“Let no one imagine that if Albania is small, if the Albanian Labor Party is a small party, it must do as someone dictates to it, when it is convinced that this someone is wrong.”

Mihai Croitor

On 4 June 1954, Nikita S. Khrushchev addressed a letter to the communist and workers’ parties in which he announced his intention to normalize relations with the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY).¹ The letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) must have surprised decision-makers in Tirana in an unpleasant way. However, given Albania’s economic dependence on the Soviet Union, on 21 June 1954, the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania (PLA) agreed to the Kremlin’s actions.² Of course, Moscow’s positive attitude towards Yugoslavia and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) deeply displeased Enver Hoxha, given that the Soviet–Yugoslav split of 1948 had given the Albanian leader the opportunity to purge the pro-Yugoslav PLA group led by Koçi Xoxe.

In May–June 1955, after an extensive exchange of letters, a Soviet delegation led by Nikita S. Khrushchev
visited the FPRY, marking the abandonment of the Stalinist view promoted within the Cominform since 1948. The decision of the Soviet leader to visit Yugoslavia further disappointed the Albanian side. In addition, on 23 May 1955, Khrushchev addressed a letter to the communist and workers’ parties proposing the annulment of the resolution on Yugoslavia adopted by Cominform members in November 1949. Initially, Albanian decision-makers expressed reservations about the proposal of the Central Committee of the CPSU, stressing that such a decision could only be adopted after an extensive debate within Cominform. But the Albanian opposition manifested itself only behind closed doors, and at the end of May 1955, in a speech to the People’s Assembly of the People’s Republic of Albania (PRA), Enver Hoxha publicly approved the steps initiated by the Soviets towards Yugoslavia. Subsequently, on 24 June 1955, the Albanian communists sent the Kremlin a second reply to the letter of 23 May 1955, this time agreeing with the Soviet stance towards Yugoslavia. Regarding the first negative answer, the Albanian side justified its stance by the “subjectivity” resulting from Yugoslavia’s hostile activity towards the PRA. The Albanian letter of 24 June 1955 also stated: “We also apologize once again to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for our grave mistake and promise that we will make no more mistakes in this matter.” Moreover, on 18 July 1955, a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the PLA was convened during which the Soviet letter of 25 June 1955 was discussed (the letter in question detailed the course of Soviet-Yugoslav negotiations). According to Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu, the plenary unanimously approved the results of the Soviet delegation’s visit to Yugoslavia. Also, at the 3rd Congress of the PLA in May 1956, Enver Hoxha praised the Soviet efforts aimed at normalizing relations with Yugoslavia.

On 6–11 January 1956, a conference of communist and workers’ parties of socialist states was convened in Moscow to discuss economic and foreign policy issues. In his speech on 7 January 1956, Enver Hoxha spoke of the need for other socialist countries to provide economic aid to Albania, again agreeing with the Kremlin’s foreign policy (including normalizing relations with Yugoslavia). Only a month later, the 20th Congress of the CPSU was convened. At a secret meeting on 25 February 1956, Nikita S. Khrushchev delivered his famous speech condemning Stalin’s abuses (including the cult of personality). The Soviet leader’s secret report was viewed with skepticism by the communist leaders in Central and Eastern Europe, as Stalinist epigones feared being purged on the orders of the Kremlin. However, none of them dared criticize the new stance promoted by the Kremlin, publicly expressing their agreement with the decisions adopted at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. In his ideologically contaminated memoirs, Enver Hoxha argues that although Soviet attempts to
normalize relations with Yugoslavia had strained relations between Tirana and Moscow, the Soviet–Albanian split began with the 20th Congress of the CPSU. Thus, referring to the secret report delivered by Khrushchev on 25 February 1956, the Albanian leader pointed out the following:

> After we had read it we immediately returned the terrible report to its owners. We had no need for that package of filthy accusations which Khrushchev had concocted. . . . We returned to Albania heart-broken over what we had seen and heard in the homeland of Lenin and Stalin, but at the same time we returned with a great lesson that we must be more vigilant and more alert towards the activities and stands of Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites. Only a few days later the black smoke of the ideas of the 20th Congress began to spread everywhere.13

However, the statements of the Albanian leader are false. In reality, in 1956, Enver Hoxha had done the same as the other communist leaders in Central and Eastern Europe, publicly supporting the decisions adopted at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. For instance, in November 1957, during the meeting of the communist and workers’ parties in Moscow, Enver Hoxha stated the following:

> The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a shining example; it fought heroically and creatively against the mistakes in its work, especially against the mistakes committed in the last period of Stalin’s life. And we have learned and will always learn from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.14

Between 14 and 19 April 1956, a conference was held in Tirana during which several communist leaders criticized the PLA’s political line. While on vacation, Hoxha urgently returned to the capital, succeeding through some skillful maneuvers to isolate the leaders who had challenged his authority.15 In his memoirs, the Albanian leader identified two culprits for his difficulties in April 1956: Khrushchev, who had instigated the revolt, and Josip Broz Tito, who had masterminded the plot. According to Hoxha:

> The attempt to attack the leadership of our Party at the Tirana Conference in April 1956, an attempt which failed, was the work of Belgrade revisionists but, at the same time, it was also the work of Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites. With their revisionist theses and ideas, the latter were the inspirers of the plot, while the Titoites and their secret agents were the organizers.16

Still, the stance adopted by the Albanian leader in 1956 was diametrically opposed. Thus, on 21 April 1956, in a letter addressed to party organizations,
Hoxha considered that the main instigators for the developments that characterized the Tirana conference were “anti-party elements” within the PLA.\(^{17}\)

In terms of the relations between the People’s Republic of Albania and Yugoslavia, the first half of 1956 brought no change. But the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution would cause a deterioration in relations between the CPSU and the LCY, with the two sides beginning an extensive exchange of letters regarding the Yugoslav request that Imre Nagy and his collaborators be allowed to leave for the FPRY.\(^{18}\) The strained relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia must have been well received in Tirana. For now, however, Hoxha refrained from taking his own stance on the Yugoslav attitude towards the Hungarian Revolution. Thus, the political line adopted by the Albanians was one of ideological conformity. To the disappointment of the leaders in Tirana, Soviet–Yugoslav negotiations were held in Romania in August 1957, at the end of which a joint document was drafted stipulating the unity of opinions of the two sides regarding the international situation.\(^{19}\)

The difficulties encountered by the Soviets in Hungary and Poland in 1956 convinced the Kremlin leader of the need to adopt a Declaration of the communist and workers’ parties. Therefore, on 16–19 November 1957, an International meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties was held in Moscow, the purpose of which was to reaffirm the ideological primacy of the Kremlin, seriously affected by the Hungarian Revolution. At the end of the meeting, a Declaration of Communist and Workers’ Parties of Socialist Countries was to be adopted, containing the principles of the international communist movement, so that events similar to those of 1956 would never occur. In fact, CPSU leaders drew up a draft Declaration to be debated at the conference. To Moscow’s surprise, the leaders of the Communist Party of China (CPC) opposed the draft Declaration, stressing that only the peaceful path of transition from capitalism to socialism was mentioned.\(^{20}\) Therefore, a joint Sino–Soviet draft of the Declaration was prepared, which included the non-peaceful path of transition from capitalism to socialism. As for Enver Hoxha, he fully agreed with the joint Sino–Soviet draft Declaration, adding the following:

We also fully agree with Comrade Mao Zedong who said that the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, not only saved us, liberated us, not only defends us, but also has a huge historical revolutionary experience, as well as the experience of building socialism, experience by which we must be guided. The enemies of socialism are trying to cut us off from the Soviet Union, so that we remain, as our people say, like fish out of water. But that’s never going to happen.\(^{21}\)
To Albanian satisfaction, 1958 would witness a further strain on Soviet–Yugoslav relations. Thus, the Kremlin condemned, through letters addressed to the Yugoslavs, the ideological misconceptions promoted by Belgrade in the Program of the 7th Congress of the LCY. Therefore, all communist and workers’ parties from the socialist states, at Moscow’s request, condemned “Yugoslav revisionism.” At the beginning of 1959, present in Moscow at the 21st Congress of the CPSU, Hoxha showed his total obedience to Moscow. Thus, at this congress, the Albanian leader stated the following:

The Albanian people and the Party of Labor of Albania have delegated us, their representatives at this congress, to express to you, dear comrades, from this high rostrum and through you to the Communist Party and its Central Committee, the Soviet people and its government, our deepest gratitude for all they have done and are doing for the good and happiness of the small Albanian people. The freedom and national independence of the Albanian people, their happy life today and their bright future are due, in large part, to the brother Soviet people and the dear Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In all they gave the Albanian people help and support, with all the nobility of their great hearts.

In May 1959, a delegation of the Central Committee of the CPSU visited Albania. In their memoirs, Nikita S. Khrushchev and Enver Hoxha mention the Kremlin’s request that the Albanian hosts refrain from publicly condemning the LCY during the visit. The authorities in Tirana accepted Moscow’s request, during the visit the Albanian press refraining from publishing polemical articles. The joint declaration, signed on 30 May 1959, stipulated unity of opinion on the international situation. Although the joint statement condemned revisionism, it made no direct reference to the LCY. Moreover, the two parties indicated their intention to develop relations with the FPRY. If in his memoirs, Khrushchev describes the visit to Albania as a pleasant one, the discussions being conducted in a friendly atmosphere, Hoxha, in his memoirs, described the visit as an unpleasant one, marked by disagreements between the two sides regarding the economic policies pursued by the PLA.

In February 1960, while in Moscow, Hoxha was informed by Anastas I. Mikoyan about the increasing intensity of Sino–Soviet dissensions. The Albanian leader called for a meeting between representatives of the CPSU and the CPC aimed at resolving differences between the two sides. Subsequently, relations between the CPSU and the CPC became significantly strained. In April 1960, Beijing published the booklet Long Live Leninism on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of Lenin’s birth. Although it did not directly name the Soviets, it
promoted ideological views contrary to those promoted by the CPSU on issues such as the aggressive nature of “imperialism,” “the main characteristic of the contemporary period,” the paths of transition from capitalism to socialism, or the doctrine of peaceful coexistence. Moreover, the 11th session of the General Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions, held on 5–9 June 1960 in Beijing, would witness the ideological dissensions between the CPSU and the CPC. Interestingly, the Albanians considered the Chinese attitude during the meetings in Beijing to be unjust, a sign that in early June 1960 the PLA leadership had not adopted a final decision on the Sino–Soviet differences.

The deterioration of Sino–Soviet relations determined the leaders of the CPSU to send, on 2 June 1960, a letter to the communist and workers’ parties of the socialist states during which they advocated for a conference on the international situation arising from the failure of the Paris summit. The Kremlin also proposed the adoption of a joint declaration of the communist and workers’ parties, adding that the conference could be held in Bucharest, where the Third Congress of the Romanian Workers’ Party was scheduled to take place in June 1960. Decision-makers in Beijing refused to participate in such a conference, citing the untimely nature of the convocation. Therefore, on 7 June 1960, in a new letter addressed to the communist and workers’ parties of the socialist states, Moscow, stressing that some parties had decided to postpone the conference, added that this did not exclude the exchange of views in Bucharest, without any decision being taken.

Therefore, at the request of the Soviets, between 24 and 26 June 1960, the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers’ Parties was organized in Bucharest. On the eve of the meeting, the Kremlin disseminated among the participants a comprehensive note on the Sino–Soviet ideological differences. The Soviet note of 21 June 1960 condemned the Chinese ideological views on issues such as “the main characteristic of the contemporary period,” the problems of war and peace, the paths of transition from capitalism to socialism, or the doctrine of peaceful coexistence. The Bucharest Conference saw the plenary manifestation of the Sino–Soviet differences, with most communist and workers’ parties rallying behind the ideological visions promoted by the Kremlin. However, the communist and workers’ parties of North Korea, Vietnam and Albania adopted a stance of neutrality. In his memoirs, Enver Hoxha claims that he had anticipated that Sino–Soviet differences would be discussed in Bucharest and therefore he had preferred to send Hysni Kapo as a PLA representative. Given its dependence on Soviet economic aid, the stance adopted by Albania during the Bucharest conference was incomprehensible to Khrushchev. In his memoirs, the Soviet leader claims that Hysni Kapo
spoke openly in favor of China. Nevertheless, the statement of Khrushchev is untrue. During the debates at the Bucharest conference, Kapo expressed his regret regarding the Sino–Soviet differences, calling for their resolution through bilateral talks.

After the Bucharest Conference, on 9 August 1960, the Central Committee of the CPSU invited Hoxha and other PLA leaders to spend their vacation in the Soviet Union. Albanian communist leaders refused to comply with the Soviet invitation, stressing that preparations for the 4th Congress of the PLA required their presence in the country. Also, on 13 August 1960, the Central Committee of the CPSU addressed a letter to the Albanian communist leaders, during which they called for bilateral meetings to discuss Soviet–Albanian differences. The response of the decision-makers in Tirana was negative, claiming that the planned Soviet–Albanian negotiations were aimed at condemning the CPC, which would represent a violation of Marxist-Leninist norms. Moreover, on 27 August 1960, the Central Committee of the PLA addressed a letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Central Committee of the CPC during which it emphasized that the conference in Bucharest had been premature and inconsistent with Leninist norms. According to the Albanians, the Sino–Soviet differences should have been discussed in bilateral meetings between the CPSU and the CPC. If these meetings failed, only then could the Sino–Soviet differences be discussed in a conference of the communist and workers’ parties.

Therefore, between July and August 1960, the stance of the PRA changed from neutrality to an obviously pro-Chinese one.

In November 1960 an International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties was held in Moscow. In October 1960 a drafting commission was created (consisting of representatives of 26 communist and workers’ parties) to debate the draft Declaration prepared by the Central Committee of the CPSU. During the 6 October 1960 meeting, the Albanian representative, Hysni Kapo, rallied behind the Chinese ideological views, arguing that the accusation in the draft declaration that the CPC had denied the possibility of peaceful coexistence was wrong. The November 1960 Conference marked a resurgence of Sino–Soviet differences. As already mentioned, in June 1960 the Central Committee of the CPSU had disseminated among the participants in the Bucharest Conference a comprehensive note on the Sino–Soviet dissensions. On 10 September 1960, the Central Committee of the CPC distributed among the communist and workers’ parties from the socialist states its response to the Soviet note of 21 June 1960. In this tense context, on 5 November 1960, during the Moscow Conference, the Central Committee of the CPSU disseminated among the participants its response to the Chinese letter of 10 September 1960. The vast majority of delegations of communist and workers parties present in Moscow
supported the ideological views of the letter of the CPSU, while representatives of Indonesia, Burma, Vietnam, and North Korea adhered to the stance promoted by the CPC and the PLA.

On 12 November 1960 negotiations were held between the delegations of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the delegation of the Central Committee of the PLA, but they failed due to the refusal of the Albanian communist leaders to discuss the differences between the two sides. On 16 November 1960 Enver Hoxha delivered an extensive speech to the Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties. From the very beginning, the Albanian leader sent a message to Khrushchev:

*Let no one imagine that if Albania is small, if the Albanian Labor Party is a small party, it must do as someone dictates to it, when it is convinced that this someone is wrong.*

Referring to the Bucharest Conference of June 1960, Hoxha accused the Soviets of having requested the delegations of the communist and workers’ parties present in Bucharest to condemn the CPC. The Albanian leader also claimed that, after the Bucharest Conference, Albania had asked the Soviets for 50,000 tons of grain, but Moscow had agreed to supply only 10,000 tons. According to Hoxha:

*Once, Comrade Khrushchev used to tell us: “Don’t worry about the bread, what you consume in a year, the rats eat here.” Thus, the rats in the Soviet Union could eat, but the Albanian people could starve until the leadership of the Party of Labor of Albania submitted to the will of the Soviet leadership.*

Addressing the Yugoslav question, Hoxha criticized the annulment of the November 1949 Cominform decision, considering Khrushchev’s policy towards Yugoslavia to be wrong. The Albanian leader would also criticize the secret report delivered by Khrushchev on 25 February 1956 at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. According to Hoxha, Stalin should be considered a “glorious Marxist.”

After the speech delivered by the Albanian leader, representatives of the communist and workers’ parties from Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia criticized the stance adopted by Enver Hoxha and Deng Xiaoping. In this context, on 24 November 1960, the representatives of the PLA disseminated among the delegations of the communist and workers parties a statement expressing their regret for the anti-Albanian stance adopted by some participants during the conference.

Following Enver Hoxha’s speech, the Central Committee of the CPSU distributed a note on the main issues raised by the PLA leader. According to the Soviets,
the Bucharest Conference had been organized with the unanimous consent of
the participants, and within it representatives of the communist and workers par-
ties had freely expressed their opinion and reached “unanimous conclusions.”56
Regarding the Yugoslav question, the Soviet note emphasized that since 1954
Albania had agreed with all policies adopted by the Central Committee of the
cpsu towards the LCy.57 Referring to the Albanian leader’s statement that Stalin
should be considered a “glorious Marxist,” the Soviet note stated that in 1957,
at the Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties, Hoxha had congratulated
the Central Committee of the cpsu for exposing Stalin’s mistakes.58
If in November 1960 the Soviet–Albanian dissensions were disseminated
among the communist and workers’ parties, 1961 would witness the total split
between the two sides. Thus, on 20 January 1961 the Soviet government de-
cided to withdraw the Soviet specialists from the Albanian oil industry within
7–10 days.59 In February 1961, the 4th Congress of the pla was convened in
the presence of 24 foreign delegations. The authorities in Tirana emphasized
that the pla’s political line was Marxist-Leninist, in line with the Declaration of
the Communist and Workers’ Parties of 1960. In fact, the Albanian communist
leaders would take credit for having contributed decisively to the drafting of this
Declaration, stressing that the draft Declaration drawn up by the Central Com-
mittee of the cpsu was a non-Marxist one.60
Also in 1961, major disagreements between the two sides arose regarding
the military base at the Bay of Vlorë. Thus, on 27 March 1961, Andrey
Antonovich Grechko, supreme commander of the Unified Armed Forces of
the Warsaw Treaty Organization, wrote a letter to Beqir Balluku, minister of
Defense of the pra, during which he discussed a series of incidents between
Soviet and Albanian soldiers at the Vlorë naval base. The Soviet official stated
the following:

The facts prove that lately, contrary to these statements, an intolerable situation
has been created in Albania, to our regret, in terms of the attitude towards Soviet
soldiers, Soviet specialists and their families. This situation is, in our opinion, a
consequence of the line taken by some officials in Albania in order to strain rela-
tions with the Soviet Union.61

In order to de-escalate the situation, the Soviet marshal proposed that all war-
ships from the Bay of Vlorë be served exclusively by Soviet military personnel. If
the Albanian side refused the Soviet proposal, all warships would be withdrawn
from the Bay of Vlorë.62 On 28 March 1961, Beqir Balluku responded to the
Soviet letter of 27 March 1961, rejecting the accusations that Albanians had
shown a hostile attitude towards the Soviet military.63 Regarding the possibil-
ity of withdrawing the Soviet warships and military personnel from the Bay of Vlorë, Beqir Balluku stressed that this would have meant a violation of agreements between the two sides and an attack on the sovereignty of the PRA.64

As a result of this exchange of letters, on 29 March 1961 the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) adopted the decision that the military ships in the Bay of Vlorë should be served by the Soviet military under the command of the Unified Soviet Command, subordinate to the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.65 If the Albanian side refused to implement the decision of the PCC, the Soviet military forces would be withdrawn from their base.66 On 5 April 1961, Mehmet Shehu addressed a letter to the PCC in which he emphasized:

If the Soviet government does not agree to observe existing agreements about the Vlorë naval base and decides to remove its military forces from that base in accordance with the abovementioned decision of the Political Consultative Committee, the government of the People’s Republic of Albania—although it opposes such a decision—will not interfere and will be prepared to render assistance to the Soviet Union in evacuating its naval forces from the Vlorë naval base.67

On 26 April 1961, the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) responded to the Albanian letter of 5 April 1961. Regarding the naval base at Vlorë, the Soviet government announced its intention to withdraw the Soviet military personnel and their equipment. According to the Soviet letter:

In view of the fact that the Albanian Government has adopted a negative attitude towards the decision of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the Soviet Government is regretfully forced to withdraw all submarines, surface ships, auxiliary ships and other means of combat deployed at the naval military base at Vlorë.68

On 27 April 1961, in a letter addressed to the Soviet military in the PRA, the Central Committee of the CPSU mentioned the differences between Tirana and Moscow, informing them of the decision to withdraw the Soviet troops and equipment.69 In the note of the USSR embassy in Tirana of 3 June 1961, the Soviets accused the Albanians of refusing to participate in negotiations on how to evacuate the Soviet troops from the Vlorë naval base.70 Moreover, the Soviets accused the Albanians of piracy. Thus, the Soviet note of 3 June 1961 stated the following:
A proof in this regard is also the fact that, so far, only a part of the Soviet maritime military forces and equipment has been evacuated from Vlorë, and 4 submarines, the floating dock Nemchinov, 10 small surface ships, 22 auxiliary ships and a considerable amount of weapons, equipment, materials and other items have been seized by the Albanian side. The Albanian government did all this despite the fact that in its letter in response to the decision of the Political Consultative Committee it promised to assist in the evacuation of Soviet naval military forces and equipment from Vlorë.71

On 6 July 1961, the Council of Ministers of the pra responded to the Soviet letter of 26 April 1961. According to the Albanian authorities, in accordance with the agreements concluded with the USSR on 12 September 1957 and 3 May 1959, the military equipment from the Vlorë naval base had become the property of the Albanian state.72 Meanwhile, between 3 and 5 August 1961, a conference of representatives of the member states of the WTO was convened in Moscow. Although the other states were represented by delegations led by first secretaries, Albania decided to send a delegation consisting of Ramiz Alia, a member of the Politburo of the PLA, and Behar Shtylla, foreign minister of the pra. At the meeting of 3 August 1961, Walter Ulbricht proposed sending a letter to the Albanian side stressing the need to send a delegation at an appropriate level. The first secretary of the Socialist Unity Party also informed the Albanian delegation that it could not attend the conference. Despite protests from the representative of the People’s Republic of China, the Albanian delegation was forced to leave Moscow the following day.73 On 14 September 1961, the Albanian government drafted a note protesting against discriminatory acts by the governments of the member states of the WTO, accusing them of not allowing Albanian representatives to attend the meetings of the organization.74

On 17 October 1961, at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev publicly condemned the Albanian ideological heresy.75 A few days later, on 20 October 1961, Albanian communist leaders circulated a statement accusing the Soviet leader of violating the principles of the Moscow Declaration, according to which differences between communist and workers parties should be addressed “in the spirit of proletarian internationalism.”76 Finally, in December 1961 the USSR broke diplomatic relations with the pra.

Thus, the PLA’s stance towards the CPSU evolved from ideological conformity (1955–1960) to neutrality (June–August 1960), while starting with August 1960 the Albanian communist leaders adopted an openly pro-Chinese stance, engaging in a polemic with the CPSU.
Notes

1. Romanian National Historical Archives (ANIC), Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party (CC of RCP), Foreign Relations, file 76/1960, fol. 140.
5. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 76/1960, fol. 81.
7. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 76/1960, fol. 84.
9. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 76/1960, fol. 84.
10. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 76/1960, fol. 118.
14. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 76/1960, fol. 86.
19. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 9U, fol. 175.
23. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 76/1960, fol. 70.
25. Hoxha, 370.
32. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 33/1960, fols. 3–68.
33. Hoxha, 392–393.
34. Khrushchev, 522.
36. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 76/1960, fol. 72.
37. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 76/1960, fols. 72–73.
38. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 76/1960, fol. 72.
41. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 33/1960, fols. 3–68.
42. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 8C/1960, fols. 3–96.
43. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 72/1960, fols. 1–85.
44. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 76/1960, fols. 118–134.
45. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 76/1960, fol. 10.
46. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 76/1960, fol. 21.
47. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 76/1960, fol. 31.
49. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 23/1956, fols. 64–122.
50. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 76/1960, fol. 54.
52. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 80/1960, fols. 119–133.
53. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 80/1960, fols. 156–166.
55. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 76/1960, fols. 61–63.
57. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 76/1960, fols. 80–84.
60. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Chancellery, File 81/1961, fols. 1–2.
68. ANIC, CC of the RCP, Foreign Relations, file 11U/1961, fol. 120.
Abstract
Soviet–Albanian Political and Diplomatic Relations (1955–1961)

The normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1955 was viewed with suspicion in Tirana. Dependent on Soviet economic aid, Albania publicly endorsed the new Soviet foreign policy, maintaining the line of ideological conformity. The secret report delivered by Nikita S. Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union worried decision-makers in Tirana. But again, Enver Hoxha did not protest, publicly supporting the decisions adopted during this congress. The emergence of Sino–Soviet differences during the June 1960 Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties led to a change in Albania’s stance within the international communist movement. Thus, unlike the other communist and workers’ parties, the Party of Labor of Albania adopted a stance of neutrality towards the Sino–Soviet polemic. Starting with August 1960, Albanian communists openly supported the stance of the Communist Party of China.

Keywords
Marxism-Leninism, Nikita S. Khrushchev, Enver Hoxha, Party of Labor of Albania, Communist Party of the Soviet Union