages (e.g. French, English, German), which the scholar appropriately tried to translate into Latin.
7. *Loca praedicta sunt Bochnia et Wieliczka (De sale, 16)*: “The places mentioned above are Bochnia and Wieliczka.”
8. He mentions Gabriel Rzączyński and Bernard Connor, whose names are misspelled in the 1910 edition (*Cannos* and *Rsacfynski*), corrected in the “Corrigenda” of the same edition (Swedenborg, 167). It is not certain whether he consulted them directly, given the errors and confusions he made. For instance, the reproduction of Connor’s account (according to which, in 1548, a cobbler discovered, while he was digging a well, a fountain whose center had a thin salt wall), in which the Morstin family name, as owners of the field, was misspelled, Swedenborg probably considering it a toponym: *tunc incolae hujus regionis ex Morstif profundius adhuc effodere puteum inceperunt (De sale, 16)*: “when the inhabitants of that region from Morstif started to dig the well deeper and deeper.” Cf. Bernard Connor, *The History of Poland, in Several Letters to Persons of Quality . . .*, vol. 1 (London, 1698), 247.
9. . . . *fodina Wieliczka dicitur 456 gradus profunditatis habere, sed circa Bochniam non nisi 80 scalas (De sale, 16)*: “. . . it is said that the Wieliczka mine is 456 steps deep, whereas Bochnia is no less than 80.”
10. For instance, the masculinization of Princess Cunegunda’s name, whose ring is said to have been discovered in salt at Bochnia, in 1251: *per Cuningundum, cujus annulus ibi repertus fuisse (De sale, 16)*. Cf. Gabriel Rzączyński, *Historia naturalis curiosa Regni Poloniae, Magni Ducatus Lituaniae, Annexarumque Provinciarum, in Tractatus XX divisa: ex Scriptoribus probatis, servata primigenia eorum phrasi in locis plurimis, ex M.S.S. variis, testibus oculatis, relationibus fide dignis, experimentis, desumpta opera (Sandomiriae, 1721)*, 58. It seems that the discovery of the salt deposits at Bochnia occurred in 1248: Janusz Wiewiórka, Józef Charkot, Krzysztof Dudek, and Małgorzata Gonera, “Historic Salt Mines in Wieliczka and Bochnia,” *Geoturystyka* 4 (18) (2008): 62.
11. . . . *per 200 annorum spatium adinvenere infinitam salis quantitatem, quo ad maximam partem usi sunt Poloni, Silesienses, Bobemi etc. ut et qui partem Ungariae colunt (De sale, 16)*: “. . . in a time span of 200 years, they found an indefinite quantity of salt used by the Poles, Silesians, Bohemians, etc. and those that live in Hungary.”
12. Probably under the influence of sources, the currencies mentioned in connection to the revenues achieved annually from salt exploitation are Tympfen (*Reditus ex his salinis putatur esse 800000 Tympfen—De sale, 16*) and imperial Thalers (*25000 thalerorum Imperialium—De sale, 16*).
13. The total length of this area is over 200 km, galleries and chambers included. Aleksander Garlicki, “Salt Mines at Bochnia and Wieliczka,” *Przegląd Geologiczny* 56, 8/1 (2008): 667.
14. Tributary to source texts (e.g. Jacques Savary des Bruslons, *Dictionnaire universel de commerce . . . Tome second. F–Z. Continué sur les Mémoires de l’Auteur et donné au public par M. Philemon-Louis Savary (Paris, 1723)*, s.v. *sel*), the author even preserves their metaphorical expression to underline the impressive dimensions and the special organization of the salt mine: *In locis his subterraneis videre licet Rempublicam quandam*

subterraneam, quae suas habet leges, suas etiam familias (*De sale*, 16): “In these underground areas there lies an underground republic with its own laws and families.”

15. *In cavernis his dicuntur audiri interdum sonos instar gannitum canis, vociferationum gallinarum, et plura quae operarii autumant sinistrum omen esse* (*De sale*, 17): “In these galleries sounds resembling a dog’s barking, a hen’s cluck and even more can be heard and workers see them as bad omens.”
16. . . . *effluvia facillime possunt incendi et flammam arripere, quod expertum est Wieliczkae anno 1644, tunc enim incendium quoddam inchoatum est, quod continuasse dicitur per integrum annum, et vapores vel odores sulphureos ex se copiose sparsisse* (*De sale*, 17): “. . . leaks can easily become flammable and ignite, which actually happened at Wieliczka, in 1644; then a fire started and it lasted for a year, widely spreading vapors and sulphur smells.” Cf. Rzączyński, 58.
17. In the modern era, researchers indicated serious problems caused by water infiltrations in the mine as a result of the uncontrolled development of mining activities, which even led to disasters (the oldest on record dating from 1868). Krzysztof Brudnik, Mariusz Czop, Jacek Motyka, Kajetan d’Obyrn, Marek Rogoż, and Stanisław Witczak, “The Complex Hydrogeology of the Unique Wieliczka Salt Mine,” *Przegląd Geologiczny* 58, 9/1 (2010): 791.
18. For a modern approach to the stratified disposal of salt in the Wieliczka and Bochnia deposits, see *ibid.*, 61–70.
19. *Frusta haec salina . . . malleis tunduntur adeo ut apta sint molis subjiendi; et molitur sic in farinam quandam, quae coloris est candidi . . .* (*De sale*, 17): “These salt pieces . . . are hammered until they become appropriate for the mill; and the <salt> is thus ground into a bright white flour . . .”
20. . . . *ex superficie vel extrema parte cylindri abraditur tantillum salis in usus oeconomicos* (*De sale*, 18): “from the surface or the cylinder end salt is little by little rasped to be used in the household.”
21. *Acta Maris Balthici*. It is actually about *Nova Literaria Maris Balthici & Septentrionis* (1699), 72–74; Swedenborg, 158. The scholar may not have consulted the paper directly, given the fact that the information is also present in other works of the time which draw on the same source, hence the difficulty in assessing whether he had direct access to it or not.
22. The editor of Swedenborg’s work preferred to emendate the toponyms *Eperies*, *Saros* and the hydronym *Tarcza* (*De sale*, 19), according to a more recent source, whereas in the manuscript Swedenborg probably took over the data from the *Dictionnaire universel de commerce* (Savary des Bruslons, s.v. *sel*), writes *Eperiei*, *Sarax*, *Tarchz*.
23. This is the mine of Prešov (located today on the territory of Slovakia).
24. . . . *moles plusquam 300 centenariorum pondere* (*De sale*, 19): “. . . blocks weighing more than 30,000 pounds.”
25. István Draskóczy, “Salt Mining and Trade in Hungary from the mid-Thirteenth Century until the End of the Middle Ages,” in *The Economy of Medieval Hungary* (East Central and Eastern Europe in the Middle Ages 450–1450), eds. József Laszlovszky, Bálint Nagy, Péter Szabó, and András Vadas (Leiden–Boston, 2018), 212–213, also mentions the great dimensions of the salt blocks extracted from Hungarian mines during the medieval period.

26. Most of the details seem to be excerpts from the *Dictionnaire universel de commerce* (s.v. *sel*), translated by Swedenborg into Latin.
27. Cf. Savary des Bruslons, s.v. *sel*.
28. This procedure for obtaining salt was known in Antiquity, according to Latin authors such as Tacitus (*Ann.*, 13, 57) and Pliny (*N.H.* 31, 83), who mention its use in Germany and Gaul. The grey color in the salt came from the mixture with the ashes resulting from burning wood: Cristina Carusi, *Il sale nel mondo greco (VI a.C.–III d.C.): Luoghi di produzione, circolazione commerciale, regimi di sfruttamento nel contesto del Mediterraneo antico* (Bari, 2008), 39–40. The technique was also used in the area of Transylvania and Moldavia from prehistory to the beginning of the 19th century: Marius Alexianu, Ion Sandu, and Roxana-Gabriela Curcă, “Fire, Brine and Wood: The First Nutritional Supplement in the Inland World,” *Mankind Quarterly* 52, 3–4 (2012): 423.
29. A series of experiments conducted by modern researchers showed that this type of salt had chemical properties with beneficial effects on animals’ bodies (*ibid.*, 417–421). Salt consumption actually brings animals an additional supply of minerals, also leading to greater water consumption.
30. Cf. Savary des Bruslons, s.v. *sel*.
31. On the discovery of other wood objects preserved in salt, in Transylvania, see, for instance, Anthony Harding and Valerii Kavruk, “Transylvania,” in *Explorations in Salt Archaeology in the Carpathian Zone*, eds. Anthony Harding and Valerii Kavruk (Budapest, 2013), 41–153.
32. Actually, the work is written (in Latin) by Georg Wernher (Georgius Wernherus). See *Călători străini despre Țările Române*, vol. 2, eds. Maria Holban, M. M. Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, and Paul Cernovodeanu (Bucharest, 1970), 13–16; Octavian Tătar, “Un proiect fiscal pentru Transilvania: Raportul lui Georg Werner din 1552 către autoritățile austriece,” *Terra Sebus: Acta Musei Sabesiensis* 6 (2014): 329; a detail also mentioned by Swedenborg’s editor in the Appendix (Swedenborg, 156).
33. Cf. Robert Boyle, “Suspensions about some Hidden Qualities in the Air,” in *The Philosophical Works of the Honourable Robert Boyle Esq.: Abridged, Methodized, and Disposed under the General Heads of Physics, Statics, Pneumatics, Natural History, Chymistry and Medicine: The Whole Illustrated with Notes, Containing the Improvements Made in the Several Parts of Natural and Experimental Knowledge Since his Time*, vol. 3, ed. P. Shaw (London, 1725), 82.
34. *Quodam loco, gallina cum ipsis ovis incubans reperta est, quae eo obducta sale servata est, ac incorrupta etiamnum ostenditur* (*De sale*, 124): “In a place a hen was found brooding eggs; covered in salt it was preserved and finds itself to be unaltered.” The text is reproduced ad litteram after Andreas Baccius (cf. Baccius, 236), who, in his turn, draws on Wernher for the data. Cf. Georgius Wernherus, *De admirandis Hungariae aquis hypomnemation: Ad generosum et vere magnificum D. Sigismundum in Herberstain, Neiperger, & Guttenhag Baronem, inclyti Roman.*

Hung. & Boëm. &c. Regis, D. Ferdinandi consiliarium, & fisci in Austria praefectum (Viennae, 1551), f. 12.

35. Andreas Baccius, *De Thermis Andreae Bacci Elpidiani . . . libri septem . . . De lacubus, fontibus, fluminibus, de balneis totius orbis et de methodo medendi per balneas* (Romae, 1622).
36. *Ibid.*, 236.
37. The sequence is also taken over from Baccius (*ibid.*).
38. Fridericus Hoffmannus, *Opuscula Physico-Medica*, Antehac seorsim edita iam revisa, aucta, emendata et delectu habito recusa, Tomus primus (Ulmae, 1725), 314; cf. Swedenborg, 157.

Abstract

Swedenborg on the Exploitation of Salt in Central and Eastern Europe in the 18th Century

The present paper is an analysis of the data concerning the regions of Central and Eastern Europe, where salt is extracted from the mountains (Poland, Hungary, Transylvania), offered by the theologian scholar Emanuel Swedenborg in some passages of his scientific work, written in Latin, *De sale communi*. A considerable number of these passages, which are of great interest for the history of technology and sciences, relate to issues that have been forgotten but which need to be revalued from the point of view of current developments in those fields. The aim of the study is to reveal the scientific principles that guided an 18th century scholar when dealing with such a topic. We are also interested in finding out the extent to which Swedenborg succeeds in systematizing the various theoretical and practical information, useful for understanding the nature of salt exploitation at that time, considering older works and the latest bibliography at his disposal.

Keywords

Latin language, Hungary, Poland, Transylvania, salt mine

Armenia

The Inedited Pages of Recent History (2002–2018)

DORIN CIMPOEȘU



The Armenian “Velvet Revolution.”

SOURCE: <https://www.iarmenia.org/armenian-velvet-revolution/>.

Dorin Cimpoeșu

Associate professor at the Faculty of Archivistics, Alexandru Ioan Cuza Academy of Bucharest. Author, among others, of the book **Armenia după atacul terorist din parlament: Misiune diplomatică la Erevan (2002–2005)** (Armenia after the terrorist attack on the Parliament: Diplomatic mission to Yerevan, 2002–2005) (2014).

MODERN ARMENIA became an independent state on 28 May 1918, following the changes triggered by World War I and the Bolshevik Russian Revolution. After only two years of independent existence, Armenia was “rescued” by the Red Army from the Turkish danger and incorporated into the Soviet totalitarian empire. Following more than 70 years of “Soviet captivity,” Armenia got separated de jure from the Metropolis by declaring its independence on 21 September 1991. However, it remained de facto within the Russian sphere of influence, becoming the only Russian foothold in the South Caucasus after Georgia “failed” by signing the Association Agreement with the EU on 27 June 2014.

The Russian military presence on the Armenian territory ever since the Soviet age, the Armenian-Russian “strategic partnership,” the association with the CIS, Russia’s role in regulating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the country’s dependence on Russian energy resources and the Russian labor and economic market—these are all factors that determined Armenia to more or

less tacitly accept a vassal status to Moscow, contrary to its national interests. More recently, this was highlighted when Yerevan was not able to follow the European aspirations of the Armenian people and withdrew from the EU integration process, during the meeting in Vilnius (28–29 November 2013), taking advice from Russian President Vladimir Putin. Moreover, Armenia signed the Association Agreement with the Eurasia Economic Union on 10 October 2014, in Minsk, during the CIS Summit.

More than that, the collective mentality of the common people had been impregnated with both the idea that Armenia owed its existence to Russia, and the fear that, without Moscow's support, it would be "swallowed up" by Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Throughout its history, Armenia has never known a democratic parliamentary regime, but only totalitarian Soviet "popular democracy," going straight and suddenly from the Middle Ages to the modern era after its incorporation into the Soviet Union, as it happened to most ex-Soviet countries. On the other hand, its detachment from the Soviet empire, in 1991, did not occur by means of a revolution—not even a "velvet" one that could have caused a radical change of the political regime. Although the Communist Party of Armenia (CPA) was abolished, party workers and members regrouped in the new political parties that were established shortly afterwards. It was therefore inconceivable to talk about an Armenian civil society in the true sense of the word, and thus about a democratic mindset. Actually, this applies to all former Soviet countries.

As a result, the political power was transferred from the hands of the central Soviet nomenklatura to the local totalitarian nomenklatura of each former Union republic. For all these reasons and in the absence of any historical democratic experience predating the totalitarian communist regime, the ruling elite of Armenia, strongly attached to its Soviet recent past, began the long and difficult transition towards a democratic parliamentary regime, under the close supervision of European organizations specialized in building the rule of law—the European Council and the OSCE in particular, especially after Armenia was accepted as a member of the European Council, in 2001.

For these reasons, democratic reforms advanced quite difficultly, as the old totalitarian mentalities presented a real and hard-to-remove obstacle in their path. At the same time, however, the civil society began to develop, and Western democratic values started to permeate Armenia, including through the Armenian diaspora in Western Europe and the USA, which had become more interested and engaged in the democratic transformation of their country of origin.

This process changed the balance of power in society, resulting in the early 2000s in strong confrontations between the representatives of neo-communist nomenklatura and those of the democratic forces and the civil society.

Presidential Elections

DURING THE first half of 2003, the political climate in Armenia became incendiary, given the campaign for presidential elections (19 February/5 March) and parliamentary elections (25 May), as well as their disputed results—the main events dominating the domestic politics.

A total of 11 candidates entered the race for the election of a new president, the main favorites being Robert Kocharian, the head of state; Stepan Demirchyan, the chairman of the People's Party; and Artashes Geghamian, the leader of the National Unity Party—the last two representing the opposition. Elections took place in a climate of fear and terror after the political assassination of Tigran Naghdalian, president of the Armenian Public Television, on 28 December 2002.

Perceived as the potential winner, Robert Kocharian had the benefit of significant administrative resources given by the so-called “power effect” and the support of over 10 political parties and public organizations, including the Republican Party, representing the government, led by Prime Minister Andranik Margharian, and the extreme nationalist Armenian Revolutionary Federation, the oldest party, branching out into the Armenian diaspora. Externally, the president had the support of Russia, the only strategic ally of Armenia. This alliance was highlighted on the occasion of his visit to Moscow during the electoral campaign (16–18 January 2003), which was an important signal given to Armenian voters, pro-Russian and Soviet-nostalgic in their majority.

The opposition began its preparations for the presidential elections in the summer of 2002, negotiations between political parties leading to the creation of an electoral coalition known as the “Alliance of the 16,” established on 3 September 2002. The egos of the political leaders and totally different doctrines of the component parties were the main obstacles in the designation of a unique candidate for the presidential election. As a result, the opposition went into the elections with two candidates, the best-ranked in the polls, around which many political forces merged, basically creating two electoral poles. The opposition's tactic was to prevent Robert Kocharian from winning the elections in the first round, with the firm belief that their best placed candidate would achieve victory during the second round.

Presidential elections in 2003 represented the fourth ballot election since the independence granted in September 1991, and the first one after the admission of Armenia as a member of the European Council, in January 2001. Also significant is the fact that these were the first elections held after the wave of political assassinations which had targeted major political figures of the country, the most notable being the terrorist attack against the Parliament building, on

27 October 1999.¹ The elections were also an important test for the progress of democratic practices in Armenia, since the previous presidential elections had been tainted by serious irregularities and lack of compliance with international standards. In 1996 and 1998, severe violations had been reported by OSCE/ODIHR, including the lack of accurate lists of voters, irregularities in organizing the elections, abuse of state resources, involvement of the military in the voting process, the presence of unauthorized people inside the polling stations during the counting of the ballots, and discrepancies in writing the minutes of proceedings. Consequently, over 1,000 foreign observers and several thousands of local observers announced their presence, in order to monitor both the campaign and the elections in 2003.

The Results of the Presidential Elections

DURING THE first round, neither of the candidates received the required majority. On 20 February 2003, the Central Election Commission (CEC) announced the preliminary results of the presidential election. Official data showed that out of the 1,418,811 votes cast, President R. Kocharian had received 707,155 or 49.84%, slightly below the majority needed to win in the first round, while his strongest opponent, Stepan Demirchyan, received 400,846 votes, i.e. 28.25%. The official final results were announced five days later, showing a slight decrease for both candidates—the president got 49.48%, while his rival got 28.22%, which did not amount to any significant differences in the presidential race.

Based on these results, the Central Election Commission announced the second round of the elections to be held between the top two contenders, on 5 March. The preliminary results of the second round, announced by the Central Election Commission on 6 March 2003, showed that R. Kocharian had won the election with 1,044,801 (67.52%) of the votes, while Stepan Demirchyan had received 503,136 votes (32.48%). The official final results were released five days later, but they did not significantly alter the percentage.

The second round of the elections showed, much as the first round, that many errors and irregularities had been committed during the voting process. For example, there were 72 polling stations that reported more ballots than voters. The official results of a polling station were different from the report received by foreign observers after the counting of votes, although there hadn't been any subsequent recount of ballots. Kocharian won by a large majority in 69 of the 71 polling stations in which foreign observers had noted that there were more ballots in the polls than voters during the second round.

The Parliamentary Elections and the Constitutional Referendum

ON 25 May 2003, parliamentary elections were scheduled. They completed a full electoral cycle that had started with the local elections of 22 October 2002 and continued with the presidential elections of 19 February/5 March 2003. Previous legislative elections had been held in October 1999.² The National Assembly, i.e. the Armenian Parliament, has a unicameral structure consisting of 131 deputies. According to the Election Code, 75 members are elected in keeping with a proportional representation system and 56 by majority ballot.

The Central Election Commission registered 21 parties and electoral blocs that were running in the race. The campaign officially started on 21 April, ending 48 hours before the election. Out of the 21 candidates, only four of six parties and blocs had a real chance to exceed the 5% electoral threshold and thus become members of the future Parliament.

The actual electoral race was to be held between the pro-presidential and the opposition parties. It is worth mentioning that after having won his second term, President Robert Kocharian wished for the parties that had supported him (the Republican Party, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, the Country of Law Party and the Liberal Democrats) to win the election and form the parliamentary majority, in order to ensure domestic political stability and the implementation of his election program.

In terms of political power, most opposition parties joined, for the first time in the recent history of Armenian parliamentary elections, a single electoral bloc known as Justice (Ardarutiun). Its backbone consisted of the former presidential candidate Stepan Demirchyan, president of the People's Party; Aram Sargsyan, leader of the Republican Party; Vazgen Manukyan, president of the National Democratic Union; and Aram Sarkisian, president of the Democratic Party. Eight other parties, smaller in their electoral share and influence, were also part of the Justice bloc. The opposition presence in the Parliament would be the most significant event to occur within the previous ten years in Armenia, *as until 2003 there had been no parliamentary opposition.*

Unhappy with the negative situation recorded during the presidential elections, international organizations including the OSCE/ODIHR and especially the Council of Europe expressed greater concern for the electoral confrontation on 25 May. Thus the number of foreign and domestic observers was significantly higher; serious efforts were made to eliminate the irregularities detected during the previous elections, and additional aid was provided, in order to ensure more transparent ballot boxes.

Along with the parliamentary elections of 25 May 2003, a referendum was held on the revision of the Constitution of Armenia, adopted back in 1995.³

The draft constitutional amendments, presented as the president's legislative initiative, were unanimously adopted by the National Assembly during a special session. They brought the following main changes: ensuring the rule of law; the separation and balance of powers; reducing the number of MPs from 131 to 101; mandatory Armenian citizenship for the prime minister and the cabinet members; the independence of the judicial system; expansion of powers for the Constitutional Court; the dissolution of the Parliament by the president, in case of prolonged inactivity of the legislature; the Parliament's right to make political statements, a right which had been stripped away since 1990; the cessation of the president's prerogatives as chief executive, his authority being limited to specific presidential powers.

The members of the National Assembly groups and factions had different positions on the constitutional reform package. Thus, the pro-presidential forces believed that they represented "a serious step forward," while the opposition contested the new constitutional reform and urged the people to vote against it at the planned referendum. The Venice Commission of the European Council had truly cooperated with the group of experts on issues related to constitutional amendments packages, yet they found there were substantial differences between its first and the final version, subjected to the referendum, especially in terms of the president's rights and attributions.

The Results of the Parliamentary Elections and the Constitutional Referendum

ON 31 May 2003, the Central Election Commission released the final results of the parliamentary elections and the constitutional referendum.⁴ According to their report, only six political forces had managed to exceed the threshold in the proportional system and accede to the new Parliament. In compliance with the final results, the 75 seats were distributed as indicated below:

- the Republican Party, 23 seats (31.18%);
- the Justice bloc, 14 (18.03%);
- the Country of Law Party, 12 (16.38%);
- the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, 11 (15.15%);
- the National Unity Party, 9 (11.65%);
- the United Workers Party, 6 (7.61%).

The majority ballot system ensured that 54 seats were occupied from a total of 56, and in two electoral divisions the elections were repeated due to numerous irregularities. The Republican Party and the Country of Law Party managed

to get 9 and 6 seats, respectively, by the majority system, while the rest of the seats went to independent candidates. According to the Central Election Commission, a number of 1,234,546 electors had cast their vote, from a total of 2,442,062 eligible voters.

The Central Election Commission recorded 56 complaints about the voting process for both election systems, and these complaints were further sent for analysis and resolution.

Regarding the constitutional referendum, the Central Election Commission announced the following results:

- 1,216,581 voters participated in the polls, out of the total of 2,334,993 eligible voters;
- 563,205 people voted for constitutional amendments and 550,668 against them.

In order for the referendum to be validated, a 2/3 participation rate was required, meaning 750,000 of the total registered voters on the lists. Following the results, the constitutional amendments were rejected by popular referendum, which represented a serious political setback for President Robert Kocharian and the forces supporting him.

The Formation of New Structures of Power and the Appointment of the New Government

THE THIRD legislature of the Armenian Parliament (i.e. the National Assembly) convened on 12 June 2003.⁵ Following negotiations between the Republican Party, the winner of the elections, the Country of Law Party and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, all of pro-presidential orientation, the Memorandum establishing a political coalition that would lead Armenia in the next four years was signed on 11 June 2003.⁶

According to the Memorandum, the National Assembly (the Parliament) leadership positions were distributed as follows:

- president: the representative of the Country of Law Party (Artur Baghdasarian);
- vice-presidents: representatives of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and the Republican Party (Tigran Torosian and Vahan Hovhannisyanyan, respectively).

Artur Baghdasarian, the president of the new Parliament, was elected with 92 votes in favor and 6 against, while vice presidents Tigran Torosian and Vahan Hovhannisyanyan obtained 95 votes in favor and 84 against.

On 20 June 2003, the Parliament validated the new Armenian cabinet of ministers and its governing program for the following four years.⁷ However, ‘vali-

dation' is an inaccurate term, as there hadn't been any real vote of confidence. According to the Constitution, the prime minister announced the government lists and program to the Parliament, and, provided neither was challenged within 24 hours by at least half of the total number of MPs, both were to be deemed as approved. And this is exactly what happened. The opposition, represented by the legislative groups of the Justice bloc and the National Unity Party, did not attend the session of the National Assembly that was to appoint the new government.

The structure of the new cabinet and its portfolio distribution had not changed fundamentally. A comparative analysis with the previous cabinet structure reveals that most of the ministers (11 out of a total of 16) had not changed, but maintained their posts—Prime Minister Andranik Margharian included. In other words, the new power in Yerevan was actually the same as the former one. The prime minister presented the government program for the following four years, which was in fact a synthesis of President Robert Kocharian's electoral platform and the campaign programs of the three parties that formed the coalition government.⁸ The government program was violently disputed and considered a "disgrace" by the opposition MPs, who indicated that key areas of the economy had been left out of the government strategy.

The Deterioration of Armenian Relations with pan-European Institutions

SERIOUS INFRINGEMENTS recorded during presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as accusations formulated by the opposition on the issue of faked results, determined European institutions such as the European Council, the OSCE and the EU to consider that Armenia did not meet international standards for democratic elections, which was a great disappointment, considering that free and fair elections are the foundation of democracy and the rule of law.⁹

Due to this situation, Armenia's relations with pan-European institutions entered a difficult period, with direct consequences on both the cooperation with these institutions and the country's image abroad. An immediate consequence of these reports was the proposition of Bernard Schreiner, European rapporteur for Armenia, formulated during the APCE summer session, to deny mandate recognition for new members of the Armenian National Delegation to the Council of Europe. A similar position was adopted by the OSCE PA to Armenia, during the session held in the Netherlands. The vice president of the National Assembly in Yerevan, Vahan Hovhannisyan, was denied the right to speak in the PA, and the second member of the Armenian delegation, representing the opposition, was only given a deliberative vote.

Internal Political Developments After the Elections

THE DYNAMICS of the domestic political situation in Armenia was closely related to the balance of power resulting from the presidential and parliamentary elections, which took place during the first half of 2003.¹⁰ President Robert Kocharian and the parties supporting him managed to remain in power for yet another term. The price of their victory had been the crude violation of democratic standards during elections, which was severely punished by the Euro-Atlantic organizations. Deciding to further observe Armenia, these organizations urged the Yerevan authorities to amend the existing legislation and reform the electoral system before the following elections (to be held in 2007). For the first time in post-Soviet Armenia, the political opposition had managed to enter the Parliament (the National Assembly) and establish two parliamentary groups, Justice and National Unity. Although not very numerous (24 members) and divergent in their opinions, they would have the opportunity to be heard on both the national and international political arena.

The confrontation between government and the opposition increased during the first months of 2004, under the influence of the Orange Revolution victory in Georgia. The opposition called into question the Parliament's vote of no confidence in the president, their initiative being rejected by the majority coalition, which led to a boycott of the National Assembly sessions for an indefinite period. Simultaneously, the opposition acted to diversify their forms of protest, frequently organizing protest meetings across the country, in order to eliminate the "illegitimate" power.

The explicit goal of the opposition and especially of its parliamentary members was to remove the current political power and restore constitutional order by means of free and democratic elections, held before the term. Achievement of this goal was made possible by a referendum regarding the vote of no confidence against the head of state, which was supposed to take place by 16 April 2004 in accordance with the decision of the Constitutional Court, adopted shortly after the presidential election, amid massive popular demonstrations. For the success of their approach, the Justice bloc needed broad and active support from the population, and towards this goal they announced that rallies would start again in Yerevan and across the country, in order to explain their plan and methods for changing the power.

On 2 February 2004, as expected by the opposition, the parliamentary majority rejected—with 81 votes in favor and 4 against—the legislative initiative of the Justice bloc to amend the Referendum Law, which was to allow the organization of a referendum regarding the vote of no confidence against the president. After the negative vote of the Parliament on the confidence referendum, MPs of both parliamentary opposition groups decided to boycott the National Assembly sessions indefinitely, which marked the beginning of a severe political crisis in Ar-

menia. The decision was announced in a joint statement, released on 3 February 2004. Besides boycotting the legislative sessions, the two parliamentary opposition forces announced they would also resume protests across the country, the first major event being held on 19 February 2004, in the capital of the Armavir region, near Yerevan. The forms of protest, according to the expectations of the opposition, included civil disobedience and blocking the main roads.

The Chronicle of a Revolution Foretold

THE BOYCOTT of parliamentary proceedings by the two opposition groups continued despite the efforts of Parliament leaders to achieve reconciliation and start a dialogue between the Parliament majority and the minority.¹¹ The opposition mainly focused on organizing frequent meetings across the country, in order to check the popular state of mind, raise awareness and get the much-needed support to trigger the action of removing the Karabakhian clan (President Robert Kocharian and Defense Minister Serzh Sargsyan) from the state leadership. Opposition rallies, held in a relatively peaceful atmosphere, usually gathered between 500 and 3,000 people, depending on the share of population in the cities where they were held.

The speeches of the Justice bloc leaders were particularly focused on accusing the government parties of various deeds, including “political assassinations” by means of perpetrators not yet discovered, the terrorist attack in the Parliament (27 October 1999), the election fraud in 2003, the suspicious privatization of strategically important economic targets, the sharp rise in prices for basic goods, the deplorable social and economic situation, the high level of poverty (87% of the population), the sharp social polarization, the questionable morality of politicians, and other such issues.

The image of the participants at the opposition meetings was disturbing: people in ragged clothes, without coats, barefoot and looking hungry etc. They were protesting not only against their poor living conditions, but simply because they had lost all hope.

The radical wing of the Justice bloc, represented by the Republican Party, led by Albert Bazeyan and Aram Sarkisian, the fiercest opponents of the Karabakhian clan, called for a democratic revolution, claiming that the change of power was to occur in a matter of weeks. There was even a deadline set for the overturn: 13 April 2004. The actual actions were to take place between 9 and 12 April 2004. The tactics of the opposition consisted of long-term picketing the Presidency headquarters by thousands of demonstrators coming from Yerevan and across the country, and holding it under siege until President Robert Kocharian’s resignation was to be obtained.

The opposition announced they would fight against the authorities only by peaceful means, as they feared that the power could make use of force. Therefore, in the rallies, the opposition leaders made repeated calls to the police, urging them to not stand against the people, and not to fight the current, because they would bear the consequences. Despite the leaders' calls for calm at the rally organized on 28 March 2004, in Gyumri, the second largest city in Armenia, there were clashes between opposition and government supporters, resulting in arrests and criminal proceedings against activists of the Justice bloc. The authorities continued the repression in the following days, with 50 members of the People's Party and 47 of the National Unity Party being molested and detained without warrant. One of them was Suren Soureniants, a leading member of the Republican Party.

After overcoming disagreements and disputes regarding possible tactics for the fight against the power, the two leaders of the parliamentary opposition, Stepan Demirchyan and Artashes Geghamian, managed to reach a consensus on 5 April 2004: together, they held a press conference, stating that the political forces they represented would meet with voters on 9 April 2004, at 16:00 hours, in Liberty Square in Yerevan, for a national meeting, with the primary goal of returning the power to the people.

The day before the national meeting with voters, Robert Kocharian gave an interview to the Armenia 1 Public Television.¹² It was articulated as a warning to political opponents about the straining of the domestic situation, showing that incitement to violence was primarily a threat to the opposition itself, and could turn against it like a boomerang. The head of state acknowledged that the events in Georgia had influenced political developments in Armenia, but stated the conditions were different in the two countries. On the other hand, on 8 April 2004, Artur Baghdasarian, the Parliament spokesperson, consulted with opposition leaders, aiming to defuse the domestic political tension. However, the consultations failed, as the opposition's proposals were rejected. The opposition believed that a dialogue with the power was only possible provided the latter accepted to organize a vote of no confidence against the president.

The Climax of the Opposition Protest Rallies against the Power

9 APRIL 2004 marked the beginning of extensive opposition protest rallies aiming to remove the illegitimate president, to organize free and democratic elections and to lead the country out of its social and economic crisis.¹³ Liberty Square in Yerevan became the favorite spot of the opposition

for organizing protest demonstrations, which were scheduled every day at 16:00 hours. At the meetings held on 9, 10 and 12 April 2004, the number of participants ranged from 15 to 50,000 people, according to organizers' estimates. Data disseminated by authorities showed a much lower level of participation. Opposition leaders were not satisfied with the number of participants, which had been below their expectations.

The measures taken by the authorities to discourage opposition supporters from leaving their home cities and coming to Yerevan included checks on public transport and blocking the access roads to the capital of Armenia, in the hope that the magnitude of these events could be limited. The authorities continued to illegally arrest heads of the local organizations of opposition parties, including lawmakers and other demonstrators. Thus, from the onset of actions until 13 April, over 250 people were detained, arrested and subjected to investigation—including four Parliament members. The opposition informed the secretary general of the European Council and the PACE president about these political repression acts and human rights violations.

At the meeting held on 9 April 2004, the opposition gave the coalition a deadline, i.e. 12 April, to bring on the Parliament agenda the legislative initiative of amending the referendum law and organizing a motion of no confidence against the president. The Parliament majority rejected the opposition's ultimatum and, in doing so, the only possibility of a dialogue that could have eased this domestic political crisis. Under the new conditions, the opposition decided to continue its protests, which would only end with the resignation of the country leadership. The meeting of 12 April 2004 turned into a march that went all the way from Liberty Square to the Presidency headquarters. Protesters were met by an impressive deployment of security forces, who prevented them from approaching the Presidency and the Parliament building. Opposition leaders called on the president of the National Assembly to talk to the people. They asked the chief of police to come with an explanation for having blocked access to the Presidency, and requested TV stations to broadcast these events live. Their appeals were either rejected or ignored. The Parliament leadership decided to suspend the plenary sessions of the National Assembly during the week.

The march ended without any results, so the organizers urged demonstrators to remain in the streets overnight. However, the troops intervened in force, the demonstrators were dispersed and Bagramian Avenue was reopened for traffic. Once again, arrests were made, targeting meeting organizers, journalists and demonstrators. The Republican and National Unity Party headquarters were searched without warrant, three Parliament members were detained for questioning, and one of them was charged with illegal possession of weapons. Several people were injured during the clashes, police officers included.

After dispersing the protesters and arresting some of them, the presidential spokesman declared that the Armenian authorities would take all the necessary measures stipulated by law in order to prevent any other possible manifestations of political extremism.¹⁴ According to his statements, the opposition was to blame for the incidents, as they had adopted an aggressive attitude, launched calls for a change of power by force and organized rallies and actions without the competent authorities' approval.

A new rally was organized by the reunited opposition on 16 April 2004.¹⁵ According to organizers, participation amounted to approximately 15,000 people, although the newspapers only estimated a number of 5,000. The speeches of the opposition leaders resumed two main themes: the departure of Robert Kocharian and his henchmen, and the restoration of constitutional order in Armenia. They rejected any form of dialogue with the power until the guilty parties would be punished for rigging the presidential elections in 2003 and repressing the demonstrations of 12/13 April 2004.

The previous day, the three parties forming the ruling coalition had issued a statement calling the opposition to negotiate—this being considered the only alternative for political dialogue. The ruling coalition emphasized that the irreconcilable politics of the opposition could have dangerous consequences for the country. Their refusal to enter a dialogue could only reduce the possibilities of relaxing the internal political situation in Armenia. During a meeting with journalists, President Robert Kocharian said he could not allow 1% of the population to mislead the entire Armenian community and force the authorities to accept populist measures that could be “catastrophic” for the whole country. The head of state warned that the authorities' response to actions of the opposition should be the appropriate one. The only way out of this situation was for the opposition members of Parliament to resume their duties without formulating any conditions.

On 21 April 2004, there was a new rally of the united opposition, attended by 7,000–12,000 people. The speeches of the opposition leaders were focused on the same issue: the president's resignation. They also requested the resignation of the attorney general and of the minister of defense, blamed for opening criminal cases against the Justice bloc and for the 2003 presidential election fraud. The Justice bloc accepted Parliament Speaker Artur Baghdasarian's proposal to take part in political consultations with the parliamentary majority, which represented a first step towards a dialogue between the government and the opposition.¹⁶

Rejecting the accusations of the power about not supporting the political dialogue, leaders of the Justice bloc met on 26 April 2004 with representatives of the ruling coalition. During the first round of consultations, MP Victor

Dallakyan, the justice secretary, presented a document containing ten proposals that once achieved could create the proper conditions for organizing the referendum for the motion of no confidence against the head of state and generate civic consensus. The head of the parliamentary group of the Republican Party, Galust Sahakyan, considered that the wording in the opposition's proposals was biased and unacceptable. Its change could however provide some basis for discussion, since the proposals were actually achievable.

After two rounds of negotiations, the opposition withdrew from the consultations, using as a pretext the fact that the parliamentary majority hadn't taken into account two of their proposals, namely the people's right to free movement and the postponing of the debate on the draft law on public assemblies (adopted in the third and final reading during the session of 28 April 2004).

On 27 April 2004, a new protest demonstration of the opposition took place in Liberty Square in Yerevan, attended by approximately 12,000 people. The speakers pointed out that the opposition was giving the power a new deadline, i.e. a week, to meet their claims. The secretary of the Justice bloc called on the people to join the fight against turning Armenia into a "police state." Aramazd Zakaryan, a member of the Political Council of the Republican Party, arrested on 11 April 2004, went on hunger strike. He was accused of seeking a change of power through violence and of slander against officials. The press secretary of the Ministry of Justice declared that Zakaryan's health condition was normal.

PACE Summons Armenia to Fulfill Commitments

ACCORDING TO a report discussed in the PACE plenary session, on 28 April 2004, Armenia had to meet commitments made on its admission in the European Council, as well as to improve its domestic political situation. The deadline was the summer session of the European Parliament. Otherwise, penalties had to be applied and they could review the status of the national Armenian delegation to PACE.¹⁷

Among other things, the authorities were asked not to obstruct public meetings and to refrain from any measures infringing the freedoms guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. At the same time, officials were required to transparently investigate human rights violations during recent events, including attacks against journalists, and to inform the European Council on the legal measures taken against the culprits. The report also demanded the release from custody of people who had been arrested for participation in rallies, and the cessation of administrative detention, while modifying the existing legislation.

The Relative Calming of the Internal Situation

THE JUSTICE bloc and the National Unity Party issued a statement expressing their willingness to start a dialogue with the authorities, particularly with President Robert Kocharian and Prime Minister Andranik Margharian. The opposition's reaction was, of course, a consequence of the recent PACE resolution, as well.¹⁸ According to the statement, the opposition intended to accept Speaker Artur Baghdasarian's proposal of resuming political consultations on 6 May 2004. The opposition had previously announced that they would cease the protests in Yerevan for a period of 10 days, "in order to enable the authorities to implement the requirements of the European Parliament." Opposition leaders had not excluded, however, organizing new demonstrations in several other regions across the country.

During the first round of consultations, following the suppression of the protest on 13 April 2004, the opposition and the ruling coalition reached an agreement to continue the dialogue that had been initiated, and to set an agenda of issues. The joint declaration, signed by representatives of both sides, emphasized the need for a new political climate in the country. Victor Dallakyan, secretary of the Justice bloc, stated it had been agreed to find a convenient way for both sides to organize the referendum regarding the motion of no confidence against the president, and this was to be placed on the agenda of the consultations.

The opposition Justice bloc issued a statement showing that Armenian authorities had continued to ignore the PACE resolution, and performed new administrative arrests among opposition members.¹⁹ After the protest rally on 21 May 2004, 16 people received various forms of administrative punishment following emergency judicial proceedings, which lasted no longer than ten minutes. A joint statement, signed by the Justice bloc, the National Unity Party and the Communist Party of Armenia, stated that "the repressive measures taken by the Kocharian regime could not suppress the people's fight for justice and dignity."²⁰

On 4 June 2004, the opposition held another protest meeting, even if this had not been approved by the municipality. The number of participants was 15,000, according to organizers, and 7,000, according to authorities' data. Aram Sargsyan, one of the opposition leaders, specified that the opposition would only stop protests "in case of war with Azerbaijan."

At the demonstration meeting on 16 June 2004, Stepan Demirchyan, leader of the Justice bloc, stated that the opposition would not give up its protest demonstrations, but would continue to fight for justice, "until the final victory."²¹ During the same meeting, Aram Sargsyan, leader of the Republican Party, stated: "Today, the first phase of the national program of struggle for the

restoration of law and order in the country has come to an end. Now we need to raise a new wave of protests, more powerful, which will certainly lead to the final victory.” Only 600 people attended this last protest rally!

President Robert Kocharian’s Statement at the PACE Summer Session

ON 23 June 2004, the Armenian president gave a speech in the plenary of the PACE summer session.²² Referring to the domestic political crisis, he said:

The opposition, encouraged by the results of the Georgian Orange Revolution, has tried to implement a similar scenario in Armenia, where facts were actually different from those in the neighboring country. History has shown time and time again that revolutions inspired by foreign models never have the expected results. In order to gain attention, the opposition organized protest demonstrations and called for civil disobedience, forcing the police to restore order, but without any significant harm to the participants. Such police operations are always regrettable, but the authorities have an obligation to protect society from political extremism. The ruling coalition parties have made repeated offers of cooperation and dialogue to the opposition, but all these have been rejected. Armenia’s obligations to the Council of Europe are a task of both the authorities and the opposition, and I regret that some opposition MPs drew PACE in discussions that led to discrediting the ruling coalition. I am convinced that the national Parliament, rather than the Council of Europe, is the best place for this.

The Failure of the Opposition Struggle against the Power

VICTOR DALLAKYAN, the secretary of the Justice bloc, asserted that during the parliamentary recess in 2004 the opposition would continue their meetings with voters, both in Yerevan and across the country.²³ In his opinion, the national movement initiated by the united opposition was a process to be completed in several stages. In summer, the opposition parties would reorganize their forces and strengthen regional structures, which would play a decisive role in the new wave of demonstrations expected to take place in September–October 2004.

Although they continued to boycott the proceedings of the Parliament in the autumn session of 2004, and further on, at the beginning of 2005, the actions of the opposition fell into obscurity. Moreover, some parliamentary political forces and members of the public blamed the failure of Justice and the National Unity Party on the lack of a united opposition program and also on their lack of firmness in dealing with the leaders of the country.

After a pause of more than eight months, the parliamentary opposition announced its intention to resume fighting in order to restore “constitutional order,” in the spring of 2005. Both the Justice bloc and the National Unity Party expected to restart the so-called meeting with the electors across the country and in Yerevan, within the following two months. This time, however, the two forces announced that they would operate separately. On 19 February 2005, Artashes Geghamian, the National Unity Party chairman, unilaterally declared that his party was free of the agreement reached in 2004 with the Justice bloc, which in fact meant the end of their cooperation in the struggle to remove the regime in Armenia. The Justice leaders rapidly reacted to these changes in the position of Artashes Geghamian. Thus, Vazgen Manukyan stated that if Geghamian felt strong enough to carry out the revolution on his own, the bloc would watch him very carefully.

According to Geghamian, “the Revolution,” conceived as a “large popular movement,” was inevitable in Armenia as the people had run out of patience and they would rise against the authorities. The causes of this uprising included the starvation of the population, large scale corruption, the turmoil caused by criminal elements, as well as the authorities’ failure in both domestic and foreign policy. Unlike the National Unity Party, the Justice bloc declared they would continue to act within the legal framework in order to overthrow Robert Kocharian’s regime. Stepan Demirchyan, leader of the bloc, was reluctant in using the term “Revolution” and rephrased it as “restoring the constitutional order,” which was to be achieved only by peaceful means, without any shock for the population.

Unfortunately, subsequent developments showed that following the separation of the two opposition leaders, the political representation they had expected remained a mere dream.

The End of Robert Kocharian’s Autocratic Regime

THE PRESIDENTIAL elections were held on 18 February 2008. They put an end to the regime of Robert Kocharian, who had held the position of president of Armenia for two consecutive terms.²⁴ Nine candidates, the likely ones, joined the incumbent, among them Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan,

Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the first president of Armenia, Artur Baghdasarian, the former speaker of Parliament, leader of the party State of Law, the largest opposition party, and Vahan Hovhannisyan, deputy speaker of Parliament from the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF).

Ter-Petrosyan had announced his candidacy since 26 October 2007, as an independent, in a speech accusing Robert Kocharian of institutionalizing a mafia-style regime responsible for widespread corruption which had allegedly stolen at least \$ 3–4 billion in the last five years of his presidential term. Sargsyan's candidacy was supported by his comrade, Robert Kocharian, the incumbent president, and Gagik Tsarukyan, whose Prosperous Armenia party had the second-largest number of deputies in the National Assembly.

The election results recorded Serzh Sargsyan's victory in the first round with 52.86% of the votes, followed by Ter-Petrosyan with 21.5% and Artur Baghdasarian with 16.67%. Despite numerous irregularities and violations of the electoral laws reported by the opposition, on 24 February 2008, the Central Election Commission communicated the final results of the elections, which were not much different from the preliminary ones: Serzh Sargsyan—52.82%, Levon Ter-Petrosyan—21.5% and Artur Baghdasarian—17.7%.

Levon Ter-Petrosyan and the opposition parties challenged those results, accusing the power of election fraud and calling supporters to a rally on 20 February in Yerevan. The protests lasted until 1 March 2008, with 15,000 to 100,000 people participating, when the clash between law enforcement and protesters reached its climax.

Then the police intervened brutally, the result being at least 10 dead (8 protesters, 1 policeman, 1 soldier), 200 injured, 100 arrested and 63 vehicles burned. In the last days of his term, President Kocharian decreed the introduction of a state of emergency in Yerevan for a period of 20 days, followed by mass arrests, the harassment and house arrest of important opposition leaders, the censorship of mass media outlets including the electronic ones (the internet), and the prohibition of any anti-government protests.

Armenia in the post-Kocharian Period

IN THIS particularly tense situation with acts of bloodshed, Serzh Sargsyan took over as president, being sworn in on 9 April 2008. The new president also benefited from two consecutive mandates according to the constitutional provisions. Serzh Sargsyan, as a disciple of his mentor, Robert Kocharian, did not show himself in the best light, continuing the authoritarian regime of the latter.

Even more, wishing to imitate Vladimir Putin, Sargsyan initiated a constitutional reform meant to ensure his continuing grip on power, this time as prime minister, after the end of his second term, in the year 2018. Thus, through the constitutional reform approved by a referendum, organized on 6 December 2015, Armenia was transformed from a semi-presidential republic into a parliamentary one. The president was deprived of the right to vote and the presidential institution was limited in its duties, becoming mainly a decorative one. The head of state is elected by Parliament for a single term of 7 years, without the right to belong to any political party.²⁵

The National Assembly or Parliament had maintained its unicameral character, but the number of deputies had been reduced from 131 to 101 and the uninominal system had been abolished, the deputies being proportionally elected on party lists.

The first parliamentary elections that benefited from the new constitutional changes were those of 2 April 2017, and they were on time. 2,585,134 citizens entitled to vote were registered, and 1,577,323 of them went to the polls. They elected 101 new members of Parliament through the proportional system, joined by four designated representatives of the national minorities.²⁶

According to the final results, 4 political forces, two parties and two electoral alliances entered the Parliament, as follows:

- the Republican Party: 771,247 (49.12%), 58 deputies;
- the Tsarukyan Alliance: 428,965 (27.32%), 31 deputies;
- the Way Out Alliance: 122,49 (7.77%), 9 deputies;
- the Armenian Revolutionary Federation: 103,173 (6.57%), 7 deputies.

Four deputies were representatives of the Russian, Assyrian, Yazidi, and Kurdish national minorities. On 2 March 2018, after the end of Serzh Sargsyan's second term, the National Assembly in its new composition elected Armen Sargsyan President of Armenia.

The Armenian “Velvet Revolution”

RELATIVELY SOON, the Republican Party launched the idea of nominating Serzh Sargsyan for the position of prime minister, the reason behind his amendment of the Constitution through the 2015 referendum, following Putin's model, in order to ensure his stay in power.

On 14 April 2018, the Republican Party decided to nominate Serzh Sargsyan for the position of prime minister, a decision supported by the coalition partner, ARF, and by the Prosperous Armenia party as well.

In this political context, on 31 March 2018, Nikol Pashinyan started peaceful protests under the slogan “My Step,” first in the city of Gyumri, after which he

passed through several localities on the way to Yerevan, where he arrived on 13 April. There, he organized a small meeting in French Square, attended by about 100 people, some of them putting up tents.²⁷

On 16 April the campaign “Take a step, reject Serzh” began. On 17 April, when the election of the prime minister was scheduled, the protesters tried to block the entrance to Parliament, but the police stopped them.

After the election of the former president as prime minister, the number of protesters continued to grow exponentially, reaching about 50,000, as demonstrations spread throughout the country, despite the arrests made by the police. As the number of protesters increased, the new prime minister called on the leader of the protest movement to come to the negotiations, but he refused, saying that the only thing to discuss was the resignation of the prime minister.

Under pressure from the incumbent president, who had a talk with Nikol Pashinyan during the rally, he agreed to have a meeting with the newly elected prime minister on 22 April 2018, at 10:00. The discussion lasted for about 3 minutes, as Pashinyan asked Sargsyan to resign. Instead, the prime minister threatened him, saying he had “learned nothing from the lessons of 1 March,” referring to the protesters killed by the police in the post-election affrays of 2008, when the presidential elections had been won by Sargsyan and challenged by the opposition as being rigged.

Immediately after announcing the results of the conversation between the two, the demonstrations engulfed the whole of Yerevan, with tens of thousands of protesters occupying Republic Square. The police arrested 232 people on the evening of 22 April, Nikol Pashinyan and two other leaders of the protesters among them. The protests were resumed the following day, 23 April, with members of the Armenian Armed Forces joining in for the first time, as confirmed by the Ministry of Defense. Nikol Pashinyan, released in the meantime, immediately joined the demonstrators in Republic Square.

Under the pressure of the street, a news post was published on the official website of the prime minister announcing that Serzh Sargsyan had resigned, his position being taken over by the former Prime Minister, Karen Karapetyan, as interim prime minister. Just two days after his resignation, the former governing partners, the Prosperous Armenia Party and the ARF, declared their support for the movement of Nikol Pashinyan, withdrawing from the ruling coalition.

Subsequently, things began to precipitate. Thus, on 28 April, Nikol Pashinyan met with the president of Armenia, Armen Sargsyan, the ARF leaders, the former ruling party and with the representatives of the second largest political group in Parliament, Prosperous Armenia. In an interview given on the same day, President Armen Sargsyan welcomed “New Armenia” and the chance for “a truly democratic state.” All those forces announced that they would support Pashinyan’s candidacy for the position of prime minister and the ruling

party would neither block his election nor present their own candidate for that position.

Despite the promises made, the Republican Party blocked Pashinyan's election in the first round on 1 May 2018, by a majority vote, although they did not submit any candidate of their own.

After that episode, the anger of population increased even more, with Yerevan and the other big cities being paralyzed by protesters. In this situation, which gained unprecedented magnitude and given the presence of over 150,000 people in Republic Square, the Republican Party was forced to accept to support Nikol Pashinyan's candidacy. Thus, on 8 May 2018, Parliament elected him as the new prime minister, with the vote of 59 deputies, 42 voting against.²⁸

Thus began and unfolded the 2018 Armenian Revolution, still known in Armenia under the name of #Merzhir Serzhin, which means #Resignation of Serzh. As evidenced by the abovementioned facts, it consisted of a series of anti-government protests which took place in April and May 2018, organized by various political and civil groups, led by Deputy Nikol Pashinyan, the leader of the Civil Contract Party.

Initially, the protests and marches took place in response to the intention of former President Serzh Sargsyan to extend his power through a mandate as prime minister, and also against the ruling Republican Party. These social-political movements were called the "Velvet Revolution" by their leader, Nikol Pashinyan, because they mirrored the revolts with the same name in two other former Soviet republics, Ukraine and Georgia, which took place in 2004.

Installing the New Democratic Power

THE ELECTION of the opposition leader in the position of prime minister was equivalent only to half a victory of the Armenian revolution, as Nikol Pashinyan's coalition had only 9 seats in Parliament, which did not give him the possibility to promote his political program.

As a result, he had to force the organization of early parliamentary elections, taking advantage of both his immense popularity and the euphoria of the population created by the unprecedented victory against the authoritarian regime of the former ruling Republican Party.

To this end, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan resigned on 16 October 2018. As the National Assembly failed in two attempts, namely on 24 October and on 1 November 2018, President Armen Sargsyan dissolved Parliament and called extraordinary parliamentary elections for 9 December 2018, in order to appoint a new prime minister.

In the early elections, 2,573,779 citizens with voting rights were registered, and the turnout stood at 1,261,105.²⁹

11 political forces, 9 parties and 2 political alliances were registered in the electoral race. Out of those, only 3 managed to cross the 5% electoral threshold and enter the Parliament, as follows:

- My Step Alliance: 884,864 votes (70.42%), 88 seats;
- Prosperous Armenia Party: 103,801 votes (8.26%), 10 seats;
- Bright Armenia Party: 80,047 votes (6.37%), 7 seats.

The former ruling party, the Republican Party, obtained only 59,083 votes, 4.70% respectively, failing to cross the electoral threshold and enter Parliament, which had never happened in its history. The same thing happened to its traditional ally, the ARE, which obtained only 48,816 votes or 3.88%.

According to Art. 96 of the Electoral Code of the Republic of Armenia, 16 and 11 additional seats were granted to the parties Prosperous Armenia and Bright Armenia respectively, in order to fulfill the condition whereby the other parties must hold one third of the House, in case the winning party obtained more than 2/3 of the total number of seats. Thus, at present the Parliament has 132 deputies instead of 105 (including the ones from the minorities), distributed as follows:

- My Step Alliance: 88;
- Prosperous Armenia Party: 26;
- Bright Armenia Party: 18.

The 4 representatives of the minorities were included in the list of the My Step alliance.

On 14 January 2019, President Armen Sargsyan nominated Nikol Pashinyan, the candidate of an absolute parliamentary majority, for the position of prime minister, and on the same day he received the confidence vote of the National Assembly.



Notes

1. Republic of Armenia, Presidential elections, 19 February and 5 March 2003, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, Final Report, Warsaw, 28 April 2003.
2. AMFA (Archive of Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Infogram of the Romanian Embassy in Yerevan, no. 339, 15 May 2003, 1–5.
3. Ibid., no. 344, 22 May 2003, 1–3.
4. Ibid., no. 347, 2 June 2003, 1–2.
5. Ibid., no. 351, 10 June 2003, 1–3.
6. Ibid., no. 357, 18 June 2003, 1.

7. Ibid., no. 361, 24 June 2003, 1–2.
8. Ibid., no. 369, 4 July 2003, 1.
9. Ibid., no. 373, 11 July 2003, 1–2.
10. AMEA, Analysis Report of the Romanian Embassy in Yerevan on internal political developments, no. 349, 17 March 2003, 1–11.
11. Infogram of the Romanian Embassy in Yerevan, no. 500, 2 April 2004, 1–3.
12. Ibid., no. 509, 9 April 2004, 1–2.
13. Ibid., no. 527, 13 April 2004, 1–2.
14. Ibid., no. 531, 15 April 2004, 1–3.
15. Ibid., no. 536, 16 April 2004, 1–2.
16. Ibid., no. 559, 27 April 2004, 1–3.
17. Ibid., no. 560, 29 April 2004, 1–3.
18. Ibid., no. 601, 6 May 2004, 1–2.
19. Ibid., no. 691, 26 May 2004, 1–3.
20. Ibid., no. 768, 7 June 2004, 1–2.
21. Ibid., no. 787, 18 June 2004, 1–2.
22. Ibid., no. 815, 25 June 2004, 1–3.
23. Ibid., no. 819, 30 June 2004, 1–2.
24. www.araratonline.com, accessed 15 December 2019.
25. www.mae.ro, accessed 11 January 2020.
26. www.parliament.am, accessed 17 January 2020.
27. www.bbc.com, accessed 1 May 2018.
28. www.monitorulapararii.ro, accessed 1 October 2019.
29. www.parliament.am, accessed 23 January 2020.

Abstract

Armenia: The Inedited Pages of Recent History (2002–2018)

The ruling elite of Armenia, strongly attached to its Soviet recent past, began the long and difficult transition towards a democratic parliamentary regime. The democratic reforms advanced quite difficultly, as old totalitarian mentalities represented a real obstacle in their path. At the same time, however, a civil society began to develop, and Western democratic values started to permeate Armenia. This process changed the balance of power in society, generating in the early 2000s a strong confrontation between representatives of the neo-communist nomenklatura, on one side, and those of democratic forces and civil society, on the other. The authoritarian regimes of presidents Robert Kocharian and Serzh Sargsyan held Armenia captive until 2018. Former President Sargsyan's latest attempt to extend his power, following Putin's model, by taking over the position of the prime minister, caused a huge wave of discontent. At the head of those social movements was the publicist and politician Nikol Pashinyan, under whose leadership a real "Velvet Revolution" took place in Armenia, which led to the ousting of the Republican Party, to early parliamentary elections and, finally, to a truly democratic political regime, open to reforms and to the modernization of the country.

Keywords


Armenia, Soviet captivity, elections, "Velvet Revolution," democracy, rule of law

Artistic Identity and Hegemony in the Establishment of the Painting School of Cluj

GEORGETA-OLIMPIA
BERA

THE EMERGENCE of recognized talents in the context generated by the Painting School of Cluj has been discussed time and again over the past twenty years, nationally and internationally, and the artists in question have consolidated their reputation with the support of prestigious galleries, museums, biennales, and contemporary art fairs.

The School of Cluj became a local brand further internationalized in different ways and by numerous means, but the debate regarding its name and the people who relied on this terminology still remains present locally and has expanded internationally, among artists, critics, and art institutions, as well as within the academic institution where it started to develop. The situation is clear as long as the representatives of the school of painting constituted within the University of Art and Design of Cluj assimilate parts of the painting tradition they have followed, up to a certain point, or towards which



Art Cities of the Future

21st Century Avant-Gardes

PHAIDON

Georgeta-Olimpia Bera

Senior lecturer at the University of Art and Design of Cluj-Napoca, visual artist and curator.

they have taken a stand in key moments of their professional evolution.¹ The institutional structural paradigm of the Painting School of Cluj is connected both to the private initiatives of valorization and, implicitly, to the relationships between institutions of cultural and artistic education. The aim of this paper is to point out the noteworthy initiatives of the University of Art and Design, as well as those of other entities or cultural movements, viewed as hegemonic structures, together with the hegemony of painting—an autonomous form of expression in contemporary art.

Who Is Represented by the Painting School of Cluj?

WHAT HAS been written about the Painting School of Cluj can be observed in the way artists belonging to different generations, with a professional history fostered in Cluj, have come to be publicized (Aurel Ciupe, Ioan Sbârciu, Florin Maxa, Victor Ciato, Andor Kómíves, Nicolae Man, Ioan Aurel Mureşan, Cornel Brudaşcu, László Bence, Cristian Rusu, Adrian Ghenie, Şerban Savu, Victor Man, Mircea Suciuc, Ciprian Mureşan, Marius Bercea, Oana Fărcaş, and many others²), while participating in major contemporary art events (the Venice Biennale—the 56th edition 2015, the 59th edition 2019, the Prague Biennale—the third edition, in 2007, art fairs—Basel,³ Istanbul⁴), in international exhibitions and acquisitions in prestigious museums (Centre Pompidou,⁵ Tate Modern,⁶ San Francisco Museum of Modern Art,⁷ and others), or in sales records over the last ten years (Adrian Ghenie's success at Sotheby's,⁸ or other artists featured by galleries at important international art fairs). A special role was played by writings or interviews about artists and artistic movements and featured in publications such as *Flash Art*,⁹ *ARTnews*,¹⁰ or *Art Tribune*,¹¹ as part of personal exhibition catalogues, or museums (such as the Cluj-Napoca Art Museum) and art centers, or in the assertion of centers and art galleries, both locally or abroad (Pace Gallery, Thaddaeus Ropac, Blain Southern, David Nolan, Plan B, Art Center Hugo Voeten, Ron Mandos, and others)—as spaces that coordinate and propagate new avant-garde initiatives or reflections of the artistic tendencies of the present (Plan B Gallery in Cluj and in Berlin, The Paintbrush Factory,¹² and many others, which, in turn, host gallery headquarters, art residencies, exhibitions, and the artists' studios). The number of people promoted or self-promoted by such means fluctuates, Cluj becoming, in itself, due to the fame gained over the past ten years, a space for the propagation of the spectacle, of the artistic event, with the assumed role of recognition—and thus legitimization—of some groups of creators, gallerists,

curators, emerged within decision groups regarding the valuation of the artistic production associated with one or the other, as exponents of the School of Cluj. The mechanism is as natural as possible, considering the opening towards multiple possibilities of affirmation, opportunities, and the tendencies to seek profit from artistic success, be it short, medium, or long term. Cluj has been turning into a city of cultural tourism, and visits to the artists' studios paid by experts from Tate Modern or Pompidou have been guided by representatives of institutions with strong influence over the education and artistic training environments, in Cluj or elsewhere. These deciding structures become hegemonic forces, influencing what is perceived and appreciated as being a "product" of the School of Cluj.

Cultural Hegemony

THE PRINCIPLE of cultural hegemony as conceptualized by Antonio Gramsci applies to the construction of mechanisms imposing the hybrid pictorial styles launched into the current artistic world by the fertile ground of the Painting School of Cluj. Several publications characterize the school of painting as a descendance moment of artistic establishment, individual or group. In this sense, the idea of cultural hegemony is associated with the recognition of the influence played by education, together with the institutions of cultural promotion, as determining factors in outlining the artistic profiles (reference is made here to artists, groups, movements, currents, styles).

Universities, crafts, media institutions, museums, among others, are part of the ensemble designating the forms of control over society. In complete agreement with this idea, the Australian sociologist Tony Bennett¹³ described the theory of the exhibitionary complex (museums, galleries, biennales) following Michel Foucault's theories regarding the system of disciplinary institutions which include modern society as well, in the form of a "confining" complex. Also, the exhibition itself became an extension of this principle, where the panopticon imagined by Foucault became the supreme control mechanism, a political instrument which assimilated the current mechanisms "of seeing without being seen," of watching over and guiding the actions in a joint space. In other words, the artistic phenomenon revealed to us is part of a more complex system involved in keeping the interest of the public, confined to the multiplied images of the architecture of the exhibitional space (described by Bennett), which takes the shape of the museum complex (*Exhibitionary apparatuses*¹⁴), respectively it becomes part of a civil society network, to which some hegemonic deciding groups are substi-

tuted. The assumed role of these groups is educational and becomes the driving force of a culture that is about to be “absorbed” into the public space.

Hegemonic Entities Involved in Promoting the Painting School of Cluj

THE REAFFIRMATION of a generation in an academic form, starting with the post-revolutionary period (the '90s), underpins the propagation initiatives of the artistic message coming from the Painting School of Cluj. The Adrian Ghenie “case” became a visible model of success in recognizing his artistic value within different mediums that promote the artistic object. As such, a new perspective regarding the promotion of the school of painting was set in place. With the insertion of the mechanisms of the art market, the training through artistic education started to interfere with the concrete means of exploiting the artistic processes, which inevitably intervened in the evaluation of the individual trajectory in the autonomous domain of painting as well. When the discussion regarding the work of art extends beyond the limits set by the act of creation and education in the artistic domain, where the art “play” occurs on unstable ground in the evolution of the art markets (the art market is not part of the scope of this paper), the phenomenon associated with the School of Cluj could be isolated from the very object of painting, and could lose some of the notoriety built year after year, with the assertion of the younger generations. Let us not forget that the recognition of the artistic merit is directly proportional to the work volume, reflected in the participation in national and international exhibitions, in the affirmation of talents as a contribution to national and global culture. The multiple possibilities of individual or collective achievement emerge with the introduction of modalities of artistic expression, self-imposed in relation with forms of pictorial traditions already known and implicitly covered, within the current image of art.

One such nucleus of forces was manifest before 2007, specifically when Giancarlo Politi addressed the relevance of the Painting School of Cluj and of the schools in Leipzig or Dresden.¹⁵ After the year 2000, with a complex activation of forces, the School set itself to become a first-rank institution of artistic education, creating contexts meant to connect the post-revolutionary cultural life to the global reality in the field. From 2002 until 2009, the “Europa Artium” Autumn Academy was hosted by the University of Art and Design at the initiative of painter and Professor Ioan Sbârciu (rector in 2002), promoter of the school of painting. The event was ample, unique in Romania at that time, and had as a purpose the integration of the city into the larger sphere of contemporary art

centers by drawing the attention upon a center of artistic forms that was in full expansion.¹⁶ A series of such events took place and many prestigious personalities were invited from Romania and from abroad, conferences were organized, as well as symposiums, exhibitions, and workshops, as such manifestations purposefully introduced, after all, a new concept to Romanian education, namely the opening towards different perspectives, curricular models, and approaches to art—in particular, painting. Such an opening involved the recognition and acceptance on behalf of University of Art and Design of visual research directions closely related to contemporary realities.

Important personalities, representatives of national and international culture, were invited, such as: Markus Lüpertz, Jean-Pierre Greff, Dan Hăulică, René Burri, Chris Wainwright, Hans-Peter Schwarz, John Butler, Robert Fleck, Dominique Auerbacher, Hermann Nitsch, Werner Meyer, Walter Smerling, Chantal De Smet, Catherine Millet, or Philip Rylands. Also, a component of this ensemble is represented by the personalities who received the title of Doctor Honoris Causa¹⁷ of the University of Art and Design: Bernard Blistène, Enzo Cucchi, Sabrina Grassi, and others.

The School of Painting of the University of Art and Design of Cluj has been, probably, one of the first such institutions in the former communist bloc to redirect its capacities beyond the role of training young talents. As a result of this opening towards the Western world, the university reassessed its institutional role in the complex network of art structures, starting with the analysis of the triangular relationship, artist–artistic higher education–contemporary art scene (“Europa Artium,” 2004). Likewise, before integrating in its structure a curriculum exclusively based on art theory, it aimed to analyze the artist–curator–gallerist relationship (“Europa Artium,” 2005), the role and the evolution of art in society, the authenticity of the traditional and contemporary media, or the instances of art legitimization and their influence upon artistic production (“Europa Artium,” 2006–2009).¹⁸

Moreover, the university directed its attention towards promoting young talents and outlining a critical perspective on the work of art. Thus, not only did it develop its own platform of artists within the institution, but it also organized projects and exhibitions at the Ataș Gallery, coordinated, starting with the year 2002, by Mihai Pop,¹⁹ a graduate of the Painting Department. He first proved himself as an artist alongside Adrian Ghenie, Victor Man, Cristian Rusu, and others, and he is now recognized as the most important Romanian curator and gallerist; he is the promoter of the independent artistic movements which placed Cluj on the world cultural map; he is, at the same time, commissioner of the Romanian Pavilion at the Venice Biennale (Victor Man, Cristi Pogăcean, Mona Vătămanu & Florin Tudor, *Low-Budget Monuments*, 2007), and curator of the same Pavilion (Adrian Ghenie, *Darwin’s Room*, 2015).²⁰

The Institutional Autonomy and Its Formative Role

IN LINE with the objectives imposed by the school of painting, under the artistic-managerial coordination of the former rector and current president of the University Senate, Professor Ioan Sbârciu, several exhibitions have been organized in collaboration with international artists over the last ten years: Markus Lüpertz, Hermann Nitsch, Enzo Cucchi, with gallerists and prestigious curators, and with personalities associated with this reputed school of painting. These cultural partners promoted an individual vision regarding the artistic phenomenon in Cluj, showcasing it in relation with their own preoccupations, aspects regarding painting styles, local cultural values, creative ideas, or a critical position adopted with respect to the present-day society.

From the perspective of personal artistic assertion, identity is assumed and understood as a sum of different historic periods of the autobiographic course (the communist and post-revolutionary periods marked by regime changes, contributions to the creation of a national conscience, social and economic cohesion, awareness of the accession to the European space, and connection to some global developments within multiple perspectives stemming from the local media, etc.), together with the professional training in different educational institutions, among the most relevant being the artistic education. Such an institution is meant to build bridges with acknowledged artistic styles and currents, with a focus on theoretical study and the assimilation of artistic influences within one's personal cultural development, from a perspective oriented towards the accumulation of experience. The practice of techniques and the development of a personal, critical perspective are important, together with the recognition of aesthetic and useful philosophical concepts, relevant and adaptable to our times. The curricular complexity is founded on the clear structure of the ideas and methods employed in the analysis and synthesis of the information associated with artistic theories, the institution of art aiming to correlate them with the imaginary arsenal of each student. In addition, the university encourages the self-promotion initiatives of young artists (participation to exhibitions, residencies, and contests) or those meant to deepen various specialized concepts, using the academic offer or the human and material resources mediated by partner institutions from abroad (Erasmus+ scholarships). Finally, the University of Art and Design can be seen as an accumulation and reactivation medium for the communication networks among art institutions (academies, prestigious universities, museums, art centers, galleries, etc.), or with various partners coming from other disciplinary areas (scientific and research institutions, private companies from the industrial and technological fields). Numerous examples can be mentioned in this sense; there is an annual project for the promotion of student

performance in partnership with other cultural institutions and private companies, which aims at the public voting on different projects of personal creation.²¹ There are diverse partnerships between the University of Art and Design and other institutions, based on projects, collaborations and sponsorships (providing work spaces for occasional activities or for exhibitions).²²

How the Painting School of Cluj Gets Worldwide Recognition

SPEAKING OF the power mechanisms that influence the artistic environment in Cluj and the frameworks of manifestation in promoting the artistic product and, implicitly, the “construction” of some currents, movements, or established names, reference can be made to a few examples promoted in the public space by art publications and some institutions, sharing the opinions of influencers regarding the Painting School of Cluj. It is important to mention this in regard to the separatist tendencies of the groups formed and coagulated in the same artistic-educational environment, specifically the University of Art and Design. We mention, thus, a tendency to separate and isolate the names of renowned artists, closely related to a specific artistic line, or to an ensemble of themes, which restricts, from a dialectic point of view, the complexity of conceptual directions and artistic approaches of interest for the art school.

An example is the Artsy virtual page (www.artsy.net), a platform for art promotion, which aims to contribute to the expansion of the art market and, in this sense, to promote successful artists. The School is presented through a relevant selection of names, but this is not conclusive enough. The representativeness of these names could become the foundation for a dispute among other successful painters, who could recognize their own work in the cursory, ambiguous description found on this platform, the names mentioned being representative from the perspective of specific galleries:

*A group of painters who coalesced in Cluj-Napoca (the unofficial capital of the historic Transylvania region of Romania) after the 1989 Romanian Revolution. Their style is characterized by the loose application of paint—often with dark, sultry palettes—and the presentation of vignettes illustrating the uncertainty and banality of life after the fall of communism.*²³

The abovementioned statement is of limited accuracy, as it derives from placing the work and the artist close to the moment of the fall of communism in Romania, at any cost, without being aware of the fact that some of these artists were

born as the regime was falling, without having a clear and assumed reference regarding the period of the communist dictatorship of that time. Therefore, the perspective with reference to the “banality of life” reflects a reality not necessarily shared by all the referential artists, rather untouched by the utopia of socialism. In exchange, “a banality of life”—an idea reiterated at another lecture which had as a topic the School of Cluj²⁴—is formulated in such a manner so as to coagulate a so-called movement characterized by everyday scenes, marked by the idea of a consumerist society, by social realism (opposed to socialist realism, on the ruins of which the nostalgic works of Șerban Savu were created), or by a manifest capitalist tint, with strident color infusions (Marius Bercea); these thematic approaches complete—in an ostentatious way—the dark palette in the inherited pictorial traditions, together with the landscape, the static nature, the scenes, and characters of complex compositions, along the lines of Ion Andreescu or Ștefan Luchian’s artistic genre. The examples and the charts²⁵ are numerous and the focus is on the image built around each painter emerged from the Painting School of Cluj. Still, the themes tackled by them are rather integrated in the development of an individual style, with a valid artistic identity, affirmed in more or less isolated groups, but which could be easily identified as being part of the new “wave” of painting already acknowledged internationally.

The school of painting represents “a fertile soil” for the formation of identities, as it is equally prepared to engage in a “fertile” dialogue with established identities of modern and contemporary painting. In this sense, there were numerous frameworks meant to connect the Cluj painting with well-known artistic movements and trends, such as German expressionism, Viennese actionism, abstractionism, and many others, concomitantly launching new means of expression in the formation of painting styles. This was made possible by displaying the artists trained by the School in Cluj alongside names such as R. A. Penk, Arnulf Rainer, Hermann Nitsch, Markus Lüpertz, Antonio Vedova, Kazuo Shiraga, Enzo Cucchi, and many others, in private collections.²⁶ An essential role was played by the painter Ioan Sbârciu, through his collaborative initiatives with institutions of art, in creating exhibition projects, in order to coagulate and coordinate the teams and the groups of artists, who were offered the possibility to engage in a dialogue with internationally successful names in the field. The continuity of Professor Ioan Sbârciu’s pictorial language, prolific in the sense of the significance that could be attributed to him, within each artistic project (the *Don Quijote* cycles, *The Rape of Europe*, *The Cinder Forest*, and others), reveals a work with content perfectly adaptable to the contemporary movement, bearing the visible mark of conceptualism. The expressionist-romantic note is reflected in his work in abstract and figurative notes, in the gestural sensualism which merges the spectacular, immanent effect of color with the nostalgia of a timeless landscape; the ancestral space becoming a fantastic one, foreshadowing

the primordial essence of genesis, under the indispensable effect of light.²⁷ Ioan Sbârciu's painting and the relationship between, on one hand, the pictorial process and, on the other, the traditions, the historical trends, and the series of contemporary manifest-projects²⁸ ensure the continuous assimilation of his work into the current artistic tendencies. This is highlighted even more as the numerous possibilities of artistic self-assertion and the relevance of the educational-artistic process have been emphasized in the development of contemporary artistic discourses.

Reality and Fiction in Artistic Creation: The Hegemony of Painting

THE REFERENCE to the history of painting in Cluj is related to the pictorial tradition, on one hand, but also to a vision closely tied to the cult of personality built around the Ceaușescu family, to which many painters had conformed²⁹ throughout their career. From among them, a good example of contemporary success is the artist Cornel Brudașcu, who has constantly managed to adapt to his time, bringing into his work outstanding elements of Romanian socio-political life, respectively elements particular to the local community of Cluj. In Brudașcu's painting, the so-called repression carried out by the dictatorial regime in Romania was transformed, for those times, into post-modern themes. Not accidentally, what has been written about his art, which was highly mediatized at the Tate of London, namely, that he had deviated from the faded chromatics of socialist realism, innovating the local artistic movement of the School of Cluj in a sort of pop art genre,³⁰ gradually became a success story, built around a work which depended upon a kind of thematic "sensuality" constructed around the masculine sexuality.³¹ A kind of subtleness of details and chromatic association which go hand in hand nowadays with the innovative approaches in painting, with the introduction of the monoprint and of the solarized image, signal a separation from the academic direction outlined in the school of painting where the artist was trained.

"Expanded Painting," the theme of the second Prague Biennale (2005), places Victor Man, a figure originating from the School of Cluj, among the promoters of European painters from different regions of influence. He is compared to Balthus, Cézanne, and Piero della Francesca³² and the artistic profile displays its originality by translating in a tenebrous baroque manner traditional schemes and the atmosphere imposed onto the Romanian art by Ceaușescu's regime. Victor Man, in his imagistic arsenal, calls upon a collective memory genre to which he opposes a committed evasion, inspired by literature, mythology, or

cinematography, with subtle notes of irony on the human condition in general. This “alienation” from the local content of the image marks practically a subversive attitude by surpassing the limits of what the Romanian artistic space represented together with his anonymity in the global artistic context.

In a dialogue published in *Flash Art*, the co-founder of the Prague Art Biennale, Helena Kontova, debates with her colleague, the US editor for *Flash Art*, Nicola Trezzi, the new “frontiers” of contemporary painting, expanding the horizons of this artistic form in related domains, such as video-installation, photography, performance, and others.³³ The School of Cluj is an example of expansion beyond the limits that the painting as a phenomenon can overcome, due to the multiple directions followed by exponential artists in this space, as long as their artistic process can be “enriched” by exceeding a specific type of mentality and the conceptual limits associated with traditions and with prejudices; this is made possible by the connection to an academic network which experienced periods of censorship and was able to connect, in a very short period of time, to the actual artistic reality, succeeding, after all, in reaching a privileged status, which conferred to the image supersaturated by the perfection of the photographic detail, the emergence—and why not—the salvation from the banality of the digitalized mechanisms continuously perfected by the technological evolution.

Following the same line of interest regarding the future of painting, Alison M. Gingeras’ article seeks a solution that aims to salvage and rehabilitate this highly exploited artistic domain, in the era of the mechanical and facile reproduction of the image. “The mnemonic function of the painted image”³⁴ reflects the relevance of painting as a medium of retention of an entire arsenal of images, highly complex, with its own history and autonomy, induced by the ability to order and correlate, by the imaginative and sensorial functions manifested by the artist in his work, in close relation with the individual human nature, with the intimate history, and with the assimilation into the work of art of the elements recognizable from the collective memory.

Also, the painter Albert Oehlen pleads in favor of the liberty of the senses and the autonomy of painting, a phenomenon independent of any other categories: “[The artists] speak about clarity: the more schematic their work becomes, the more they believe that they achieved more clarity. They lead this moment of clarity, this sum of decisions and rejections towards the point they call ‘autonomy,’ although it can be equally called ‘negation’ or ‘negativity.’”³⁵

This way, a revitalization of painting is fulfilled from a continuous new perspective on art in general, at the confluence of traditional media (painting included) and new, experimental media under the auspices of the latest technologies of the digital era.

The Painting School of Cluj represents a relevant example in the assertion of painting as a phenomenon, together with some important names associated with

it, starting with the idea that the educational-artistic media ensure an enlarged framework of knowledge regarding the artistic techniques and the aesthetic and philosophical ideas and principles, which lead, after all, to the much-awaited result—self-knowledge—so necessary in the practice, evaluation, and valorization of art. The hegemony of painting as a phenomenon of artistic expression is propagated into the contemporary visual media, concurrently with other hegemonies, such as the institutional one, be it educational, cultural or economic, becoming thus more poignant and receiving more visibility—as the artistic personality explicitly reclaimed an active role in gaining knowledge of the world in the form of a vivid and unique creative act.



Notes

1. “Cluj: School or Artistic Center,” a round table organized by the Art Museum of Cluj, a debate opportunity among artists, gallerists, professors, and art critics, such as: Teodor Botiș, Victor Ciato, Negoită Lăptoiu, Mihai Pop, Ioan Sbârciu, Călin Stegorean, from among the debated themes one could mention the status of the artists before and after 1989 and the role played by the artistic higher education system in the case of well-known artists trained at the School of Cluj. <https://www.ziarde-cluj.ro/scoala-de-arta-de-la-cluj-intre-nostalgii-dupa-comunism-si-internet>, accessed 17 August 2019.
2. The list of internationally recognized painters is very long, with the inevitable risk of omitting representatives of different generations of alumni of the School, such as Dan Măciucă, Szabolcs Veres, Andrei Cămpan, Aurelian Piroșcă, Cristian Lăpușan, István Kudor Duka, and others. Their names, together with the ones belonging to newer generations, are linked to individual and group participations to different artistic manifestations in the country and abroad. Many of them also carry out their professional activity in educational-artistic systems or in various research groups (doctorate, independent artistic groups, private galleries, etc.).
3. <https://www.artbasel.com/catalog/artist/15670/Adrian-Ghenie>; <https://www.artbasel.com/catalog/artwork/58831/Ciprian-Muresan-Palimpsest-Artforum-April-2008>; <https://www.artbasel.com/catalog/gallery/1426/Galeria-Plan-B>, accessed 7 August 2019.
4. <https://www.artribune.com/dal-mondo/2018/09/fiera-contemporary-istanbul/>, accessed 8 August 2019.
5. The most recent event, The Romania–France Season, 2019, https://www.centre-pompidou.fr/cpv/agenda/event.action?param.id=FR_R-42f02a98aca69d563bd4ef57af7a1a68¶m.idSource=FR_E-42f02a98aca69d563bd4ef57af7a1a68, accessed 17 August 2019.
6. <https://www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tate-modern/exhibition/ey-exhibition-world-goes-pop/artist-interview/cornel-brudascu>, accessed 17 August 2019.

7. <https://www.sfmoma.org/artwork/2014.26/>, accessed 8 September 2019.
8. <https://www.sothebys.com/en/artists/adrian-ghenie?locale=en>, accessed 16 August 2019.
9. <https://flash---art.com/article/serban-savu/>, accessed 16 August 2019.
10. <http://www.artnews.com/?s=romanian+artists&cx=0&cy=0>, accessed 8 September 2019.
11. <https://www.artribune.com/?s=pittura+cluj>, accessed 8 September 2019.
12. The Paintbrush Factory was set as an expositional and artistic production space around Plan B Gallery, with headquarters in Cluj-Napoca and in Berlin, having as protagonists a series of artists who gained international reputation after the year 2000, and their names have been associated with the initiator of this movement, Mihai Pop, founder, visual artist, gallerist, and curator.
13. Tony Bennet, "The Exhibitionary Complex," *New Formations Journal* 4 (1988): 73–102, accessed 18 September 2019, <https://www.lwbooks.co.uk/new-formations/4/the-exhibitionary-complex>; id., "The Exhibitionary Complex," in *Representing the Nation: A Reader: Histories, Heritage and Museums*, eds. David Boswell and Jessica Evans (London–New York: Routledge, 1999), 339.
14. The concept of cultural hegemony was introduced by Antonio Gramsci, with applicability in the work of Oliver Marchart, philosopher and theoretician. The concept developed by Gramsci has been transposed in the form of an ample installation by the architect Alfredo Jaar (*Cella infinita*, Lia Rumma Gallery, Milan, 2004, <http://www.liarumma.it/exhibitions/alfredo-jaar-2004/>, accessed 8 September 2019).
15. The expression belongs to the art critic and founder of *Flash Art*, and co-founder of the Prague Art Biennale. Together with Helena Kontova, Giancarlo Politi devised the program of the biennale held on the territory of former Czechoslovakia, succeeding, in 2007, in organizing an edition which brought together different perspectives of artists from Central Europe and the Balkans, in what was defined to be a multicultural synesthesia, by virtue of destroying an overall globalized culture. "Glocal," as a new concept, refers to this distinction, where the dialectic confrontation takes place between local and universal realities; at the third edition of the biennale, the concept was meant to connect global cultures with territorial artistic movements, the latter representing sequences of what was intended to be perceived as a whole. <https://art-map.com/praguebiennale/exhibition/3rd-prague-biennale-2007-2007>, accessed 16 August 2019. Regarding the Cluj School of Painting, it has already been assimilated to the western vision of higher education institutions in the artistic domain. "There will be a special focus on the 'School of Cluj' in Romania, which, after Leipzig and Dresden, is proving to be a veritable goldmine of contemporary painters," <https://www.e-flux.com/announcements/40450/announcing-the-prague-biennale-3/>, accessed 16 August 2019.
16. http://www.uad.ro/noutati/evenimente/europa_artium/%20index.htm, accessed 17 August 2019.
17. http://www.uad.ro/noutati/evenimente/honoris_causa/, accessed 17 August 2019.
18. http://www.uad.ro/noutati/evenimente/europa_artium/%20index.htm, accessed 17 August 2019.
19. <http://www.humanitas.ro/mihai-pop-ed>, accessed 6 September 2019.

20. <https://www.e-flux.com/announcements/29852/adrian-ghenie-to-represent-romania-at-the-56th-venice-biennale/>, <https://www.modernism.ro/2017/08/10/history-of-romanian-participations-at-venice-biennale/>, accessed 10 August 2019.
21. The Expo Maraton Competition, an annual University of Art and Design project, from 2011 until the present, <http://www.expomaraton.ro/>, accessed 11 August 2019.
22. Examples: exhibitions abroad with partner art institutions: the Art Museum of Cluj, the Romanian Cultural Institute New York, RIVAA Gallery New York, the exhibition *L'art s'invite dans l'industrie*, organized by University of Art and Design at the Energom Company (Gonzales Group) of Cluj-Napoca, with support from the Francophone Business Center; the exhibition marked the debut of the Energom sponsorship project for University of Art and Design and consisted in offering a venue for students and professors from the Painting Department. <https://ro.ambafrance.org/Inaugurarea-expozi%C8%9Biei-de-arta-intitulata-Arta-se-invita-in-industrie>, accessed 11 August 2019.
23. <https://www.artsy.net/gene/cluj-school>, accessed 18 August 2019.
24. Introduction to the conference with the title “Between Melancholy and the Art Market: A Short History of an Immense Success: ‘The Painting School’ of Cluj” attended by the art historian and curator Horea Avram, at Gateway Art Center New York, Columbia Gallery, with the support of the Romanian Cultural Institute in New York: “Beyond the market and institutional success, the artists of the group of Cluj recommend and legitimate themselves through their authentic artistic value, their conceptual solidity, to their aesthetic suppleness and visual force of their works. The works of the most rally around a kind of magic realism referring to melancholy, memory, politics or the trivial everyday life,” <https://www.icr.ro/pagini/de-la-cluj>, accessed 19 August 2019.
25. <http://www.modernedition.com/art-articles/romanian-art/contemporary-art-romania.html>, accessed 8 September 2019.
26. Group exhibitions were organized in partnership with IAGA Contemporary Art Gallery in Cluj, Zero Gallery in Milan, the Museum of Art in Cluj, the Bistrița-Năsăud Museum Complex: *Il movimento delle cose & Times and Genesis* (2017), catalogue for two collective exhibitions at the Museum of Art in Cluj (2016), published by IAGA Contemporary Art, with works of the artists Carla Accardi, Sam Francis, Emilio Scanavino, Ioan Sbârciu, Victor Vasarely, Emilio Vedova, Penck, Bruno Munari, Arnulf Rainer, Keith Haring, Dadamaino, Gino De Dominicis, Kazuo Shiraga, Manfredo Massironi, César Baldaccini (*Il movimento delle cose*), respectively Liu Bolin, Angela Corti, Franco Fontana, Alexandra Mureșan, Sabina Elena Dragomir, Francesco Arecco, Giorgio Tentolini, Silvia Inselvini, Marcello De Angelis, Maurizio Galimberti, Gabriela Elena David, Mihai Vrabies, Mimmo Iacopino, Marcello Gobbi, Nicola Vinci (*Times and Genesis*). *Sottobosco (Ioan Sbârciu & Enzo Cucchi, special guest: Markus Lüpertz)*, catalogue for the *Sottobosco* exhibition, 2018, multimedia, the Museum of Art Cluj-Napoca, exhibitional trilogy, curator Antonello Tolve; artists: Ioan Sbârciu, Enzo Cucchi (“The Trembling of the Forest and of the Wind”), Georgeta-Olimpia Bera, István Kudor Duka, Cristian Lăpușan, Anca Bodea Mureșan, Andrea Salvino (“On the Reddish Background of the Sky”), Veronica Bisesti, Botond Gagyi, Dario Carratta, Giovanni de Cataldo, Luca Grechi, Mihai

- Guleș, Andrei Ispas, Tincuța Marin, Alexandra Mureșan, Oana Năstăsache, Emma Păvăloaia, Jacopo Pinelli, Lucian Popăilă, Marcel Rusu, Andrei Scifos (“In the Clear Freshness of the Morning”); *17 Reasons* (2018), collective exhibition of the University of Art and Design Cluj professors at the Museum of Art in Cluj and *Portrait from Memory* (2018), collective exhibition at the Bistrița-Năsăud Museum Complex, with works from IAGA Contemporary Art collection (Ioan Sbârciu, Emilio Vedova, Markus Lüpertz, Hermann Nitsch, Mimmo Paladino and others). *Semni (di) Segni: Ioan Sbârciu in Dialogue with Masters of Modern Art* (Alighiero Boetti, Arnulf Rainer, Hermann Nitsch, Emilio Scanavino, A. R. Penck, Bruno Munari, Emilio Vedova, and César), IAGA Gallery, Cluj-Napoca.
27. In exhibitions such as: *The Labyrinth Landscape* (2017), Sector 1 Gallery, Bucharest (curator Mihai Pop); *Illato Lumine* (2017), Fondazione Menna, Rome (curators Antonello Tolve and Olimpia Bera), *Transylvanian Lights* (2015), Hugo Voeten Art Center, Herentals (Belgium); *The Cinder Forest* (2013), the Art Museum, Cluj-Napoca.
 28. Group exhibitions, which explore selected works of different generations of artists coming from the School of Cluj, such as: *The Wanderers* (2017), collective exhibition, curator Maria Rus Bojan, Richard Taittinger Gallery New York, with different generations of artists coming from the School of Cluj: Cornel Brudașcu (1937), Ioan Sbârciu (1948), Victor Răcățău (1967), Aurelian Piroșcă (1973), Marius Bercea (1979), Oana Fărcaș (1981), Alin Bozbiciu (1989), Robert Fekete (1987), and Sergiu Toma (1987), <https://www.artrabbit.com/events/the-wanderers-contemporary-painting-from-cluj>, last accessed 7 September 2019, *Con-front East* (2017), a collective exhibition, RIVAA Gallery New York, artists: Ioan Sbârciu, Ioana Olăhuț, Andrei Ciurdărescu, Anca Bodea, Olimpia Bera, Cristian Lăpușan, István Kudor Duka.
 29. <http://divus.cc/praha/en/article/not-that-painting-the-other-one>, accessed 7 September 2019.
 30. <https://www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tate-modern/exhibition/ey-exhibition-world-goes-pop/artist-interview/cornel-brudascu>, accessed 3 September 2019.
 31. <https://www.calvertjournal.com/features/show/9720/being-lgbtq-cornel-brudascu>, accessed 3 September 2019.
 32. <https://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/man-untitled-connaissiez-vous-des-esseintes-t14776>, accessed 7 September 2019.
 33. “Expanded Painting, according to the idea that we present at the Prague Biennale, is not painting that steps necessarily out from the canvas, but is painting at 360 degrees. Any artwork that has pictorial qualities is expanded painting for us. It can be a photograph, an installation, a video. It is anything that uses painting or pictorial means . . . there are many very interesting artists today who use painting in very traditional ways, as many as important artists from the past (Gerhard Richter, Marcel Broodthaers), and you could even exchange their work with an old master or with historical modernist work. Very good examples of this tendency are painters from the Dresden school or from Cluj, who have had good academic training in terms of painting history and tradition. We thought this kind of painting was particularly appropriate to be shown in the Prague Biennale, because of the active academic paint-

- ing tradition in that part of the world, which has been connected for a long time with the constrictions of the communist regime, but has become revitalized by contemporary culture.” <https://flash---art.com/article/hestekur/>, accessed 28 August 2019.
34. “Once threatened by the advent of photomechanical devices, painting has struggled against slipping into irrelevancy, in the same way that human beings grapple with the possibility of being forgotten. Yet since the contemporary viewer has become so saturated with camera-made images, hyperrealistic forms such as photography and film have become banal and ineffective. Painting has regained a privileged status. The medium’s tactility, uniqueness, mythology and inherent ambiguities has allowed painting to become an open-ended vehicle for both artist and viewer to evoke personal recollections, to embody collective experience and reflect upon its own history in the age of mechanical reproduction.” <https://www.saatchigallery.com/art/essays.htm>, accessed 28 August 2019.
35. “They talk about clarity: the more schematic their work becomes, the more clarity they think they’ve gained. I direct this moment of clarity, this subtotal of decisions and rejections, toward the point I call ‘autonomy,’ though you could also call it ‘negation’ or ‘negativity.’” Fragment from the interview with the artist Albert Oehlen, published in *Artforum* (1994), created by Diedrich Diedrichsen, <https://farticulate.wordpress.com/2010/11/08/8-november-2010-albert-oehlen-selected-paintings-interview/>, accessed 8 September 2019.

Abstract

Artistic Identity and Hegemony in the Establishment of the Painting School of Cluj

The present article discusses the evolution and the recognition of the School of Painting established after the year 2000 within the University of Art and Design in Cluj-Napoca, with an activity involving both private initiatives and the relations between cultural and artistic educational institutions. It also highlights the various developments occurred inside and outside the university, namely cultural initiatives involving museums, private galleries, art portals, biennales and art fairs, teams of curators, and art historians, which continuously brought their contribution to the establishment and recognition of this school of painting, quite unique in Eastern Europe. Generations of painters asserted themselves in the framework of Cluj artistic higher education, their names being recognized internationally on the art market, in private museum collections, or in the great galleries of the world. Their success, on the one hand, maintained the reputation of this school of painting, and on the other, generated a gradual construction, based on concrete institutional actions, which outlined some acknowledged directions in contemporary art. Cultural hegemony is generally applied to the construction of the mechanisms that contribute to the formation of the hybrid pictorial styles required by the Cluj School of Painting. From this perspective, the hegemony of art education significantly determines the formation of a series of recognizable artistic profiles. Besides, painting as a phenomenon becomes an ever complex entity, constantly reinventing itself and living its own history in the digitalized era of mechanical re-production.

Keywords

contemporary painting, art galleries, museums, higher education, art institution, university of art, Romanian painters, cultural hegemony, art fair, artistic education

BOOK REVIEWS

MIHAI DRAGNEA

Misiune și cruciadă în teritoriul vendilor (secolul al XII-lea)

(Missione e crociata nel territorio dei vendi, secolo XII)

Prefazione di ADRIAN IONIȚĂ

Ed. Etnologică, București 2019

RELABORAZIONE DI una tesi di dottorato preparata, sotto la guida del professor Șerban Papacostea, presso l'Istituto di Storia "Nicolae Iorga" dell'Accademia Romana, il libro affronta il tema delle crociate in un contesto decisamente diverso dai Luoghi santi: i nemici non sono, in questo caso, musulmani, ma slavi pagani dell'Europa centro-settentrionale, conosciuti sotto il nome collettivo di vendi.¹ Così, nel medioevo, i tedeschi chiamavano tutti i popoli slavi stanziati tra l'Oder, l'Havel, la Sprea, l'Elba, la Saale e l'Erzgebirge: dai polabi e dagli obodriti del Basso Elba e della costa baltica ai sorabi della Saale e dell'Elba superiore, senza dimenticare gli sloveni della Germania sud-orientale.²

Il titolo, *Missione e crociata nel territorio dei vendi (secolo XII)*, mette a fuoco lo sforzo profuso dal potere religioso e da quello civile al fine di integrare quelle popolazioni nella cristianità latina. Tale processo comincia all'epoca di Ottone I (936-973), quando molti capitribù si convertono, divenendo tributari dei margravi e dei duchi sassoni. Già alla fine del X secolo, tuttavia, insofferenti nei riguardi della nobiltà tedesca, i vendi si ribellano, rinnegando in massa il cristianesimo. I centri ecclesiastici sorti a

est dell'Elba sono allora abbandonati. Gli ultimi esponenti della dinastia ottoniana, impegnati a consolidare le proprie posizioni di fronte a polacchi e ungheresi, rinviando il recupero dei territori perduti. È solo nel XII secolo che l'attività missionaria riprende con forza. In seguito all'appello di Bernardo di Chiaravalle per una seconda crociata in Terrasanta, tedeschi e danesi aprono un fronte parallelo nella regione baltica, con l'obiettivo di sottomettere gli slavi pagani (1147). Mentre la spedizione in Oriente va incontro al fallimento, quella in Europa registra un successo duraturo: i territori conquistati sono integrati appieno nel mondo cristiano.

Il libro si articola in cinque capitoli. Il primo è dedicato allo stato attuale della ricerca e alle fonti, tra le quali spiccano la *Chronica Slavorum* di Elmoldo di Bosau – la più importante per lo studio dei rapporti tra sassoni e vendi³ – e la *Gesta Danorum* di Sassone Grammatico, in cui sono narrate le campagne militari dei danesi contro i popoli slavi. La bibliografia di riferimento è dominata dal saggio di Friedrich Lotter sulla crociata del 1147 contro i vendi e dal volume, ormai classico, di Eric Christiansen, *Le crociate del Nord* (1980).⁴

Il secondo capitolo è incentrato sulle costruzioni identitarie nell'area baltica. Dragnea disquisisce sull'origine dei vendi e presenta le informazioni riguardanti quei popoli nei testi latini medievali; si interroga poi sulla loro lingua e sull'esistenza di una loro identità specifica in seno al mondo slavo; studia quindi le forme di governo e le confederazioni di tribù sorte tra l'Elba e l'Oder. Particolarmente interessante il

quinto paragrafo, in cui l'autore sottolinea l'influenza delle alleanze matrimoniali sui rapporti di potere tra i vendi e la nobiltà sassone e scandinava.

Il capitolo terzo ricostruisce l'attività missionaria nello spazio vendico: dalle prime azioni individuali, intraprese da prelati tedeschi, alla fondazione di importanti centri ecclesiastici – in primo luogo Magdeburgo – a partire dai quali coordinare l'evangelizzazione degli slavi. All'interno di questa cornice, Dragnea mette in risalto alcune figure chiave nella cristianizzazione della Germania orientale: Adalberto arcivescovo di Magdeburgo, Boso vescovo di Merseburgo, Adalberto arcivescovo di Amburgo e Brema.

Argomento del quarto capitolo sono i tentativi di conversione dei vendi nel XII secolo, sia da parte del clero diocesano sia da parte degli ordini monastici, nel caso specifico i premonstratensi e i cistercensi. «Pionieri della colonizzazione e dell'attività missionaria» (p. 157), questi accolgono gli immigrati cristiani che affluiscono da ovest, alla ricerca di nuove terre. Lo stanziamento di coloni a est dell'Elba, insieme con l'adozione della lingua tedesca e della religione cattolica da parte delle élite vendiche, danno avvio a un graduale processo di germanizzazione della popolazione slava, protrattosi fino alla fine del XVI secolo.

Come ha scritto Henryk Samsonowicz, «assicurarsi posizioni in un nuovo territorio era nell'interesse della Chiesa, dei principi e delle numerose comunità urbane orientate verso i commerci lontani [...]. La colonizzazione tedesca, che portava con sé il cosiddetto diritto germanico, fondato sulla rendita monetaria e sull'autogestione territoriale, era d'altronde incoraggiata anche dai sovrani slavi e persino lituani, perché produceva vantaggi materiali e mi-

gliorava l'economia rurale, malgrado i conflitti culturali, linguistici e politici che suscitava».⁵

L'ultimo capitolo è incentrato sull'apparizione dell'idea di crociata come atto di vendetta divina. In particolare, Dragnea analizza il ruolo svolto da Bernardo di Chiaravalle nella giustificazione della crociata contro i vendi, «colpevoli» di avere rinnegato la fede cristiana. «A connettere gli interessi dei sassoni alla retorica teologica della crociata in Terrasanta è stato Bernardo di Chiaravalle», scrive l'autore. «La sua posizione ha portato a un cambiamento nella retorica della crociata e ha fatto sì che una serie di conflitti militari generati da interessi diversi fossero condotti in nome di Cristo» (p. 189).

Il volume, corredato di numerose carte, è sorretto da un'ampia bibliografia in tedesco, inglese, romeno, polacco, francese e ceco.



MARCO CASSIOLI

Note

1. Sulle differenze che rendono originale l'esperienza della crociata nell'Europa centro-settentrionale rispetto a quella in Terrasanta si veda l'articolo di Claudio Carpinì, *La Crociata senza Terrasanta. Nota preliminare per una ricerca sulla Crociata nel Baltico*, «Res Balticae», 9 (2003), pp. 179-193.
2. Michel Mourre, *Dizionario Mondadori di storia universale*, Mondadori, Verona 1973, vol. II, p. 1239, voce «Vendi».
3. Piero Bugiani, *Elmoldo di Bosau, gli Slavi e il Baltico*, «Res Balticae», 11 (2007), pp. 111-126.
4. Friedrich Lotter, *Die Konzeption des Wendenkreuzzugs. Ideengeschichtliche, kirchenrechtliche und historisch-politische Voraussetzungen der Missionierung von Elb- und Ostseeslawen*

um die Mitte des 12. Jahrhunderts, Thorbecke, Sigmaringen 1977; Eric Christiansen, *Le crociate del Nord. Il Baltico e la frontiera cattolica (1100-1525)*, il Mulino, Bologna 2016 (prima edizione inglese: *The Northern Crusades: The Baltic and the Catholic Frontier 1100-1525*, Macmillan, London 1980).

5. Henryk Samsonowicz, *I Cavalieri Teutonici*, Giunti, Firenze 1987, pp. 16, 28. Cfr. Friedrich Lotter, *The Crusading Idea and the Conquest of the Region East of the Elbe*, in *Medieval Frontier Societies*, a cura di Robert Bartlett e Angus MacKay, Clarendon, Oxford 1992, pp. 267-306, in particolare p. 304.

MARIA VAIDA

The Great Union in Western Transylvania

Foreword by IOAN-AUREL POP,
preface by MIRCEA POPA, translated by

CAMELIA SIGHIARTĂU

Cluj-Napoca: Școala Ardeleană, 2019

THIS YEAR marks the passage of one hundred years since the powers of the Triple Entente and Hungary signed the Treaty of Trianon, a document that sanctioned the new political realities on the European map which resulted from the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The dissolution of the dual monarchy was not only the outcome of the First World War and the Paris peace negotiations, but especially the effect of the political embodiment of the will of most nations inhabiting this region of Central and Eastern Europe. This book presents an important episode in this historical process, which unfolded between 1918 and 1919 in today's western Romania, more exactly in the western part of Transylvania, in Crișana or Țara Crișurilor, which makes up the county of Bihor. The book appeared in its Roma-

nian version in 2018 and was translated into English by philologist and authorized translator Camelia Sighiartău.

Maria Vaida, a historian and literary critic, poet and writer, doctor of Philology of 1 Decembrie 1918 University of Alba Iulia, born near Beiuș, is a diligent wielder of the pen who has not forgotten her roots, nor the people who broadened the horizon of Romanian culture for her. Following the example of her teachers and of history aficionados, although not a historian herself, in spite of possessing a bachelor's degree in history since before 1989, Maria Vaida drew up this work after a thorough documentary research, having mastered the specialized methodology and employing a critical apparatus fit for a genuine historical monograph.

Reading through the pages of this volume, one discovers an author who does not seek to create literature, nor to mislead, but who knows how to carefully put together testimonies from that time like a professional historian, thus managing to reconstruct the past based on her sources and using truth as her working criterion. It is these very merits that Professor Ioan-Aurel Pop highlights in his cordial foreword addressed to the reader, in which he pays homage to Maria Vaida and, through her, to all the people of Bihor who fostered a new Romania, praisingly deeming the book "not only a history lesson, but also a life lesson" (p. 8). The words of the president of the Romanian Academy are followed by a preface by literary historian and critic Professor Mircea Popa, president of the Cluj branch of the ASTRA cultural association. Himself a native of Țara Crișurilor, Professor Popa provides us with a veritable introduction into the history of the Romanian national movement in Transylvania in general and in Bihor in

particular, dwelling on the presentation of *Tribuna Bihorului* (The Bihor Tribune), the official newspaper of the Romanian National Council of Oradea, which is today a regrettably little-known organ of the Romanian press in Crişana at the time of the Great Union. Thus, these two introductory texts underline the publicistic, historiographic and sentimental importance of the work signed by Maria Vaida.

In the argumentation, as well as in “My Beiuş,” the author confesses to having written this book with her mind and heart out of an inner drive to bring back to the attention of her contemporaries the epic events of 1918–1919 and to commemorate the heroes and all the personalities from Bihor who participated in the Great Union of 1918.

The volume is divided into eight chapters, followed by conclusions and annexes—which comprise documents, maps, and photographs—, as well as a bibliography. The first chapter, “The People from Bihor at the Great Union” tackles the organization of the elections for the Great National Assembly of Alba Iulia in the Bihor area and lists the names of the rightful, elected, and alternate members grouped according to the 12 electoral circles in Bihor: Oradea, Salonta, Ceica, Beiuş-Vaşcău, Tinca, Aleşd, Marghita, Ugra, Biharia, Berettyóújfalú, Bărand-Paleu, and Săcuieni. This general presentation is followed by the book’s longest chapter, which comprises the biographical medallions of 111 participants from Bihor (official and unofficial delegates) in the Great National Assembly of Alba Iulia—no easy feat, given the diversity and scarcity of available sources. This observation is otherwise reflected by the length of the biographical texts, which range from 3–4 lines to 3–4 pages. The third chapter, which complements the pre-

vious ones, is especially dedicated to “the Romanian women performing the Great Union.” The 61 delegates of the fair sex elected and empowered via mandate who represented the various Associations of Romanian Women from all over Transylvania at the Assembly of Alba Iulia are listed by name. Moreover, the women who wove flags and displayed national insignia in the villages of Bihor are evoked as well, as the author puts together nine biographical medallions of the Romanian ladies who stood out among the members of the Alba Iulia assembly: Elena Ardelean, Eleonora Lemeni-Rozvan, Ersilia Petrovici, Roza Şerban, Elena Munteanu, Sidonia Docan, Elena Căpâlneanu, Viora Ciordaş, and Veturia Lapedatu. Distinct sub-chapters are dedicated to Queen Marie, to the Romanian women of Beiuş, and to Romanian folk costumes in the Beiuş area.

Chapter IV is dedicated to the Romanian heroes and martyrs imprisoned and brutally killed before and after the union, namely the Memorandists, as well as to the massacres of Aleşd, Sighiştel, Beiuş, Târgu-Lăpuş, Vaşcău, Drăgăneşti, and other places in Transylvania. In chapter V, “Reflections of the Great Union in Several Literary Works,” a series of poems, songs, soldering songs, excerpts from the press of the time and from two novels (*Sacrificiul/The sacrifice* signed by Mihail Diaconescu and *Joiă Patimilor/Maundy Thursday* signed by Horia Bădescu) are reproduced and analyzed, thus providing today’s readers with the possibility to gain a deeper understanding of the effervescent mood that dominated the year of the Great Union. Titled “From the Porches of the Faith,” chapter VI evokes several episodes from the history of Bihor’s Romanian Church and schools, naturally focusing on the contribution of these two fundamental insti-

tutions of the Romanians in Transylvania—which were intimately and closely connected to each other until 1920—to the accomplishment of the 1918 union. Finally, chapter VII presents a few “Echoes of the Great Union” by selecting a series of texts signed by several illustrious figures of the time such as Sir Arthur Nicolson, Vasile Goldiș, Alexandru Boieriu, Basiliu Bașiotă, King Ferdinand I, Nicolae Iorga, Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, and Vasile Stoica, who organized the National League of Romanians in the United States of America. The author’s text is accompanied by photographs of the Bihor participants in the Great Union, by the mandates, and by pictures of certain historical monuments dedicated to Transylvania and the 1918 union.

Through her book *The Great Union in Western Transylvania*, Maria Vaida redeems an important page in the history of the Romanians of Bihor of the year 1918, thus rescuing from oblivion the figures of those who forged Greater Romania within the blessed region of Țara Crișurilor. Thoroughly researched and written in an accessible language which reveals a love for the truth and for the Romanian nation, Maria Vaida’s book also possesses pedagogical, national and sentimental value, as it is both a model of Romanian thinking and feeling on the occasion of the centenary of the Great Union and, more than anything else, a plea to get to know the history of the Romanians, thus cultivating the memory of those who sacrificed themselves for the national cause during the years of the First World War (1914–1919). The publication of the book in its English version offers a wider, international public the chance to access pertinent information regarding the events that took place

in Transylvania at the end of the year 1918 and their protagonists, thus providing the opportunity to become better acquainted with Romanian history.

□

MIRCEA-GHEORGHE ABRUDAN

A l’Est, la guerre sans fin 1918-1923

Sous la rédaction de FRANÇOIS LAGRANGE,

CHRISTOPHE BERTRAND, CARINE LACHÈVRE,

EMMANUEL RANVOISY

Paris, Gallimard ; Musée de l’Armée, 2018

CERTAINES OBSERVATIONS sur le catalogue de l’exposition sont nécessaires pour offrir aux lecteurs du texte sur la Roumanie, signé par Roman Krakovsky, la possibilité de se former une image correcte sur les événements de 1918-1923.

Le texte commence avec une erreur. L’auteur croit que le Royaume de Roumanie a été créé en 1866 : c’est faux ; depuis 1866, quand Charles de Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen est arrivé dans les Principautés Unies, il a dirigé les affaires du pays, qui était dépendant de la Porte ottomane, en tant que prince régnant, jusqu’à 1881, quand la Roumanie indépendante (1877-1878) est déclarée royaume et Charles devient roi.

Comment l’auteur sait-il que les Roumains, avant 1914, n’étaient pas intéressés à intégrer le Royaume de Roumanie – c’est, peut-être, à l’aide d’une Machine à lires les pensées, aux dires d’André Maurois – et qu’ils s’intéressaient seulement à élargir leur autonomie ? D’abord, les Roumains n’avaient aucune autonomie politique en Hongrie et en Russie. Affirmer le contraire, c’est faire preuve d’ignorance concernant les structures internes de la Hongrie dua-

liste, quant à la Russie, cela ne vaut même pas la peine d'en parler. Les projets comme celui de Aurel C. Popovici sont des pis-aller, pas des solutions définitives.

Une erreur élémentaire nous attend plus loin : à en croire l'auteur, la Roumanie serait rentrée dans la Grande Guerre le 31 octobre 1918 ; la Roumanie a repris les armes le 10 novembre 1918. Le 9 novembre le Gouvernement roumain avait adressé un ultimatum au Commandement des Armées allemandes de Bucarest, en demandant le retrait des troupes dans les 24 heures, et le 10 novembre la Roumanie a déclaré la guerre à l'Allemagne. Sans la présence de l'Armée Alliée du Danube, commandée par le général Henri Mathias Berthelot, qui franchissait le Danube le 9 novembre, la rentrée en guerre aurait été très dangereuse.

Le 18 octobre 1918, c'est dans le Parlement de Budapest, et non pas à Oradea, que le député Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, du Parti National Roumain, a présenté la déclaration des Roumains de séparation de la Hongrie sur la base du droit à l'auto-détermination, qui avait été rédigée à Oradea.

Les armées roumaines sont entrées en Transylvanie en conformité avec les décisions prises à Belgrade (le 13 novembre), pour occuper la ligne de démarcation entre les armées roumaines et hongroises, établie par la Convention militaire signée par le gouvernement hongrois et le général Louis Franchet d'Esperey, le commandant des Armées Alliées d'Orient. Il ne pouvait pas y avoir de « résistance majeure ». Il n'y a pas eu de résistance du tout !

L'affirmation que la Roumanie se serait présentée à Versailles « comme vainqueur » est inexacte ; elle a été considérée comme « puissance redevenue alliée » et n'avait pas à la Conférence de la Paix une place à côté

des Grands vainqueurs. Elle faisait partie du groupe des Petites Puissances.

Aussi, en Transylvanie ce ne furent pas « les organisations roumaines de Transylvanie » qui votèrent pour l'union avec le Royaume de Roumanie, mais une Assemblée nationale de tous les Roumains de Hongrie, réunie le 1^{er} décembre 1918 à Alba Iulia.

Passons des erreurs aux affirmations fausses et tendancieuses : « À Versailles la Roumanie obtient de l'Empire austro-hongrois des territoires peuplés de Hongrois. » Qui ne connaît pas ces territoires, comme l'auteur de ce texte, peut s'imaginer qu'il n'y avait que des Hongrois dans les parages et que la Roumanie aurait accaparé des territoires où il n'y avait pas de Roumains.

La Roumanie ne pouvait pas « obtenir » des territoires de l'Empire austro-hongrois, qui n'existait plus, car la Conférence de la Paix ne distribuait pas des territoires ; elle n'a fait qu'entériner les décisions de l'Assemblée nationale de Transylvanie, ce que l'auteur avait mentionné quelques lignes plus haut. Ces territoires étaient habités par les Roumains en majorité, d'après le recensement hongrois de 1910.

Il suit, à la fin du texte, la plus étonnante énormité : « Après un coup d'État du roi Ferdinand en 1920, la monarchie constitutionnelle prend un virage plus conservateur, autoritaire et nationaliste, le rejet des réformes sociales, l'antisémitisme et l'antimagyarisme encourageant les conflits sociaux et ethniques. »

Cette phrase est aberrante et tendancieuse parce que :

1. Le Roi Ferdinand n'a jamais fait de coup d'État, ne s'est pas prêté à en organiser.

2. L'État roumain n'est pas devenu « plus conservateur et nationaliste » ; la

Roumanie a voté une Constitution avancée pour cette époque-là, garantissant à tous les citoyens tous les droits civiques, toutes les libertés d'un pays démocratique. L'État roumain a légiféré le suffrage universel pour hommes, la liberté religieuse, d'association, d'expression, la naturalisation de Juifs. Après 1919, l'État n'a pas entravé les activités économiques, politiques et religieuses des minorités. L'État entretenait les écoles où l'enseignement se faisait en langues minoritaires. « Instead, therefore, of seeking to Romanize them, [the minorities], Romania has adopted the wiser, and certainly more successful policy encouraging their own national cultures, since the gains they may record are solely at the expense of the Magyars. Her purely cultural policy towards those nationalities has been very liberal » (C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences 1919-1937*, London-New York-Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1937, p. 285-287, apud *Romanian Minority Policy and the 1918 Alba Iulia Resolution*, dir. Larry Watts et Vladimir Ionaș, București, Roundtable on Ethnic Relations, 2019, p. 81).

3. L'État roumain a fait une réforme agraire radicale : toutes les grandes propriétés ont été soumises à l'expropriation, sans distinction nationale, et tous les paysans de toutes les nationalités ont reçu de la terre, sans discrimination aucune.

4. L'État roumain n'a pas encouragé l'antisémitisme et l'antimagyarisme. Les Hongrois avaient inondé de pétitions la Société des Nations. À cet égard, Erik Colban, le directeur de la Section des minorités de la Société des Nations (1920-1927) déclarait en 1924 : « I had been able to verify that the petitions were in many points exaggerated and even in some points gave quite

false impression. My feeling was that the general tendency of the policy of the Romanian Government towards its minorities was much better than I had expected [...] in general my impressions were much more favorable than I had dared to hope when basing myself only on the documentation I had had before arriving in Romania » (Giuseppe Motta, *Less Than Nations: Central-Eastern European Minorities after WWI*, vol. 1, Newcastle upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholars, 2013, p. 186, apud *Romanian Minority Policy and the 1918 Alba Iulia Resolution*, *op. cit.*, p. 29). Économiquement, les Allemands, les Hongrois et les Juifs de Roumanie avaient toutes les voies ouvertes (Archive de la Société des Nations, Genève, 41/30120, Rapport signé Erik Colban, 1923, apud Gheorghe Iancu, *Le Problème des minorités de la Roumanie dans les documents de la Société des Nations (1923-1932)*, Cluj-Napoca, Argonaut, 2002, p. 65-139). Concernant la loi roumaine de l'enseignement (1924) adoptée par le Parlement roumain, le Mémoire préparé par la Section des minorités de la Société des Nations constate que « un certain nombre de modifications peuvent être considérées comme de véritables concessions aux intérêts des minorités, quoique strictement elles ne puissent pas être considérées comme étant envisagées dans le but de mettre d'accord le texte de la loi et le texte du Traité des minorités » (*ibid.*, p. 304-305). Politiquement, il y avait un Parti Magyar dans le pays, qui avait des représentants dans le Parlement. Les organisations juives ont fait des alliances électorales avec le Parti National Libéral (1927) et le Parti National Paysan (1928) et ont eu des députés et des sénateurs dans le Parlement (Carol Iancu, « Evreii din România interbelică, 1919-1940 », in *Trecutul prezent. Evreii din România : istorie, memo-*

rie, *reprezentare*, sous la direction de Anca Filipovici et Attila Gidó, Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Institutului pentru Studierea Problemelor Minorităților Naționale, 2018, p. 68). En 1930 un Parti juif a été créé dans le royaume (*ibid.*). Le gouvernement n'a pas « encouragé » les conflits sociaux et ethniques.

5. L'État n'est donc pas responsable de la montée ultérieure des formations d'extrême-droite en Roumanie.

La Roumanie n'a pas « oublié » les engagements pris à Versailles, même si tout n'a pas été fait. Les experts de la Société des Nations l'ont constaté sur le terrain. La Roumanie a collaboré avec la Société des Nations pour trouver des solutions aux problèmes des minorités.

Concernant l'enseignement, par exemple, Lord Cecil, le président du Comité des trois de la Société des Nations, qui a examiné les pétitions des Hongrois, déclarait, le 18 mars 1926 : « Mes collègues du Comité du Conseil, qui a examiné la question de la Roumanie sur l'enseignement privé, m'ont prié d'exprimer en leur nom leur appréciation de l'utile concours qui a été apporté par le représentant de la Roumanie, M. Comnène.

Le Comité reconnaît que le gouvernement roumain n'a épargné aucun effort

pour mettre à la disposition du Comité tous les renseignements nécessaires en vue d'une étude approfondie de la question et il désire en remercier le gouvernement roumain. Dans une question très difficile, le gouvernement roumain a manifesté le désir le plus sincère et le plus louable de satisfaire à ce que demandent la justice et l'humanité » (Société des Nations, *Journal Officiel*, 1926, p. 741-742, apud Silviu Dragomir, *La Transylvanie roumaine et ses minorités ethniques*, Bucarest, Imprimerie Nationale, 1934, p. 174-177).

« I believe I ought to send a word to M. Duca, in order to express my personal gratification at the action taken by his government in this matter » (Azcarate, Report Geneva, 1 August 1924, apud Iancu, *Le Problème des minorités ethniques de la Roumanie*, *op. cit.*, p. 297). « Il ne semble plus possible de trouver dans le texte de cet article tel qu'il a été adopté par la Chambre, une contradiction avec les stipulations du Traité des minorités » (Iancu, *Le Problème des minorités ethniques de la Roumanie*, *op. cit.*, p. 303).

□

GEORGE CIPĂIANU
ANA-MARIA STAN

CONTRIBUTORS

MIRCEA-GHEORGHE ABRUDAN, Ph.D.

Researcher at George Barițiu Institute of History,
Romanian Academy
12–14 Kogălniceanu St., Cluj-Napoca
400084, Romania
Email: mirceapadre@yahoo.com

IOSIF MARIN BALOG, Ph.D.

Senior researcher at George Barițiu Institute
of History, Romanian Academy
12–14 Kogălniceanu St., Cluj-Napoca 400084,
Romania
Email: iosif_balog@yahoo.de

GEORGETA-OLIMPIA BERA

Senior lecturer at the University of Art and Design,
visual artist and curator
31 Unirii Square, Cluj-Napoca 400098, Romania
Email: olimpialazar@yahoo.com

MARCO CASSIOLI, Ph.D.

Associate researcher, TELEMME Laboratory,
University of Aix-Marseille
5 Rue Chatâneau de l'Horloge, Aix-en-Provence
13090, France
Email: marcocassio@libero.it

DORIN CIMPOEȘU, Ph.D.

Associate professor at the Faculty of Archivistics,
Alexandru Ioan Cuza Academy
1–3 Aleea Privighetorilor, Bucharest 014031,
Romania
Email: dorin.cimpoesu@dhmprint.ro

GEORGE CIPĂIANU, Ph.D.

Emeritus professor, Faculty of History
and Philosophy, Babeș-Bolyai University
11 Napoca St., Cluj-Napoca 40088, Romania
Email: cipaianug@yahoo.com

TITUS CORLĂȚEAN, J.D.

Associate professor at the Faculty of Legal and
Administrative Sciences, Dimitrie Cantemir
Christian University
176 Splaiul Unirii, Bucharest 040042, Romania
Email: titus.corlatean@psd.ro

IOAN LUMPERDEAN, Ph.D.

Professor at the Faculty of Economics and Business
Administration of Babeș-Bolyai University
58–60 T. Mihali St., Cluj-Napoca 4000591, Romania
Email: ioan.lumperdean@econ.ubbcluj.ro

FERENC PÁLL-SZABÓ, Ph.D.

Researcher at the Center for Transylvanian Studies,
Romanian Academy, postdoctoral fellow at Babeș-
Bolyai University
12–14 Kogălniceanu St., Cluj-Napoca 400084, Romania
Email: pallszabo.ferenc@ubbcluj.ro

ALEXANDRU PĂCURAR, Ph.D.

Associate professor at the Faculty of Geography,
Department of Human Geography and Tourism,
Babeș-Bolyai University
5–7 Clinicilor St., Cluj-Napoca 400006, Romania
Email: alexandru.pacurar@ubbcluj.ro

IOAN-AUREL POP, Ph.D.

Chairman of the Romanian Academy,
professor at Babeș-Bolyai University
125 Calea Victoriei, Bucharest 010071, Romania
Email: ioanleruapop@gmail.com

ALEXANDRU PORȚEANU, Ph.D.

Former university professor from Bucharest,
historian, founding president of the Association
of Former Refugees (AFOR)
Email: alexandruporteanu@gmail.com

KURT SCHARR, Ph.D.

Professor at Leopold Franzens University
52 Innrain St., Innsbruck 6020, Austria
Email: kurt.scharr@uibk.ac.at

ANA-MARIA STAN, Ph.D.

Senior researcher, Museum of Babeș-Bolyai
University History
4 Kogălniceanu St., Cluj-Napoca 40088, Romania
Email: ana.stan@ubbcluj.ro

CLAUDIA TĂRNĂUCEANU, Ph.D.

Associate professor at the Faculty of Letters,
Alexandru Ioan Cuza University
11 Carol I Blvd., Iași 700506, Romania
Email: claudia.tarnauceanu@gmail.com